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Abstract 
 This study examines the relationship between state-level attributes and 
employment outcomes of US inbound Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). In 
particular, I investigate how investment-promotion policies influence the 
employment of workers in the US by foreign-owned manufacturing firms (FDI-
related employment, hereafter). As discussed in the first two dissertation chapters, 
there are critical shortcomings and gaps in the existing literature. My research 
addresses these gaps. In so doing, the implications are of interest to researchers and 
policy makers regarding the strategic use of business incentives to promote US 
employment. 
 Chapter 3 analyzes the effectiveness of US investment-promotion policies 
aimed at attracting FDI. It begins by reviewing four principal business incentives 
offered by state governments: favorable corporate income taxation, non-tax financial 
support, the provision of Foreign-Trade Zones (FTZs), and the establishment of trade 
offices abroad. Using data from 50 states between 1999 and 2008, I employ a two-
way fixed effects panel data framework and a dynamic system GMM approach to 
address the dynamic features of employment outcomes. I also correct for potential 
measurement errors and potential endogeneity of policy variables. The results 
suggest that state business incentives such as providing more FTZs (both general-
purpose and subzones), spending more on public services even with higher corporate 
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income taxes, and holding overseas offices in particular countries, have statistically 
significant effects on FDI-related employment in the US.  
 Chapter 4 builds on Chapter 3 by exploring the potential heterogeneous 
response to state investment-promotion policies. Because state-level FDI-related 
employment does not follow a normal distribution, the conditional mean effects 
generated by standard least squares estimates may be unreliable. Accordingly, I 
employ a simultaneous quantile regression approach to reveal the relative importance 
of each policy at various locations of the employment distribution. I empirically 
investigate the employment by foreign-owned manufacturing firms aggregated to the 
state level for 50 US states between 1997 and 2008. The results suggest that the 
estimated effects of a better transport infrastructure, the provision of FTZs, the count 
of offices abroad and the selection of office-host countries, vary significantly across 
the FDI-related employment distribution. Therefore, unequal employment benefits of 
attracting FDI could be expected between states, as well as more interest in FDI for 
some states than for others.  
 Chapter 5 introduces a third line of inquiry that draws from industrial 
organization. It offers a novel application of FDI location choices within the context 
of a dynamic market structure. The recent development in empirical studies of firm 
entry/exit behavior fully takes advantage of the aggregate-level information. For 
instance, Pakes, Ostrovsky and Berry (POB, 2007) model the number of firms as 
endogenous because it is determined by firms’ entry/exit decisions. Given that firms’ 
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choices of entry/exit depend upon their continuation value and entry value, the key 
step is to estimate the incumbents’ (potential entrants’) perceived transition 
probabilities across states of the market. This methodology provides a framework for 
analyzing how state-level attributes (particularly business incentives) affect foreign 
firms’ entry costs and fixed costs, and further impact foreign firms’ entry/exit 
decisions in the US. I outline in this proposal how to apply the POB (2007) 
methodology to the study of FDI location choice decisions within the US retail 
industry.  
 
 
 
 1 
 
Chapter 1: 
 Foreign Direct Investment in the United States: Facts and 
Literature 
 
1.1. World-wide Operations by Multinational Enterprises 
 The International Labor Organization (ILO) has defined Multinational 
Enterprises (MNEs) as corporations that “(w)hether they are of public, mixed or 
private ownership, own or control production, distribution, services or other facilities 
outside the country in which they are based”.1 As economic globalization takes hold, 
more and more firms are now using foreign countries or regions to finance, produce 
and diversify. MNEs have made substantial contribution in providing jobs, 
enhancing workers’ compensation, bringing new research and innovation, and 
stimulating output in both Home and Host countries. Take U.S. owned MNEs for 
example. In 2007, parent enterprises of US-owned MNEs (hereafter referred to 
simply as U.S. Parents) accounted for 19.1 percent of total private-sector payroll 
employment, i.e. 22 million U.S. workers. The average wage per-worker paid by 
U.S. Parents was $63,272, 18.7 percent higher than the rest of the private sector. 
Total output produced by U.S. Parents was equal to 24.3 percent of all private-sector 
                                                 
1
 Cite source: Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational 
Enterprises and Social Policy, ILO, DOCUMENT:(OB Vol. LXI, 1978, Series A, 
No. 1) DOCNO:28197701. 
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output. On the other hand, foreign affiliates of U.S. owned MNEs employed 10 
million workers and produced totally $1.1 trillion output all over the world.
2
    
 Associated with the global expansion of MNEs is a remarkable development 
of worldwide Foreign Direct Investment (FDI, hereafter) activity. FDI is a measure 
of foreign participation into a country’s domestic economic activity. As Figure 1.1 
and Figure 1.2 show, world-wide FDI inflows, measured by both absolute value and 
the share of Gross World Product (GWP), increased steadily during the last decade 
of 20
th
 century and the years 2002 to 2007.
3
 World FDI inflows peaked in the year of 
2000 with $1519.4 billion investment flows and 4.8% of the current GWP. It 
dropped since 2001 and slipped down to its bottom since 1997 with $643.1 billion 
investment volume and 1.7% of the GWP in 2003. But, since then, it began to 
increase exponentially until 2007, when FDI inflow reached its summit with a value 
of $2322.9 billion. During the recent Economic Crisis in 2008, FDI declined but still 
with a large volume of $1823.3 billion and a share over GWP of 3.1%.  Figure 1.3 
indicates that in the 1990s, global FDI inflows increased annually by around 29.6 
percent (24.7 percent for the share of FDI over GWP) and this average annual 
                                                 
2
 Data source: Matthew J. Slaughter, 2010, “Data update to How U.S. Multinational 
Companies Strengthen the U.S. Economy”, United States Council for International 
3
 Data Source for Figure 1.1: International Monetary Fund (IMF), International 
Financial Statistics (IFS) and Balance of Payments (BOP) databases, World Bank, 
Global Development Finance (GDF), and World Bank and OECD GDP estimates. 
http://search.worldbank.org/data?qterm=foreign%20direct%20investment&language
=EN&format=html. Data Source for Figure 1.2: IMF, IFS and BOP databases, and 
World Bank, GDF. 
http://search.worldbank.org/data?qterm=foreign%20direct%20investment&language
=EN&format=html. 
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growth rate equals 22.5 percent (16.2 percent for the share of FDI over GWP) 
between 2002 and 2007. Compared with the 1.5% annual growth in world exports 
and the 0.6% annual increase in world GDP, the growth of global FDI is dramatic 
(Blonigen et al., 2007). 
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Figure 1.1: FDI World Inflows  
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Figure 1.2: FDI Inflows as 
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 Different countries have established various standards regarding foreign 
ownership of domestic productive assets. In the United States, according to the 
International Investment and Trade in Services Survey Act, Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI), defined by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), refers to 
“ownership or control, directly or indirectly, by one foreign person, or entity, of 10 
percent or more of the voting securities of an incorporated U.S. business enterprise 
or an equivalent interest in an unincorporated U.S. business enterprise
4.” FDI is often 
measured by the value of a firm’s asset owned by foreign investors.  
1.2.1. U.S. FDI Inflows: Overview 
 The United States has been the world’s largest recipient of FDI. As Figure 
1.4
5
 and Figure 1.6
6
 show, during the 1990s, the value of world-wide FDI flowing 
into U.S. surged from $19.8 billion (or 0.3% of U.S. GDP) in 1992 up to $321.3 
billion (or 3.3 of U.S. GDP) in 2000. Since the year of 2003, the upward trend of 
U.S. FDI inflows occurred again. In 2008, more than $328.3 billion investment (or 
2.3% of U.S. GDP) flowed into US, which is a 21 percent increase from 2007 ( 
$271.2 billion). Even during the recent Economic Crisis in 2009, the U.S. still 
received more than $134.7 billion investment (about 1% of U.S. GDP) from all over 
the world.  
                                                 
4
 ALICIA M. QUIJANO, 1990, “A Guide to BEA Statistics on Foreign Direct 
Investment in the United States”, pp. 29. 
5
 Data source for Figure 1.4: “Table 1. U.S. International Transactions” of U.S. 
International Transactions Accounts Data, the Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
6
 Data source for Figure 1.6: Foreign Direct Investment in the U.S.: Financial and 
Operating Data for U.S. Affiliates of Foreign Multinational Companies, BEA. 
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 Figure 1.5
7
 describes the US share of world FDI inflows since 1980. The 
United States received on average about one third of the global FDI inflows during 
the 1980s. Between 1992 and 2000, the average U.S. share of world FDI inflows was 
one fifth. Since 2003, this share dropped a little, but was still as large as 15 percent 
on average and was 21 percent in 2008. The growth of U.S. inbound FDI is also 
notable: as shown by Figure 1.8, U.S. FDI inflows increased on average by 23.1 
percent (13.8 percent for the share of U.S. inbound FDI over GDP) annually in 1980s 
and the average annual growth rate was even higher in 1990s at 32.2 percent (25.1 
percent for FDI share as of GDP). After a substantial drop in 2001 and 2002, U.S. 
inbound FDI (its share as of U.S. GDP) has been going up with an average annual 
growth rate of 24.5 percent (18.5 percent). 
 
                                                                                     Figure 1.5 
                                                 
7
 Source for Figure 1.5: Invest in America, International Trade Administration, 
http://www.investamerica.gov/home/iia_main_001155.asp. 
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Figure 1.4: Global FDI Flows 
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 Since 1997, the value of gross Property, Plant and Equipment (PP&E) by 
U.S. non-bank affiliates of foreign firms has been increasing steadily: as shown by 
Figure 1.13, the average annual gross PP&E was $1180.1 billion, with a maximum 
value of $1407.6 billion in 2006; compared with the year of 1997, the gross PP&E 
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Figure 1.6: U.S.FDI Inflows as 
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Figure 1.7: Employees by U.S. 
Non-bank Affiliates of 
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Figure 1.8: Growth Rates of U.S. FDI Inflows and Share of US 
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by foreign non-bank firms in U.S. has grown by 46.2 percent (i.e. $1283 billion). 
Total sales by U.S. non-bank FDI inflows was averaged at $2414.4 billion per year 
between 1997 and 2007: Figure 1.14 shows that it kept increasing until 2001 and 
after 2002 it has been going steadily upward before reaching a summit value of 
$3277.2 billion in 2007; the average annual growth rate of total sales equals 9.6 
percent between 2002 and 2007. 
 The United States benefits from inbound FDI in several important ways. 
Figures 1.7 through 1.14 are constructed based on the data from “Foreign Direct 
Investment in the U.S.: Financial and Operating Data for U.S. Affiliates of Foreign 
Multinational Companies” by BEA. Figure 1.7 shows the employment contribution 
by U.S. non-bank affiliates of foreign firms. Between 1997 and 2007, the average 
annual employment by non-bank foreign plants in U.S. was 5.8 million. In 2007, 
U.S. affiliates of foreign companies (majority-owned) employ approximately 5.5 
million U.S. workers. According to Invest in America by the ITA, this amount equals 
4.6% of total U.S. private industry employment.
8
 During the years 1997 – 2007, U.S. 
non-bank affiliates on average pay 25 percent higher wages and salaries than that of 
all U.S. establishments: as Figure 1.10 indicates, the average annual U.S. payroll 
supported by non-bank affiliates of foreign-owned firms was $334 billion, with an 
average annual per-employee compensation of over $68,000.
9
  
                                                 
8
 BEA, “International Economic Accounts”, Operations of Multinational Companies, 
http://www.bea.gov/international/index.htm#omc. 
9
 BEA, “National Economic Accounts”, http://www.bea.gov/national. 
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 The inbound FDI does not only contribute to U.S. employment and labor 
compensation, it also stimulates U.S. exports: as shown by Figure 1.11, annual 
exports shipped by U.S. non-bank affiliates have been going up since 2002 with an 
average annual growth rate of 8.7 percent and the average absolute volume was 
$167.8 billion per year between 1997 and 2007. In 2006, $205.9 billion of goods 
(around 20 percent of all U.S. exports) were shipped by U.S. subsidiaries of foreign 
companies
10
 and in 2007, this number increased to $215.5 billion. The U.S. FDI 
inflows also bring in new research, technology and skills: Figure 1.12 shows that, 
from 1997 to 2007 a total of $338.2 billion was spent on Research and Development 
(R&D) by U.S. non-bank affiliates. The R&D spending by U.S. inbound FDI has 
been going steadily upward except for a small drop (i.e. $27 million) in 2001 and the 
average annual growth rate equals 10.5 percent. Since 2001, U.S. non-bank affiliates 
spent on average $34 billion annually on R&D. This number increased by 5.3 
percent from $37.8 billion in 2006 to $39.8 billion in 2007. 
1.2.2. U.S. FDI Inflows: Manufacturing 
 The U.S. FDI inflow greatly strengthens US manufacturing industry. Figures 
1.9 through 1.14 suggest the importance of manufacturing FDI inflows among the 
total U.S. non-bank inbound FDI. Since 1997, about 40.2 percent of total jobs 
supported by U.S. non-bank affiliates of foreign firms are in the manufacturing 
sector: as shown by Figure 1.9, on average more than 2.3 million workers were 
                                                 
10
 BEA, “Foreign Direct Investment in the U.S.: Financial and Operating Data.”   
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employed by foreign manufacturing firms in U.S. per year, accounting for 12 percent 
of all manufacturing jobs in the United States.  
 Figure 1.10 indicates that the average annual compensation paid by U.S. 
manufacturing affiliates was $155.5 billion, which equals 45 percent of annual 
compensation paid by all non-bank FDI inflows. Between 1997 and 2007, a total of 
$1091.3 billion exports was shipped by U.S. inbound FDI in the manufacturing 
sector: as shown by Figure 1.11, this number amounts to 60 percent of total exports 
shipped by all U.S. non-bank affiliates of foreign firms. In 2007 alone, $125.7 billion 
exports were shipped by US manufacturing affiliates, which equals a 7.1 percent 
increase compared with 2006.  
 Figure 1.12 shows that the share of U.S. non-bank affiliates’ R&D 
expenditure going to the manufacturing sector is even more prominent, reaching the 
summit of 77.7 percent in 2000. During the years 1997 - 2007, U.S. manufacturing 
affiliates of foreign firms spent a total of $247.7 billion on R&D, accounting for 73.7 
percent of the total foreign R&D expenditure in all sectors; the average annual 
growth rate of R&D spending by foreign manufacturing firms was 7.3 percent. Since 
2004, the R&D spending by foreign manufacturing plants in the U.S. has increased 
by 38.2 percent and reaches $30.6 billion in 2007.  
 The U.S. inbound FDI in the manufacturing sector captures 43.6 percent of 
total gross PP&E by all non-bank affiliates in the U.S.: as indicated by Figure 1.13, 
between 1997 and 2007, foreign manufacturing plants owned on average $514.4 
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billion of the gross PP&E per year; compared with the year of 1997, this number in 
2007 was raised by 27.1 percent. During the same period, 40 percent of total sales by 
U.S. non-bank affiliates came from the manufacturing sector: Figure 1.14 shows that, 
foreign manufacturing firms sold on average $964.3 billion of goods per year with a 
summit value of $1195.8 billion in 2007; the average annual growth rate of total 
sales by U.S. inbound manufacturing FDI equals 7.5 percent. 
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 The question of what determines MNEs’ decisions of where to locate 
affiliates among foreign countries has been hotly debated among academics and 
policy-makers. 
1.3.1. Aggregate-level Studies 
 One large group of empirical studies investigates what aggregate market 
characteristics will attract more FDI. According to different measures of FDI 
activity, these studies use a variety of econometric methods. Most aggregate-level 
studies of FDI location choices measure foreign firms’ activity by their assets, sales 
or the gross value of property, plant and equipment (Fredriksson 2003). They utilize 
either a gravity-type linear panel data model (e.g. Broaconier et al 2005; Tuan and 
Ng 2001, 2007; Hejazi 2009; Blonigen et al 2007) or a dynamic system Generalized 
Method of Moments (GMM) model (e.g. Ge 2009; Barrios et al 2006; Cheng and 
Kwan 2000; Kemegue and Mohan 2009). Some aggregate-level studies utilize the 
count of foreign establishments to represent the foreign presence and apply either a 
Poisson model (List 2001; List et al 2004) or a Negative Binomial model (Coughlin 
and Segev 2000; Jin et al 2006). 
 The spatial unit of aggregate-level research also varies. Conventional 
aggregate studies employ cross-country data (see for reference, Blonigen and Davies 
2004; Kemegue and Mohan 2009; Blonigen et al 2007 and Baltagi et al 2007). More 
recently, researchers acknowledge that the substantial heterogeneity across countries 
may lead to a significant issue of unobservable factors. Because of this wide 
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recognition, the aggregate-level FDI location analysis has moved towards smaller 
geographical areas (Arauzo-Carod 2010), such as state/province-level (e.g. Sun 
2002; Fredriksson et al 2003; Ge 2009; Cheng and Kwan 2000; etc), and even 
county-level studies (e.g. Coughlin and Segev 2000; Barrios et al 2006; Figlio and 
Blonigen 2000; List 2001; List et al 2004).  
1.3.2. Firm-level Studies 
 Meanwhile, considerable effort has been devoted into micro-level FDI 
location analysis utilizing establishment-level data. Most plant-level studies are 
theoretically built upon McFadden’s Discrete Choice theory (Arauzo-Carod et al. 
2010). Empirically, they are interested in the determinants of MNEs’ location 
decision of affiliates and employ either a Conditional Logit model (see for reference, 
Woodward 1992; Du et al. 2008a,b; Levinson 1996; List and Co 2000; Devereux et 
al. 2007; Blonigen et al. 2005; Buettner and Ruf 2007; Head et al. 1999 and Dean et 
al. 2009), or a Nested Logit model (Lee et al. 2007; Dean et al. 2009).  
1.3.3. Determinants Suggested by Literature 
 Empirical results with regard to determinants of FDI location choices are 
quite mixing. In addition to the conventional determinants offered by Gravity model 
(e.g. market size, distance, production costs, etc), the main findings of those studies 
that utilize different econometric methods described above call people’s attention to 
  
15 
 
various neoclassical and institutional factors
11
(Arauzo-Carod et al. 2010). 
Neoclassical factors include the agglomeration economies of FDI (Woodward 1992; 
Du et al. 2008 a, b; Devereux et al. 2007; Blonigen et al. 2005; Lee et al. 2007; Sun 
et al. 2002; Ge 2009;  Barrios et al. 2006) and the human capital conditions (Gross 
and Ryan 2008; Broaconier et al. 2005; Sun et al. 2002). Institutional factors contain 
the “pollution haven hypothesis” (List 2000; List and Co 2000; List et al. 2004; 
Levinson 1996; Dean et al. 2009; Fredriksson et al. 2003), the effect of taxation 
(Woodward 1992; Coughlin and Segev 2000; Buettner and Ruf 2007; Desai et al. 
2004; Ng and Tuan 2003; Fredriksson et al. 2003; Blonigen and Davies 2004), local 
business promotion policies (Woodward 1992; Coughlin and Segev 2000; Devereux 
et al. 2007; Head et al. 1999; Dean et al. 2009; Jin et al. 2006; Cheng and Kwan 
2000) and spatial interaction of FDI between regions (Head et al 1999; Ng and Tuan 
2006; Kemegue and Mohan 2009; Blonigen et al. 2007; Baltagi et al. 2007). 
1.3.4. A Critical Evaluation of Shortcomings in Aggregate-Level Studies 
 The measurement of FDI activity and foreign presence is a core issue in 
aggregate-level studies. However, the intensively employed measures are 
unsatisfactory in terms of capturing the economic contribution of FDI on local 
economies. The count measure inappropriately assigns each foreign establishment an 
equal size such that a region with more foreign plants is automatically assumed to 
                                                 
11
 Arauzo-Carod (2010) define neoclassical factors as “(p)rofit- or cost-driving 
factors such as agglomeration economies, transport infrastructures, technology and 
human capital” (pp.702). Institutional factors, on the other hand, refer to 
determinants that affect profit and cost through a “(n)etwork of economic relations” 
between the firm and other agents, e.g. clients, suppliers, governments, etc”. 
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have a larger volume of FDI inflows and more employees supported by foreign firms 
(Blonigen et al. 2005). None of other widely used measures (i.e. foreign assets, sales 
and the gross value of property, plant and equipment) explicitly captures the 
employment contribution associated with foreign investments. Accordingly, I focus 
on the employment outcome of FDI activity by using the employment measure and 
further investigate the relationship between FDI-related employment and state 
attributes in the U.S. 
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Chapter 2: 
Investment-Promotion Policies in U.S. States: Facts and Literature 
 
 Foreign direct investment (FDI) has been playing an important role in the 
United States economy. It has been serving as a key source of innovation, exports 
and jobs. It also contributes to the U.S. economy by boosting U.S. wages, 
strengthening U.S. manufacturing and services, and rising U.S. productivity.
12
 The 
U.S. governments, from the federal level to state and local levels, have always 
provided foreign investors a stable and friendly market.  The efforts made by U.S. 
governments to encourage foreign investments cover all needs to conduct a business, 
from a predictable and transparent legal system, low taxes, outstanding 
infrastructure, to direct financial supports for the usage of production factors.  
2.1. Investment-Promotion Policies in U.S. states: the Stylized Facts 
 This chapter mainly discusses a total of four principal promotion policies 
used by U.S. state governments: competitive corporate income taxes, non-tax direct 
financial supports, foreign-trade zones and state trade offices abroad. 
2.1.1. Low Corporate Income Tax 
 Corporate tax is one fiscal factor commonly considered by studies of 
industrial location. Most of those earlier studies find evidence revealing that high 
                                                 
12
 Invest in America, The International Trade Administration, U.S. Department of 
Commerce. http://www.investamerica.gov/home/iia_main_001154.asp. 
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corporate taxes deter foreign investment (see for reference, Head et al. 1999; 
Woodward 1992; Coughlin and Segev 2000; List and Co 2000; Levinson 1996; 
Fredriksson et al. 2003; Desai et al. 2004). So, relatively low tax on corporate 
income is an important policy option for state governments to attract business.  
Compared with some of other OECD countries, state-level corporate taxes in U.S. 
are relatively low. For example, in 2009, the average top state Corporate Income Tax 
(CIT) rate was 6.3% (ranging from 0% in Nevada to 12% in Iowa), while the average 
top state/provincial CIT rates in Switzerland (14.47%), Germany (14.4%), Canada 
(12.3%), Japan (11.56%) and Luxembourg (6.75%) were higher than that of the 
U.S.
13
 If we consider a relative low corporate tax as an effort by a state government 
to offer an investors-friendly atmosphere (which is reasonable according to the 
findings of previous studies), then this cross-country comparison may indicate that 
U.S. states do more work to promote business development than their counterparts in 
some OECD countries. 
 Between 1991 and 2009, forty five out of the fifty U.S. states imposed a 
direct CIT.
14
 Comparing states within the U.S., as described in Figure 2.1, we could 
observe that there exists substantial heterogeneity in their top CIT rates. In 1991, 
Iowa had the highest top rate of 12%, and the second highest rate was 11.5% in 
Connecticut. Michigan’s 2.35% corporate tax rate was the lowest among the states 
                                                 
13
 Data source: “Comparing U.S. State Corporate Taxes to the OECD”, Tax 
Foundation. http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/26/56/33717459.xls. 
14
 Five states that have no direct CIT are Nevada, S. Dakota, Washington, Texas and 
Wyoming.  
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with corporate income tax, and Indiana had the second lowest rate of 3.4%. In 2001, 
although the highest top CIT rate was still 12% in Iowa, the second highest rate 
decreased to 10.5% in North Dakota. The lowest top tax rate dropped to 2.1% in 
Michigan. In 2009, top state CIT rates varied from 12% in Iowa and 9.99% in 
Pennsylvania to 4.63% in Colorado and 0.26% in Ohio. Texas has a franchise tax, 
the Texas Margins Tax,
15
 with the tax rate of 4.5% before 2007, and then it dropped 
to 1%.Washington did not levy income tax on firms until 2007. And then, it began to 
charge a franchise tax, the Washington Business & Occupation (B&O) Tax, with a 
top rate of 1.5%.
16
 
 Figure 2.2 shows that state-level top CIT rates change over time for most 
states.  From 1991 to 2009, twelve states have decreased their top CIT rates. Ohio 
has the sharpest drop (from 8.9% to 0.26%). North Dakota and Connecticut each 
reduced its top tax rate by 4 percentage points (PP). Arizona’s top CIT rate declines 
by 3.532PP, followed by New York (1.8PP) and Kentucky (1.25PP).
17
 In the mean 
while, seventeen states have raised their top CIT rates. The largest increase was 
                                                 
15
 The Texas Margins Tax is a gross receipts tax paid by most taxable entities. Since 
2007, qualified entities with $10 million or less in total revenue pay 0.575%. 
Qualifying retailers and wholesalers pay 0.5%. Taxable entities with total revenue of 
$300,000 or less will owe no tax. Taxable entities with tax due of less than $1,000 
will owe no tax. (Source: “State Corporate Income Tax Rates” by Tax Foundation). 
16
 The Washington Business & Occupation (B&O) Tax is also a gross receipts tax 
like the Texas Margins Tax. It is levied at various rates. The major rates are 0.471% 
for retail sales, 0.484% for wholesale and manufacturing, and 1.5% for service and 
other activities. (Source: “State Corporate Income Tax Rates”, various years, Tax 
Foundation; state tax forms and instructions. www.taxfoundation.org). 
17
 West Virginia, California, Idaho, Colorado, Missouri and North Carolina also 
reduced their top tax rates by, respectively, 0.95, 0.46, 0.4, 0.37, 0.25 and 0.1 
percentage points. 
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5.1PP in Indiana. Ten other states boosted their top rates by more than one PP.
18
 
Even that  relatively more states have raised their top CIT rates, the average state-
level top CIT rate actually declined from 6.8% in 1991 to 6.3% in 2009. Assuming 
that a reduction in top CIT rate is an indicator of a state government’s effort to attract 
business developments, we may infer from this longitudinal comparison that U.S. 
states differ in terms of their promotion effort. However, as a whole, they tried to 
promote more investments by decreasing the top CIT rate. 
2.1.2. Non-tax Direct Financial Support 
 In addition to relatively low corporate tax rates, states offer various non-tax 
direct financial assistances. Direct factor subsidy/grant is one widely applied tool by 
state and local governments.
19
 Governments encourage investors to start or expand 
their business by subsidizing their factor inputs. To be qualified to receive 
subsidies/grants, applicants must satisfy certain requirements on minimum jobs or 
investment levels. For example, to promote high-wage jobs, the Delaware New 
Economy Jobs Program offers a qualified business a subsidy of up to 65% of the 
firm’s whole withholding taxes. An applicant for this subsidy must create at least 50 
                                                 
18
 Those states are, ranked by the absolute value of increase in percentage points, 
Indiana (5.1), Illinois (3.3), Michigan (2.6), Alabama (1.5), Washington 
(1.5),Pennsylvania (1.49), Oregon (1.3), Maryland (1.25), Nebraska (1.16), 
Oklahoma (1), and Rhode Island (1). 
19
 Other non-tax financial supports include state loans or loan guarantees, state or 
local issued bonds, venture corporations, tax credits, abatements and deductions, etc.  
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net new jobs with each having an annual salary of at least $100,000.
20
 Due to the 
variety of eligibility conditions across all states, implementation of this business 
promotion policy has significant heterogeneity across all U.S. states. Table 2.1
21
 lists 
all the direct factor subsidy/grant programs by states in 1991 and 2009. In 1991, 
thirty one out of fifty states offered subsidy/grant programs for labor inputs, twenty 
states provided subsidies /grants for investors’ capital inputs, and fourteen states had 
both. Twelve states did not offer either job or capital subsidy/grant to business 
expansions or start-ups.  
 Historically, elected officials treated the investment-development programs 
as a luxury item reserved for a good time of plenty. As a result, they usually first cut 
budgets for business incentives when an economic distress occurred. Until better 
times emerged, they would put the development-promotion programs back on table. 
However, during the recent Economic Crisis, things have changed somehow. 
Starting from the Federal Stimulus package, what has emerged is a reinforced 
participation of government in the economy. State and local governments have been 
pursuing a so-called “Incentives as Investments” strategy. They work on promoting 
                                                 
20“Delaware Direct Financial Incentives 2010”, Delaware Economic Development 
Office, http://www.areadevelopment.com//stateResources/delaware/Delaware-direct-
financial-incentives2010-100990.shtml.  
21
 Data source: Information on state subsidy/grant programs in 1991 is from a 
publication of  National Association of State Development Agencies (NASDA), 
named “Directory of Incentives for Business Investment and Development in the 
United States: A State-by-State Guide, 1991”. This is the newest edition of this 
publication available. Information on state direct financial support is from the 
website “Area Development Online”, 
http://www.areadevelopment.com//stateResources, and websites of state 
governments ‘department of commerce, economic development, etc. 
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jobs, controlling over tax increases, and making a more investors-friendly 
environment in the hope of solidifying “(e)xisting and further developing new tax 
revenue on the eventual upswing of the business cycle” (Business Incentives in 2010: 
Alive and Well by Thomas J. Stringer).                                
 From Table 2.1 we can observe this trend toward an “Incentives as 
Investments” strategy and a more strengthened government participation in 
economy. In 2009, thirty seven states offered employment subsidy/grant programs. 
The number of states that offer subsidy/grant for capital inputs rises by more than 50 
percent (from twenty in 1991 to thirty one). Meanwhile, the count of states providing 
both kinds of subsidy/grant program almost doubled, changing from fourteen to 
twenty six. Only eight states did not directly subsidize labor or capital usage by 
investors. Compared with 1991, twenty states have expanded their factor 
subsidy/grant offering by adding at least one category of grant programs in 2009. 
Eleven states
22
 have made great effort on attracting business by offering 
subsidy/grant programs in both categories, and only four
23
 states have no 
subsidy/grant categories during the years of 1991 to 2009. 
2.1.3. Foreign Trade Zones 
 In the U.S., the duty on an imported product which is manufactured abroad is 
assessed on the finished product rather than on its individual parts, materials, or 
                                                 
22
 They are Arkansas, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, New 
York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania and Washington. 
23
 They are Georgia, Nebraska, South Carolina, and South Dakota. 
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components.  However, if the same product was manufactured in the U.S., then U.S. 
based manufacturers have to pay a higher tax on imported materials or components 
used in the manufacturing process. As a result, they have a disadvantage compared 
with their foreign competitors in terms of the taxation on imported goods. To correct 
this imbalance which is adverse to U.S. based manufacturers, and to encourage 
companies to maintain and expand their operations in America, some sites within the 
U.S., called Foreign Trade Zones (FTZs), are considered by federal government as 
outside Customs territories. Products manufactured in those zones, for the purpose of 
tariff assessment, are treated as if they were manufactured abroad. So, a U.S. based 
manufacturer that uses imported component in his manufacturing process could 
benefit by only paying duty based on its status when it actually enters the U.S. 
Within FTZs, imported merchandise can be re-exported or destroyed without ever 
incurring Customs duties. The FTZ program will also benefit a host state because the 
zone manufacturers rely on the state for labor, services, and inputs.
24
 
 Currently, two kinds of FTZ widely exist in U.S. states. One is the General-
Purpose Zone (GP Zone), and the other is the Subzone. A GP zone is a “(f)oreign 
trade zone in which any number of firms may operate, constrained only by the 
physical limitations of space in the zone”. But, a subzone is a “(s)ingle-firm site, 
normally involving manufacturing, whose operations and control are separate from 
                                                 
24
 Foreign-Trade Zones Manual, the United States Customs Service, the Foreign-
Trade Zones Board, the Bureau of Census and the National Association of Foreign-
Trade Zones,  
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the general purpose zone; in this sense, it is approved only for a specific activity”.25 
Producers in certain industries, such as automobile and television, must apply for 
subzone status to obtain tariff  reductions  (Head et al, 1999). 
 The prevalence of FTZs has increased since 1991 for majority of states. As of 
1991, 47 out of the 50 states had GP zones (Head et al. 1999).
26
 In 1999, 236 GP 
zones were offered by all U.S. states and 381 subzones existed in all but 6 states 
(Idaho, Montana, Rhode Island, S. Dakota, Utah and Wyoming). The count of zones 
varied among states, reflecting different efforts to attract business developments. In 
1999, Texas ranked first with 29 GP zones and 55 subzones, followed by California, 
which offered 16 GP zones and 26 subzones. Ohio ranked third with 8 GP zones and 
27 subzones. Thirty states had less than 10 FTZs (GP and subzones together).  
 As shown by Figure 2.3 and 2.4, the first decade of the 21
st
 century has 
observed substantial expansion of FTZs in U.S. states. As of 2009, 253 GP zones are 
widely distributed in all states and 523 subzones are offered by all but 5 states 
(Montana, Rhode Island, S. Dakota, Utah and Wyoming). Texas still ranked as 
number one with 32 GP zones and 72 subzones. California followed Texas with 19 
GP zones and 36 subzones. Twelve states had more than twenty FTZs, while the 
count of states with less than ten FTZs (GP and subzones) decreased to 25
27
. 
                                                 
25
 Foreign Trade Zones, Economic Development Partnership of Alabama, 
www.edpa.org. 
26
 The three states with no FTZs are Idaho, South Dakota and West Virginia. 
27
 Data source: Annual Report of the Foreign-Trade Zones Board to the Congress of 
the United States,  1999-2009, the Department of Commerce. 
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Compared with 1999, only 11 states (Alaska, Arizona, Delaware, Hawaii, Ohio, 
Rhode Island, S. Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, W. Virginia and Wyoming) have kept 
their FTZs constant, but all other 39 states have added 159 FTZs by 2009. Texas 
added 20 FTZs, followed by California with an increase of 13. S. Carolina, Illinois 
and Louisiana each had increased 10. There are 5 states (New York, N. Carolina, 
Michigan, Massachusetts, Indiana and Georgia) that gained 6 more FTZs between 
1999 and 2009. 
2.1.4. Overseas Investment-Promotion Offices 
 Another common practice by states is the opening of overseas offices to 
attract international companies. The official presence of a state in foreign countries 
usually provides foreign investors with various advisory and support services, such 
as professional support in the business site selection process, information on industry 
sectors and operating costs, access to technical and workforce training programs, and 
the provision of governmental assistance, etc. 
 Before 1990s, the prevalence of foreign business-promotion offices was not 
impressive. As of 1991, only twenty states had foreign offices or official business 
representatives abroad. Among those states, Illinois ranked first with seven foreign 
offices in six countries or districts (Belgium, Brazil, Hong Kong, Japan, China and 
Russia). New York followed closely with six foreign offices distributed in five 
countries (Canada, Germany, Hong Kong, Japan and the United Kingdom). Indiana 
ranked third with international offices in five countries (China, Germany, Japan, 
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Korea and Tai Wan). Alabama, Georgia, Maryland, N. Carolina and Wisconsin each 
had overseas offices in four countries
28
.  
 The 1990s, however, had experienced prominent increase in the operation of 
opening overseas offices by U.S. states. From 1991 to 2002, twenty four states with 
no foreign offices in 1991 opened their overseas offices. As a result, only six states 
(Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, Vermont and Wyoming) had no 
official presence in foreign countries as of 2002. Although that majority of U.S. 
states opened official representatives abroad, there was significant heterogeneity in 
their efforts. In 2002, Pennsylvania, which had eighteen overseas offices, led all 
other states. Eight other states (California, Florida, Indiana, Maryland, Missouri, 
Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Utah) each had official trade/business representatives in 
more than ten foreign countries.
29
 Five states (Alabama, Hawaii, Massachusetts, 
Montana and New Mexico) each had two foreign offices, and seven states each had 
only one. 
 After 2002, states’ effort to open overseas offices kept growing, although the 
growth was not as prominent as the one in 1990s. Compared with 2002, nineteen 
                                                 
28
 Information on state overseas offices in 1991 is from a publication of National 
Association of State Development Agencies (NASDA), named “Directory of 
Incentives for Business Investment and Development in the United States: A State-
by-State Guide, 1991”. 
29
 Information on counts and locations of states’ foreign offices in 2002 is from 
appendix A (pp. 49 - pp.51) of “State Official’s Guide to International Affairs” 2003, 
by Chris Whatley, the Council of State Governments.  
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states
30
 have expanded their official presence abroad by opening more trade offices 
in foreign countries in 2009. Currently, only four states (Wyoming, Utah, Rhode 
Island and Maine) have no foreign offices.
31
 States differ significantly in terms of 
their efforts to attract foreign companies by opening official representatives abroad. 
Pennsylvania is still leading all other states. Its international offices increased from 
eighteen in 2002 to twenty three in 2009. Five other states (California, Florida, 
Georgia, New York and Ohio) have more than ten overseas offices. Illinois and 
Maryland each have nine, followed by Texas with eight. Eleven states each have 
only two or one. Table 2.2 lists the counts and locations of overseas offices for all 
U.S. states in 1991, 2002 and 2009 
2.2. Critical Review of Literature on Investment-Promotion Policies 
 In addition to its direct contributions to the employment and exports in the 
host economy, FDI also affects the local market by its spillovers to domestic firms. 
As a result, world-wide governments have been providing various promotion policies 
to encourage foreign plants. 
 2.2.1. Why Governments Attract FDI: Literature on FDI Spillover Effects. 
                                                 
30
 They are Alabama, Georgia, Illinois, Massachusetts, Nebraska, Nevada, New 
Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, 
Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, Washington, and 
Wisconsin. 
31
 Information on state international offices for the current year is from websites of 
economic development authorities for all states, such as the department of 
commerce.  
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 Empirical studies of FDI spillover effects report a significant influence of 
FDI inflows on domestic economies.  
 First, foreign-owned plants create jobs and boost local real wages. For 
example, Figlio and Blonigen (2000) investigate the effects of FDI on local wages 
and public spending in South Carolina counties from 1980 to 1995. They find that 
foreign manufacturing firms boost local real wages more than domestic investment 
does.  
 Second, they bring in new research and enhance the host economy’s 
innovation ability by knowledge spillover effect. Branstetter (2006) examines two 
directions knowledge spillover effects on firms’ innovation ability between Japanese 
plants and U.S. domestic firms. Their empirical results indicate that Japanese 
innovation investments have positive effect on domestic U.S. firms’ patent number. 
Cheung and Lin (2004) pay attention to knowledge spillover effects of inward FDI 
on Chinese provincial domestic economy. They also find evidence confirming a 
positive spillover effect of foreign firms’ R&D activity on the number of domestic 
patent applications in China. 
 Finally, they also induce positive spillover effects in domestic labor 
productivity by training workers. Jordaan (2005) focuses on the potential spillover 
effects from foreign manufacturing investments on Mexican manufacturers ‘labor 
productivity. His empirical estimation supports the “absorptive capacity hypothesis” 
by showing that foreign plants induce positive spillovers to Mexican labor 
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productivity in manufacturing sector through FDI agglomeration in regions that have 
large technological gap between foreign and domestic firms. Using firm-level data 
on Chinese manufacturing industry from 1998 to 2005, Lin et al (2009) find 
heterogeneous spillover effects based on the source of FDI. FDIs from OECD 
countries induce help on Chinese Total Factor Productivity (TFP), while Hongkong, 
Macao and Taiwan firms have adverse impacts on domestic Chinese firms’ 
productivity due to more intense competition between them. 
2.2.2. Literature on Investment-Promotion Policies: World-Wide Studies 
 Global wide governments have been providing a variety of business 
incentives to encourage foreign developments. Those promotion policies are 
investigated extensively by the literature. 
 In the United Kingdom, governmental grants are reported as conducive to 
attract new business. Devereux et al (2007) investigate the question that whether 
potential benefits from agglomeration affect the effectiveness of fiscal instruments 
like government discretionary grants to investors. They apply this to data on new 
establishments in the British manufacturing sector between 1986 and 1992. They 
conclude that fiscal incentives, like grants, will be more effective accompanied with 
agglomeration effects within the area, and foreign-owned plants also favor locations 
with larger numbers of existing foreign-owned plants in their industry. 
 Considerable effort has been made to study business promotion incentives in 
China. For example, Jin et al (2006) utilize a city-level panel data of Japanese food 
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manufacturing investments in China to investigate the role by agglomeration and 
policy incentives as determinants of Japanese food FDI location decisions in China. 
Dean et al (2009) use Chinese provincial data on manufacturing joint venture 
projects and pollution regulation from 1993 to 1996 and mainly investigate the 
effects of regional environmental regulation and FDI promotion policies on FDI 
location choices in China. In both papers, the authors simply create an incentive 
dummy which equals one if there is a special economic zone (SEZ) or open coastal 
city (OCC) in the province. Note that, this variable may be constant during a certain 
period. Cheng and Kwan (2000) focus on the dynamic adjustment process of FDI in 
China and rely on a panel data of 29 Chinese regions from 1985 to 1995. They 
construct a variable which is the sum of all Open Coastal Areas/Cities and Economic 
and Technological Development Zones to work as an aggregate policy indicator. 
Those papers all find evidence that FDI promotion policies in China have 
significantly attracted more foreign investors. However, one common disadvantage 
for all three studies is that they do not distinguish between various incentives given 
to FDI. 
2.3. Literature on Investment-Promotion Policies: the Case of the U.S. 
 Investment-promotion policies in the U.S. have been examined by some 
studies of FDI location choices.  
 To my knowledge, Head et al. (1999) is the first and the most comprehensive 
investigation of state-level investment incentives within the context of MNEs’ 
decisions of locating affiliates in the U.S. A total of six investment-promotion tools 
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used by state and local governments are examined, namely, 1) low corporate income 
tax; 2) labor subsidies; 3) capital subsidies; 4) existence of investment promotion 
office in Japan; 5) existence of a foreign trade zone in the state and 6) unitary 
taxation by the state. They report that the provision of lower corporate income taxes, 
job subsidies and Foreign-Trade Zones (FTZs) significantly help a state to attract 
Japanese investment. 
 However, most papers investigate only one or a couple of business 
incentives. For example, Woodward (1992) also analyzes the location of Japanese-
affiliated manufacturing plants in U.S. for 1980-1989. Unlike Head et al. (1999), 
who focus on state-level attributes and business incentives, Woodward (1992) clearly 
separates state-level and county-level variables. The separation of state and sub-state 
decisions has advantage in studying the agglomeration economies. However, state-
level analysis may be more reasonable for investigating investment promotion 
policies given that most business incentives are provided by federal and state 
administrative. Woodward reports a negative effect of taxes, but a positive effect of 
overseas offices on FDI location choices. 
 Coughlin and Segev (2000) examine the location pattern of new foreign-
owned manufacturing firms in U.S. counties from 1989 to 1994. They consider two 
state-level promotion policies, namely corporate taxation and international office. 
Their Negative Binomial regression indicates that the corporate taxation as a percent 
of state gross product has negative effect on attracting new foreign plants, and that 
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the number of foreign offices is insignificant. Note that, they include the 
manufacturing employees as a share of county labor force to measure manufacturing 
agglomeration effect. However, FDI agglomeration was not considered in their 
research. 
 Fredriksson et al. (2003) also report a negative impact of corporate income 
taxes on FDI spatial allocation decisions among U.S. states over the period 1977-
1987. Their main focus is given to the environmental policy and they find that the 
environmental policy stringency deters the entry of foreign plants. List et al. (2004), 
in the contrast, find that foreign plants are not significantly influenced by 
environmental regulations in U.S. counties. They also examine the effect of property 
taxes on FDI location choices and report that this effect is negative. 
2.4. A Critical Evaluation of Shortcomings in this Literature  
 Two critical shortcomings make the existing literature unsatisfactory in terms 
of providing valid advice on using investment-promotion policies to promote FDI 
and employment. First, very little attention has been currently devoted into a 
comprehensive investigation of all state-level investment incentives within the 
context of FDI location choices in the United States. Most studies in this literature 
have considered only one type of business-promotion policy, namely the low 
corporate taxation (e.g. Woodward 1992; Coughlin and Segev 2000; List et al. 2004; 
Fredriksson et al. 2003). Some studies incorporate into consideration the role of 
overseas offices in attracting FDI (Woodward 1992; Coughlin and Segev 2000; Head 
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et al. 1999). However, they only investigate such state offices in Japan. As a result, 
the policy implications of their paper are quite restricted.  
 Second, the common measurement errors and policy endogeneity associated 
with policy variables are ignored in the literature. For example, using a variable Tax 
Burden, which indicates the share of corporate tax collection over state personal 
income or gross product, is problematic in terms of measuring tax policy due to 
changes from non-tax source (Reed and Rogers 2006). Meanwhile, some promotion 
policy variables, such as job/capital grants, are endogenous in the determination of 
FDI activity (Devereux et al. 2007).  
 By systematically investigate a basket of investment-promotion polices, the 
present study attempts to draw valid implications on the role of governmental 
business incentives in promoting FDI-related employment. 
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Data Source: “State Corporate Income Tax Rates”, various years, Tax Foundation; 
state tax forms and instructions. www.taxfoundation.org. 
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Figure 2.1: U.S. Top Corporate Income Tax Rate by States, 
1991, 1999 and 2009 
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Data source: State Corporate Income Tax Rates, various years,Tax Foundation; state 
tax forms and instructions. www.taxfoundation.org 
 
 
 
 
-9% -8% -7% -6% -5% -4% -3% -2% -1% 0% 1% 2% 3% 4% 5% 6%
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Dalaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Missisippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New york
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Isand
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming
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Data source: Annual Report of the Foreign-Trade Zones Board to the Congress of 
the United States, various years, the U.S. Department of Commerce. 
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Data source: Annual Report of the Foreign-Trade Zones Board to the Congress of 
the United States, various years, the U.S. Department of Commerce. 
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Continued  
Table 2.1: U.S. State and Local Government Subsidy/Grant Programs,  
1991-2009 
        
State Yr. Employment Subsidy Capital Subsidy 
Alabama 1991 Economic Development Block Grant Industrial Site Preparation Grants 
Alabama 2009 none Industrial Site Preparation Grants 
Alaska 1991 none Capital Matching Grants Program 
Alaska 2009 none none 
Arizona 1991 none none 
Arizona 2009 Arizona Job Training Program  none 
Arkansas 1991 
Arkansas Industry Training 
Program 
Basic Research Grant Program; 
Applied Research Grant Program 
Arkansas 2009 Create Rebate Program  Venture Capital Investment Fund  
California 1991 Employment Training Panel none 
California 2009 
Employment Training Panel; Market 
Development and Expansion Grant 
Program; Beverage Container 
Recycling Grant Program 
Market Development and Expansion 
Grant Program ; Beverage Container 
Recycling Grant Program 
Colorado 1991 
Colorado First Customized Training 
Program ; Existing Industry 
Training Program  none 
Colorado 2009 
Colorado First Customized Training 
Program ; Existing Industry 
Training Program  
Community Development Block Grant 
funds; Bioscience Discovery Evaluation 
Grant Program  
Connectic
ut 1991 
Urban Jobs Program; Urban 
Enterprise Zones; Connecticut 
Labor Training Program none 
Connectic
ut 2009 none Risk capital/technology assistance  
Delaware 1991 
Delaware Technical Innovation 
Fund; Industrial Training Programs none 
Delaware 2009 
New Economy Jobs Program ;The 
Clean Energy Partnership 
Delaware Competitiveness Fund; 
Delaware Strategic Fund; Emerging 
Technology Funds 
Florida 1991 Sunshine State Skills Program Applied Research Grants Program 
Florida 2009 
Quick Response Training Grant ; 
High-Impact Performance Incentive 
Grant  
High-Impact Performance Incentive 
Grant  
Georgia 1991 none none 
Georgia 2009 none none 
Hawaii 1991 
Aloha State Specialized Employment 
and Training none 
Hawaii 2009 
Hawaii Investment Attraction 
Program  
Community-Based Economic 
Development (CBED) program ;  Small 
Business Innovation Research Grant 
Program  
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Continued   
State Yr. Employment Subsidy Capital Subsidy 
Idaho 1991 New Industry Training Program none 
Idaho 2009 
Workforce Development Training 
Fund none 
Illinois 1991 
Illinois Industrial Training 
Program;  Prairie State 2000 
Illinois Coal Demonstration Program; 
Build Illinois Frail Freight and Local 
Rail Service Assistance Programs 
Illinois 2009 
Employer Training Investment 
Program;                                                   
Large Business Development 
Program  
Illinois Department of Agriculture 
AgriFIRST Grant Program;                   
Large Business Development Program  
Indiana 1991 
Training-for-Profit Program; Basic 
Industries Retraining Program) 
Industrial Development Grant Fund; 
Industrial Development Infrastructure 
Program 
Indiana 2009 
state-funded Industrial Development 
Grant fund ; Skills Enhancement 
Fund grants program none 
Iowa 1991 
Community Economic Betterment 
Account; New Jobs Training 
Program Export Trade Assistance Program 
Iowa 2009 New Jobs Training Program  
The Entrepreneurial Ventures 
Assistance (EVA) program and 
Community Economic Betterment 
Account (CEBA) "Venture Project"  
Kansas 1991 
Kansas Industrial Training 
Program; Kansas Industrial 
Retraining Program none 
Kansas 2009 none none 
Kentucky 1991 Bluegrass State Skills Corporation none 
Kentucky 2009 none Kentucky New Energy Ventures Fund  
Louisiana 1991 Industrial Start-up Training none 
Louisiana 2009 
Quality Jobs; Economic 
Development Award Program  Economic Development Award Program  
Maine 1991 Job Opportunity Zone Program none 
Maine 2009 Employment tax increment financing  
Grants to Municipalities for Direct 
Business Support  
Maryland 1991 
Maryland Industrial Training 
Program 
Maryland Industrial and Commercial 
Redevelopment Fund 
Maryland 2009 
Economic Development 
Opportunities Fund  
Economic Development Opportunities 
Fund ;Maryland Venture Fund  
Massachu
setts 1991 Bay State Skills Corporation none 
Massachu
setts 2009 
Training Grants ;  Hiring Incentive 
Training Grant  none  
Michigan 1991 
Michigan Business and Industrial 
Training Program, Training 
Incentive Fund State Research Fund 
Michigan 2009 
Site development and infrastructure 
grants; Michigan New Jobs Training 
Program 
Site development and infrastructure 
grants 
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State Yr. Employment Subsidy Capital Subsidy 
Minnesota 1991 
Minnesota Pilot Community 
Development Corporations 
Wastewater Treatment Programs; 
Challenge Grant Program; Economic 
Development Grants; Technology 
Research Grants 
Minnesota 2009 
Minnesota Job Skills 
Partnership ;Job Opportunity 
Building Zone Program Job Opportunity Building Zone Program 
Mississipp
i 1991 Start-up Training for Industry none 
Mississipp
i 2009 
Job Protection Act ;Mississippi 
Business Investment Act Program  
Mississippi ACE Fund ;Community 
Development Block Grant Program ; 
Mississippi Business Investment Act 
Program ; Rural Impact Fund Program  
Missouri 1991 
Small Business Incubator Loan 
Program 
Higher Education Research Assistance 
Applied Projects Fund; Small Business 
Incubator Loan Program 
Missouri 2009 none none 
Montana 1991 none none 
Montana 2009 
Big Sky Economic Development 
Fund ; Montana Department of 
Commerce Economic Development 
Finance Program; Primary Sector 
Workforce Training Grant (WTG) 
program ; Workforce Investment Act 
(WIA) funds  
Montana Department of Commerce 
Economic Development Finance 
Program  
Nebraska 1991 none none 
Nebraska 2009 none none 
Nevada 1991 
Nevada Quick Start Job Training 
Program none 
Nevada 2009 
Nevada's Train Employees Now 
(TEN) Program  none 
New 
Hampshir
e 1991 none none 
New 
Hampshir
e 2009 Job Grants Program  none 
New 
Jersey 1991 none 
Small Business Innovation Research 
Bridge Grants 
New 
Jersey 2009 
Business Employment Incentive 
Program ;Business Retention and 
Relocation Assistance Grant 
Program 
Clean Energy Financing ; Petroleum 
Underground Storage Tank Remediation, 
Upgrade & Closure Program 
New 
Mexico 1991 
Industrial Development Training 
Program none  
New 
Mexico 2009 Job Training Incentive Program  none 
New York 1991 Industrial Access Program, 
University-Industry Energy Research 
Program; Secondary Materials 
Program; Small Business Innovation 
Research Matching Grants 
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Continued   
New York 2009 
JOBS Now Manufacturing 
Assistance 
Program ;Entrepreneurial 
Assistance Program  Environmental Investment Program  
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Continued   
State Yr. Employment Subsidy Capital Subsidy 
North 
Carolina 1991 
Industrial Building Renovation 
Fund 
Incubator Facilities Program; North 
Carolina Biotechnology Center) 
North 
Carolina 2009 
Job Development Investment 
Grant ; One North Carolina Fund One North Carolina Fund 
North 
Dakota 1991 none none 
North 
Dakota 2009 Workforce 20/20  none 
Ohio 1991 Thomas Edison Program Selective Excellence Initiatives 
Ohio 2009 none 
Small Business Innovation Research 
(SBIR) program  
Oklahoma 1991 none none 
Oklahoma 2009 
Quality Jobs Program; Small 
Employer Quality Jobs Program; 
Training for Industry Program  none 
Oregon 1991 none none 
Oregon 2009 
Governor's Strategic Training 
Fund ;Film production( Oregon 
Production Investment Fund rebates 
20 percent of Oregon-based 
production expenses and 10 percent 
of wages paid). Film production  
Pennsylva
nia 1991 Customized Industrial Training 
Pennsylvania Energy Development 
Authority; Challenge 
Grants/Technology Centers; Research 
Seed Grants; Seed "Venture" Capital 
Pennsylva
nia 2009 
Opportunity Grant Program; 
Workforce Leadership Grants 
First Industries Fund; Infrastructure 
Development Program 
Rhode 
Island 1991 
Rhode Island Partnership for 
Science and Technology none 
Rhode 
Island 2009 none none 
South 
Carolina 1991 none none 
South 
Carolina 2009 none none 
South 
Dakota 1991 none none 
South 
Dakota 2009 none none 
Tennessee 1991 none 
Tennessee Industrial Infrastructure 
Program 
Tennessee 2009 none 
Small Cities Community Development 
Block Grant  
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Source: Information on state subsidy/grant programs in 1991 is from a publication of  
National Association of State Development Agencies (NASDA), named “Directory of 
Incentives for Business Investment and Development in the United States: A State-
by-State Guide, 1991”. This is the newest edition of this publication available. 
Information on state direct financial support is from the website “Area Development 
Online”, http://www.areadevelopment.com//stateResources, and websites of state 
governments’ department of commerce, economic development, etc. 
 
 
State Yr. Employment Subsidy Capital Subsidy 
Texas 1991 
Industrial Development Training 
Program none 
Texas 2009 
Self-Sufficiency Fund ; Texas 
Enterprise Fund; Texas Enterprise 
Zones 
Texas Enterprise Fund; Texas 
Enterprise Zones 
Utah 1991 Custom Fit Program none 
Utah 2009 
Industrial Assistance Fund ; Short-
Term Intensive Training  Industrial Assistance Fund  
Vermont 1991 none none 
Vermont 2009 
Vermont Employment Growth 
Incentive  none 
Virginia 1991 none 
Virginia Coalfield Economic 
Development Authority 
Virginia 2009 
Virginia Economic Development 
Incentive Grant ;Enterprise zone 
grants;Tobacco Region Opportunity 
Fund 
Virginia Investment Partnership Grant 
and Major Eligible Employer Grant 
Fund ; Virginia Economic Development 
Incentive Grant; Enterprise zone 
grants; Tobacco Region Opportunity 
Fund 
Washingto
n 1991 
Washington State Job Skills 
Program  
Community Economic Revitalization 
Board (CERB) Program  
Washingto
n 2009 
Washington State Job Skills 
Program  
Community Economic Revitalization 
Board (CERB) Program  
West 
Virginia 1991 none none 
West 
Virginia 2009 Jobs Investment Trust  none 
Wisconsin 1991 none Technology Development Fund 
Wisconsin 2009 
Technology Assistance Grant 
Program ; Auto Adjustment 
Entrepreneurial Support Initiative  
Community Development Block Grant 
Program; Technology Assistance Grant 
Program ; Technology Bridge Grant 
Program  
Wyoming 1991 none none 
Wyoming 2009 
Business Training Grants ; Pre-Hire 
Economic Development Grants 
Business Ready Community (BRC) 
Grant and Loan Program ; Wyoming 
SBIR Phase 0 Program 
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Table 2.2: U.S. State Overseas Offices in 1991, 2002 and 2009 
State Year Count of Foreign Offices and Locations 
Alabama 1991 4 (HK,JP,KO,Switzerland) 
 2002 2(GM,JP) 
 2009 4 (HK,JP,KO,Switzerland) 
Alaska 1991 none 
 2002 5(CN,JP,KO,Russia,TW) 
 2009 3 (KO,JP,TW) 
Arizona 1991 none 
 2002 4(JP,Mexico,TW,UK) 
 2009 4 (Mexico, Mexico,JP, Canada) 
Arkansas 1991 3 (Belgium, JP, TW) 
 2002 4(Belgium, JP,Malaysia,Mexico) 
 2009 2 (JP,CN) 
California 1991 none 
 2002 12(Argentina,, CN, UK, GM, HK, Israel, JP, KO, Mexico, Singapore, S. 
Africa, TW) 
 2009 12(Argentina,, CN, UK, GM, HK, Israel, JP, KO, Mexico, Singapore, S. 
Africa, TW) 
Colorado 1991 none 
 2002 3 (Mexico,JP,GM) 
 2009 3 (Mexico,JP,GM) 
Connecticut 1991 2 ( Germany, JP) 
 2002 7(Argentina, Brazil, CN,,Israel,Mexico,S. Africa, Turkey) 
 2009 7(Argentina, Brazil, CN,,Israel,Mexico,S. Africa, Turkey) 
Delaware 1991 none 
 2002 4(CN, Israel, JP, TW) 
 2009 4(CN, Israel, JP, TW) 
Florida 1991 3 (EU, UK, Latin American) 
 2002 14( Brazil, Canada, CN, Czech Republic,GM, Israel, JP, KO, Mexico, S. 
Africa, Spain, TW UK, Venezuela) 
 2009 13 (Canada, Czech, France, GM, Israel, JP, Mexcico, CN,CN,S.Aferica, 
UK,Spain, TW) 
Georgia 1991 4 (Belgium, Canada, JP,KO) 
 2002 9( Brazil, Canada, EU, Israel, JP, KO, Mexico, S. Africa, UK) 
 2009 10 (Brazil,Canada, Chile, CN,EU,JP,KO,Mexico,Isreal, UK) 
Hawaii 1991 none 
 2002 2( CN, TW) 
 2009 2 (CN,TW) 
Idaho 1991 none 
 2002 4( CN, KO, Mexico, TW) 
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 2009 3 (TW, Mexico, CN) 
Illinois 1991 7(Belgium, Brazil,HK,JP,JP,CN,Russia) 
 2002 8( Belgium, Canada,CN, Israel, JP, Mexico, Poland, S. Africa) 
 2009 9(Belgium, JP,HK, Mexico,Brazil,CN,Canada,Israel, Poland) 
Indiana 1991 5(CN,EU,JP,KO,TW) 
 2002 15( Australia, Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, CN,, India, Israel, JP, KO, 
Mexico, Netherlands, Singapore S. Africa, TW) 
 2009 6(Australia, CN, EU, JP, TW,UK) 
Iowa 1991 3(GM,HK,JP) 
 2002 4(GM,JP,HK,Mexico) 
 2009 4 (CN,Mexico,JP,EU) 
Kansas 1991 none 
 2002 7( Australia, Brazil, Chile, EU, JP, KO, Mexico) 
 2009 3(CN,JP,Mexico) 
Kentucky 1991 none 
 2002 4( Belgium, Chile, JP, Mexico) 
 2009 3 (CN,JP,Mexico) 
Louisiana 1991 none 
 2002 1(TW) 
 2009 1(Mexico) 
Maine 1991 none 
 2002 1(GM) 
 2009 none 
Maryland 1991 4(EU,HK,JP,TW) 
 2002 10( Brazil, Chile, CN, Israel, JP, Mexico, Netherlands, S. Africa, Singapore, 
TW) 
 2009 9(KO, JP, Montenegro, Canada, Brazil, S. Africa, India, Scandinavia，
Vietnam) 
Massachuset
ts 
1991 none 
 2002 2 (CN, EU) 
 2009 4 (Brazil,CN,EU,Mexico) 
Michigan 1991 none 
 2002 5( Canada, CN, JP, Mexico, S. Africa) 
 2009 3(Canada,JP,GM) 
Minnesota 1991 none 
 2002 1( GM) 
 2009 1 (China) 
Mississippi 2002 5( JP, Santiago, Chile, Singapore, UK) 
 1991 none 
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 2009 5(CN,Chile,JP,EU,GM) 
Missouri 1991 3(GM,JP,KO) 
 2002 10( Belgium, Brazil, GM, , Ghana, Israel JP, , KO, Mexico, S. Africa, UK) 
 2009 6(UK,JP,KO,TW,Mexico,CN) 
Montana 1991 2(JP, TW) 
 2002 2(JP, TW) 
 2009 2(TW,JP) 
Nebraska 1991 none 
 2002 none 
 2009 2(JP,Brazil) 
Nevada 1991 none 
 2002 none 
 2009 6(Shanghai,Beijing,HK,GM,Brazil,Italy) 
New 
Hampshire 
1991 none 
 2002 none 
 2009 1 (Ireland) 
New Jersey 1991 none 
 2002 9( Brazil, CN, Egypt, England, Greece, Israel, JP, KO, Mexico) 
 2009 12 
New Mexico 1991 none 
 2002 2( Mexico, TW) 
 2009 2( Mexico, TW) 
New York 1991 6(Canada, Canada,GM,HK,JP,UK) 
 2002 8( Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Israel, JP,  S. Africa, UK) 
 2009 14(Canada, 
Canada,GM,CN,UK,France,India,Isreal,Mexico,Turkey,Australia,Brazil,Chil
e,S.Africa) 
North 
Carolina 
1991 4 (GM, HK, JP,KO) 
 2002 6( Canada, GM, HK, , JP, KO, Mexico) 
 2009 7 (Canada, EU, HK, JP,KO,CN,Mexico) 
North 
Dakota 
1991 1 (JP) 
 2002 1 
 2009 5(Ukraine,HK,Turkey,KO,Astana) 
Ohio 1991 2(Belgium, JP) 
 2002 10( Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Europe, Israel, Japan, Mexico, 
South Africa) 
 2009 11(Canada,Mexico,Belgium,Chile,Brazil,Israel,S.Africa,SE.Asia,CN,JP,Indi
a) 
Oklahoma 1991 none 
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 2002 4 (Israel, China, Mexico, and Vietnam) 
 2009 4 (Israel, China, Mexico, and Vietnam) 
Oregon 1991 none 
 2002 6( China, Japan, Mexico, South Korea,Taiwan, United Kingdom) 
 2009 4(CN,JP,KO,EU) 
Pennsylvania 1991 3(Belgium,GM,JP) 
 2002 18( Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Czech 
Republic, Germany, India, Israel, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Singapore, South 
Africa, UK-Trade Office, UK- Investment Office) 
 2009 23(Dubai,Australia,Brazil,Canada,Chile,CN,CN,Czech,Israel,France,GM,Ind
ia,JP,KO,Mexico,Netherlands,Saudi 
Arabia,S.Aferica,Singapore,Spain,TW,UK,Vietnam) 
Rhode Isand 2002 0 
 1991 none 
 2009 none 
South 
Carolina 
1991 2(GM,JP) 
 2002 1( GM, JP) 
 2009 2(GM,CN) 
South 
Dakota 
1991 none 
 2002 1( Netherlands) 
 2009 7(France,GM,Italy,JP,Netherlands,UK,CN) 
Tennessee 1991 none 
 2002 3( Canada, JP, UK) 
 2009 4(Canada,CN,JP,GM) 
Texas 1991 3 (JP, Mexico,TW) 
 2002 1( Mexico) 
 2009 8(Mexico,Canada,Brazil,Argentina,CN,France,United Arab Emirates,Qatar) 
Utah 1991 none 
 2002 13(Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Chile, China, Germany, Italy,Japan, Korea, 
Mexico, Singapore, Sweden, United Kingdom) 
 2009 none 
Vermont 1991 none 
 2002 none 
 2009 2(CN,TW) 
Virginia 1991 2 (Belgium,JP) 
 2002 6(Brazil, China, Germany, Japan, Korea,Mexico) 
 2009 3(Belgium,HK,JP) 
Washington 1991 none 
 2002 5( China, France, Japan, Korea, Taiwan) 
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Data source: 
 1. “Directory of Incentives for Business Investment and Development in the United 
States: A State-by-State Guide, 1991”,  by National Association of State 
Development Agencies (NASDA). 
2. Appendix A (pp. 49 - pp.51) of  “ State Official’s Guide to International Affairs” 
2003, by Chris Whatley, the Council of State Governments. 
3. Websites of economic development authorities for all states, such as the 
department of commerce.  
 
Key Abbreviation:  
AG-Argentina; AT-Australia; AR-Austria; BZ-Brazil; CA-Canada; CH-Chile; CN-
China; CZ-Czech Republic; DB-Dubai; EG-Egypt; EU-Europe Union; FR-France; 
GM-Germany; GN-Ghana; GR-Greece; HK-Hongkong; IL-Ireland; IN-India; IR-
Israel; IT-Italy; JP-Japan; KO-Korea; KZ-Kazakhstan; LA-Latin American; ML-
Malaysia; MT-Montenegro; MX-Mexico; NL-Netherlands; PL-Poland; QT-Qatar; 
RS-Russia; SA-South Africa; SB-Saudi Arabia; SD-Scandinavia; SG-Singapore; SL-
Switzerland; SP-Spain; TK-Turkey; TW-Tai Wan; UK-United Kingdom; UR-
Ukraine; VN-Vietnam; VZ-Venezuela. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2009 6 (CN,EU,JP,JP,TW,Mexico) 
West 
Virginia 
1991 none 
 2002 3( Germany, Japan, Taiwan) 
 2009 2 (JP,GM) 
Wisconsin 1991 4 (GM,HK,JP,KO) 
 2002 3( Brazil, Canada, Mexico) 
 2009 4 (Brazil, Cananda, CN,Mexico) 
Wyoming 1991 none 
 2002 none 
 2009 none 
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Chapter 3: 
FDI Location Choices and Employment in the U.S.: 
Do State “Incentives as Investments” Strategies Matter? 
 
3.1. Introduction: Research Question and Contributions 
 This study investigates the extent to which state-level attributes affect 
employment by foreign manufacturing plants in U.S states. Particular attention is 
given to the role of business incentive policies in foreign manufacturing plants’ 
employment decisions. The question is: do variations in state investment-promotion 
policies influence the geographical distribution of foreign manufacturing firms’ 
employment in U.S. when other FDI location choice determinants are also 
incorporated? 
 Research examining the determinants of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
location choice is extensive. Typically, researchers regress various measures of 
location outcome on explanatory variables such as market size, labor conditions and 
infrastructures, etc.
32
 One insightful branch of research focuses on the employment 
decisions by foreign plants (Fredriksson et al. 2003; Gross and Ryan 2008). A related 
branch of analysis investigates the impact of investment-promotion policies on U.S. 
inbound FDI (Woodward 1992; Head et al. 1999; Coughlin and Segev 2000).  
                                                 
32
 For a detailed discussion of the literature on FDI location choice, please refer to 
Chapter 1. 
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 However, conclusive evidence on the relationship between state business-
promotion policies and foreign plants’ employment decisions in the U.S. has been 
elusive. Possibly two reasons are responsible for this unsatisfactory result. First, 
most aggregate-level studies measure FDI activities by foreign plants’ assets, sales 
and the value of property, plant and equipment (PP&E). The employment 
contribution of foreign plants in the U.S. has been largely ignored. To my 
knowledge, only a few studies have empirically examined determinants of FDI-
related employment. Gross and Ryan (2008) investigate the employment by Japanese 
firms in Western Europe. Fredriksson et al. (2003) is the only paper that focuses on 
foreign plants’ employment levels in the U.S. Second, empirical studies that 
investigate the role of state investment-promotion policies in influencing FDI are 
rare. Woodward (1992) and Coughlin and Segev (2000) only incorporate the 
provision of overseas investment-promotion offices by states. Head et al. (1999) is 
the first to comprehensively investigate a total of four categories of business 
incentives: competitive corporate income taxes and unitary taxation, job/capital 
subsidies, foreign-trade zones and international offices. However, better measures of 
these policies are needed to address empirical issues such as measurement errors and 
the policy endogeneity. 
 My study contributes to the aggregate-level research of FDI location choices 
in two ways. The principal contribution lies in its focus on the employment effect 
related to investments by foreign enterprises. Creating jobs is a prominent 
contribution of foreign firms on U.S. economy. In 2007, about 5.5 million U.S. 
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workers were employed by foreign plants.
33
 Between 2003 and 2009, foreign 
companies created about 632,500 new jobs in over 4,500 new projects.
34
 However, 
very few studies in the literature of FDI location decisions have explicitly 
investigated the determinants of foreign firms’ employment outcomes. To address 
this gap in the literature, I treat the employment level by foreign manufacturing 
plants as the dependent variable so as to focus on the employment contribution 
associated with FDI activity. Moreover, the employment measure of foreign 
presence could reflect an important mechanism through which the technical spillover 
effect is imposed by foreign firms on the local economy (Ford and Rork, 2010). 
 My research also contributes to the literature by comprehensively examining 
the role of state business-promotion policies in influencing FDI-related employment 
and paying particular attention to potential measurement errors associated with 
policy endogeneity. Following Head et al. (1999), I investigate four categories of 
business incentives offered by state and local governments: low corporate income 
tax, Foreign Trade Zones (both “general-purpose” zones and “subzones”), subsidies 
paid to factor usage (both job and capital subsidy/grant), and overseas investment-
promotion offices. I extend Head et al. (1999) by utilizing measures that better 
                                                 
33
 Foreign Direct Investment in the U.S.: Financial and Operating Data for U.S. 
Affiliates of Foreign Multinational Companies, BEA. 
34
 Data source: Invest in America, The International Trade Administration, the U.S. 
Department of Commerce. 
http://www.investamerica.gov/home/iia_main_001154.asp. 
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reflect the impacts of policies. Furthermore, I employ econometric techniques to 
explicitly address common endogeneity problems.  
 My results are important for researchers and policy makers who are interested 
in the effect of business-promotion policy on employment outcomes. By 
systematically investigating the relationship between state-level attributes (especially 
the business-development incentives) and employment by foreign-owned 
manufacturing firms, valid implications can be drawn by policy makers in terms of 
their effort to promote FDI and employment.  
3.2. Related Literature 
 This study merges two lines of literature. One is the literature on aggregate-
level studies of FDI-related employment, and the other is on the role of 
governmental investment-promotion policies in industrial location decisions.
35
 As to 
the first set of studies, this research closely relates to Gross and Ryan (2008). In the 
second set, it directly builds off of Head et al. (1999).     
3.2.1. Aggregate-level Studies on Foreign Firms’ Location and Employment 
 Several papers investigate the impact of employment by foreign plants on 
local economies: the FDI spillover effect.
36
 However, few studies treat employment 
supported by foreign firms as the dependent variable of interest. 
                                                 
35
 For a detailed discussion of the two literatures, refer to Chapter 1 and Chapter 2, 
respectively. 
36
 For example, Figlio and Blonigen (2000) focus on the spillover effects of 
employment by foreign greenfield manufacturing establishments on local real wages, 
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 Gross and Ryan (2008) is the only paper which addresses the issue of 
employment effects associated with Multinational Enterprises (MNEs)’ location 
behavior. They mainly investigate the effect of Employment Protection Legislation 
(EPL) for both regular and temporary workers on Japanese investments in a total of 
fifteen Western European countries during 1985-1990 and 1995-2000. Using 
different measures of EPL, their empirical results reveal that job protection 
requirements have a significant and negative impact on employment by Japanese 
firms in Western Europe.   
Although my study also focuses on the employment effect of FDI location 
choice, it differs from Gross and Ryan (2008) in several important ways. First of all, 
their principal attention has been given to the role of employment protection policies 
on Japanese FDI location choice in Western Europe. In contrast, I conduct a 
comprehensive investigation of all state-level business promotion policies in terms of 
expanding employment supported by foreign investments in U.S. Moreover, the 
employment level by foreign firms in a geographical area is dynamically associated 
with its lagged value (Barrios et al. 2006). However, econometric methods used by 
Gross and Ryan (2008), such as Ordinary Least Square (OLS, both Pooled and with 
fixed effects) and Tobit estimations, do not control for potential problems associated 
with the dynamically determined system.  
                                                                                                                                          
employment level and fiscal policy in South Carolina counties from 1980 to 1995. 
They find that employment by FDI boosts local wages more than domestic firms. 
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 Finally, none of these econometric models addresses the potential policy 
endogeneity. To illustrate, foreign plants may avoid locating investments in regions 
with strict labor protection legislations; meanwhile, they may also lead to a more 
strict labor protection policy because they boost real wages in host regions (Figlio 
and Blonigen 2000). A simple OLS or Tobit estimation cannot handle this situation. 
My study corrects these problems by utilizing a dynamic system Generalized Method 
of Moments (DSGMM) estimate, which is proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998) 
and then widely used among aggregate-level studies in fields like international 
finance and trade (e.g. Ge 2009; Barrios et al 2006; Cheng and Kwan 2000; 
Kemegue and Mohan 2009). The DSGMM estimate addresses the endogeneity issue 
by selecting the lagged values of variables (both the dependent and independent 
variables) as instruments and by estimating both the differenced-equation and the 
level equation simultaneously. 
3.2.2. Literature on Investment-Promotion Policies in U.S. 
 Extensive studies of FDI location choices in the U.S. have considered only 
one or a couple of business promotion policies, such as low corporate taxation and 
overseas offices. For example, empirical studies that consider state corporate income 
tax and/or property tax include Woodward (1992), Coughlin and Segev (2000), List 
et al. (2004) and  Fredriksson et al. (2003). The role of state-level international 
offices in attracting foreign investors is examined by Woodward (1992) and 
Coughlin and Segev (2000). However, very little attention has been currently given 
to any comprehensive investigation of all state-level investment incentives within the 
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context of MNEs’ locating affiliates in the United States. Head et al. (1999) is the 
first to provide a comprehensive examination of how state business development 
policies influence Japanese manufacturing plants’ location decisions in U.S. Six 
categories of investment-promotion tools used by state and local governments are 
examined, namely, 1) low corporate income tax; 2) labor subsidies; 3) capital 
subsidies; 4) existence of investment promotion office in Japan; 5) existence of a 
foreign trade zone in the state and 6) unitary taxation by the state. Their statistical 
results indicate that different promotion policies have different effects. To be 
specific, the provision of lower corporate income taxes, job subsidies and Foreign-
Trade Zones (FTZs) significantly help a state to attract Japanese investment. 
 My study extends the work of Head et al. (1999) and Woodward (1992) from 
the perspectives of both policy implications and empirical estimation. First, both 
Head et al. (1999) and Woodward (1992) limit their research to only one source of 
FDI by focusing on Japanese MNEs’ discrete choices of locating manufacturing 
affiliates in U.S. states.
37
 As a result, the policy implications of both papers are quite 
restrictive. My research, however, expands their policy application by looking at the 
employment effect associated with location decisions in U.S. by foreign firms from 
                                                 
37
 Unlike Head et al. (1999), who focus on state-level attributes and business 
incentives, Woodward (1992) clearly separates state-level and county-level 
variables. The separation of state and sub-state decisions has advantage in studying 
agglomeration economies. However, state-level analysis may be more reasonable for 
investigating investment promotion policies given that most business incentives are 
provided by federal and state administrative.  
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different countries within the context of multiple state-level investment incentives. 
To my knowledge, my research is the first to do this. 
 This paper further adds values upon Head et al. (1999) by addressing the 
measurement errors and policy endogeneity associated with policy variables. First, 
Woodward (1992) and Head et al. (1999) measure corporate income tax rate by a tax 
burden variable, which indicates the share of corporate tax collection in a state over 
its personal income. Coughlin and Segev (2000) create a tax rate variable, which 
actually equals state and local taxes as a percent of gross state product. However, 
Reed and Rogers (2006) point out that neither measure is satisfactory in terms of 
measuring the tax policy because changes in such measures maybe driven by non-tax 
sources, such as income, gross product and population. They further suggest that 
statutory tax parameters, such as corporate income tax rates, are better measures of 
tax policy (Reed and Rogers 2006, pp.422). Keeping this in mind, I use the top 
corporate income tax rate for each state to explain the variation directly associated 
with state tax policies (Bartik 1985). Meanwhile, more and more states rescinded 
unitary taxation since the 1990s under the huge pressure from multinationals and 
foreign governments. Currently, only Alaska levies unitary tax (Mold 2004).
38
 
Accordingly, unitary taxation is dropped from policy variables in this study.  
                                                 
38
 The reason for multinationals and foreign governments to protest unitary taxation 
in the U.S. is that it “subjected foreign firms to double taxation, required burdensome 
accounting procedures, and forced Transnational Corporations (TNCs) to write 
detailed reports on their global operations.” (Mold 2004, pp. 46). 
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 Second, only Head et al. (1999) consider the role of FTZs. Notably, they 
employ a rough indicator to measure the effect of FTZs. Specifically, they only 
consider the existence of “general-purpose” zones and use a dummy variable which 
equals one if a state has at least one “general-purpose” zone. I extend this by taking 
into consideration both “general-purpose” zones and “subzones”. The key difference 
between the two types of FTZs is that “subzones” are specialized to individual users 
(normally involving manufacturing) and approved only for a specific activity.
39
 
Another advantage of including “subzones” is that there is larger variance in the 
counts of “subzones” between states and within a state over time. Accordingly, I use 
the sum of counts of “general-purpose” and “subzones” for each state to measure the 
presence of FTZs.  
 Third, both Woodward (1992) and Head et al. (1999) focus on attracting 
Japanese investors by establishing investment-promotion offices in Japan. It is worth 
noting that state overseas offices are established in different countries with the 
purpose of promoting and attracting foreign investments. There is also significant 
heterogeneity among states in terms of their international offices.
40
 Following 
Coughlin and Segev (2000), I incorporate the count of foreign offices in different 
countries for each state. More than that, I create different dummy variables for all 
destination countries, and each equals one if there is at least one international office 
                                                 
39
 Foreign Trade Zones, Economic Development Partnership of Alabama, 
www.edpa.org. 
40
 For a detailed discussion of the stylized facts of state offices abroad, refer to 
Section 1.4, “Overseas Investment-Promotion Offices”, in Chapter 2 of the 
dissertation. 
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set by a U.S. state. Hopefully this would allow us to identify differential impacts of 
foreign offices in various countries on attracting foreign investments and creating 
jobs in U.S. 
 Finally, Head et al. (1999) express subsidies in a rate form which equals per-
job subsidies divided by the state’s wage. A critical concern is that a per-job subsidy 
rate could be  endogenous to the extent that foreign plants may not only be attracted 
by subsidies, they may also boost subsidies through some unobserved efforts. One 
example of those unobserved factors is the increased bargaining power due to an FDI 
agglomeration effect. To address this endogeneity issue of job subsidy/grant policy, I 
use per-capita total subsidies paid by a state government as an instrument for state 
employment and capital subsidies. State total subsidies are closely correlated with 
job and investment subsidies but also include benefits going to other sectors, such as 
agricultural and housing subsidies. 
3.3. Empirical Analysis 
 The United States is the largest recipient of world-wide FDI inflows. It has 
significant levels of employment by U.S. affiliates of foreign firms, among which 
manufacturing affiliates capture the largest share of total employment by foreign 
plants in U.S.
41
 The question that what is the role of state investment-promotion 
policies in influencing the FDI-related employment is of particular interest to both 
policy makers and researchers. The present study mainly examines this relationship 
                                                 
41
 For a detailed discussion of the stylized facts and literature on U.S. inbound FDI, 
refer to Chapter  . 
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using panel data on manufacturing FDI-related employment for the 50 U.S. states 
between 1999 and 2008. 
3.3.1 Basic Empirical Model and Data 
 Two types of empirical model are widely employed in aggregate-level studies 
of FDI-related employment. One is the fixed effects linear panel data model that 
regresses a continuous measure of employment by foreign firms on a set of 
independent variables. For example, Fredriksson et al. (2003)
42
 regress two unlogged 
continuous measures of FDI, namely gross value of plant, property and equipment 
(PP&E), and employment by foreign plants, on some covariates expressed at current 
values, such as state environmental stringency, the provision of public goods and 
other control variables. The other approach used is a variety of log-linear models 
which allow for measuring different elasticities associated with FDI activities (e.g. 
Sun et al. 2002). Gross and Ryan (2008) apply a log-linear specification to obtain a 
job-creation elasticity. Their dependent variable is the natural logarithm of 
employment by Japanese-owned firms for each Western Europe country. 
Independent variables are one-year lagged values of six explanatory variables.   
                                                 
42
 My study differs from Fredriksson et al. (2003) in a few important ways. First, 
they mainly focus on the impacts of state environmental regulations and bureaucratic 
corruption on aggregate FDI activities. My study mainly investigates the relationship 
between state investment-promotion policies and FDI-related employment. Second, 
they rely on a linear panel data model and use an instrumental variable estimation. 
My paper, however, relies on a dynamic log-linear specification and use a system 
General Methods of Moments estimator. 
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 My baseline empirical specification is similar in spirit to Gross and Ryan 
(2008). It utilizes a log-linear model where estimation results could better explain 
elastisities of FDI-related employment. In addition, it builds off Gross and Ryan 
(2008) by incorporating both state dummies and time dummies. This approach 
mitigates the concern of biased coefficient estimates associated with omitted 
variables (Co 2001; Fredriksson et al. 2003). To summarize, my basic empirical 
specification is a two-way fixed effects log-linear panel data model for the 50 U.S. 
states between 1999 and 2008: 
                                                        
                                                     
                            (1) 
where    is a time-invariant dummy used to control for some state-level unobserved 
factors that do not vary over time and     is a state-invariant  dummy to capture 
unobserved shocks due to national business cycles. All other variables are selected 
based on the discussion below and are as described below and in Table 3.1. The 
statistics of state-level data on all variables are summarized in Table 3.2. 
 My study uses FDI-related employment as the measure of FDI activities and 
investigates its relationship with state-level attributes. The selection of independent 
variables is based on findings of previous empirical research resulting in a total of 
six sets of state attributes: investment-promotion policies, agglomeration effects, 
market size, labor conditions, transport infrastructure and border effects. 
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3.3.2. Dependent Variable: Measurement of FDI 
 The presence of foreign investment has been measured in various ways, such 
as the stock of investment volume (Ford et al. 2008; Sun et al. 2002), the counts of 
foreign-owned establishments ( List 2001; List et al. 2004), U.S. affiliate sales 
(Blonigen et al. 2007) and the employment level by foreign plants (Gross and Ryan 
2008；Fredriksson et al. 2003). Despite being intensively employed in the literature, 
the first three measures have shortcomings which are worth noting.   
 The stock measure of FDI presence is widely used in studying the technology 
spillover effect of foreign firms on domestic economy. Foreign firms bring new 
research and technology into host markets. But, it usually takes a long time for the 
new research and technology to be fully manifested in domestic firms. So, the larger 
the stock of foreign investment over time, the stronger the foreign control of 
domestic production,
43
 and thus, the higher level of spillover effect on the host 
economy. However, the stock measure of foreign investment may not be adequate 
for understanding foreign firms’ location choices of affiliates. Foreign plants believe 
that more updated market information could be obtained by observing more recent 
                                                 
43
 Investigating the technology spillover effect of foreign-owned firms in U.S., Ford 
et al. (2008) show a very strong positive correlation (above 0.9) between the stock of 
foreign investment and the share of US GDP produced by foreign firms. 
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FDI activities.
44
 Therefore, they are more influenced by the recent flow of FDI when 
they make a location decision.  
 One critical disadvantage of using counts to measure FDI activity is that it 
does not distinguish between establishment size and activities of foreign firms 
(Blonigen et al. 2005).  Locales with more foreign plants are assumed to have a 
larger volume of FDI inflows and a higher level of employment supported by foreign 
firms. However, this assumption is suspicious given that plant size differs 
substantially among establishments and average plant size is likely to be 
heterogeneous even at aggregate levels.
45
 To illustrate how the count measure could 
lead to a misunderstanding of foreign firms’ actual effects on the host economy, let’s 
take a simple comparison. Under the assumption of similar technical content, the 
economic significance of ONE U.S. affiliate of a foreign plant with 500 employees 
should be far beyond the importance of TEN U.S. affiliates with only 5 employees in 
terms of creating jobs and transferring innovation to domestic plants. The difference 
between these cases is best captured with an employment measure of FDI activities.  
                                                 
44
 Using firm-level data on Japanese FDI across all foreign regions, Blonigen et al. 
(2005) distinguish between agglomeration effects ( the stock measure) and 
information effects (one-year lagged flow). Their empirical investigation shows that 
the information effect is more significant in terms of increasing the probability of 
location. 
45
 For example,  Blonigen et al. (2005) show that the average employment level for 
Japanese firms varies considerably among all destination countries, ranging from the 
lowest of 187.4 employees per affiliate in Singapore to the highest of 434.5 in 
Germany. Their empirical investigation confirms that the employee measure results 
in better estimates. 
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 Fredriksson et al. (2003) and Gross and Ryan (2008) use an employment 
outcome measure. Specifically, the former uses employment by foreign 
manufacturing firms in each U.S. state and the latter uses national employment by 
Japanese manufacturing firms in each Western European country. Notably, neither 
explicitly explains the advantages of this measure over alternatives. I utilize an 
employment measure of FDI presence similar to Fredriksson et al. (2003) to correct 
for aforementioned problems associated with other measures.  
 Another reason to rely on this measure lies in the prominent contribution by 
foreign firms in terms of creating U.S. jobs. Promoting employment is a central 
focus of federal and state governments.
46
 Although local governments’ principal role 
is to provide local public services rather than attracting investment, county-level 
studies of FDI location choices report that some local attributes, such as education 
attainment and environmental stringency, are related to FDI location decisions (e.g. 
Devereux et al. 2007; Woodward 1992; Barrios et al. 2006; Coughlin and Segev 
2000; List 2001; List et al. 2004) 
 Finally, as mentioned above, foreign investment brings into the host market 
new research and technology. Some contributions by foreign plants in their 
innovative process could be measured by FDI Research and Development (R&D) 
expenditures, but some innovations are transferred by employing and training 
domestic workers, who may flow into domestic firms. Assuming a similar technical 
                                                 
46
 For detailed information about the business promotion policies across U.S. states, 
refer to Chapter 2. 
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content, a large foreign plant with more employees contributes more to the technical 
spillover effect than a small plant. Using employees of foreign firms to measure 
foreign presence could capture this important mechanism through which the 
technology spillover effect of FDI occurs.
47
  
3.3.3. Business-Promotion Policies 
 The first set of explanatory variables captures state and local governments’ 
efforts to encourage FDI.
48
 Four investment-promotion policies are included to 
provide a comprehensive investigation of business incentives with regard to 
attracting foreign investments. These policies are low corporate income tax rates, 
jobs and capital subsidies/grants, foreign-trade zones and overseas offices. 
 Tax effects on FDI location choice have been widely examined. For example, 
county-level studies usually consider the property tax (e.g. List et al. 2004; List 
2001; Woodward 1992; Coughlin and Segev 2000), while most state- and country-
level studies utilize the corporate income taxation (Woodward 1992; Head et al. 
1999; Coughlin and Segev 2000; Fredriksson et al. 2003; Desai et al 2004). It is 
worth noting that the measure of Corporate Income Tax (CIT) is a core issue and 
several measures of CIT policies are used. Some studies rely on a tax burden 
                                                 
47
 Ford and Rork (2010) also utilize the employment measure of FDI presence. Their 
focus is put on the knowledge spillover effects from foreign firms to U.S. firms at 
state level. The knowledge spillover effect is measured by number of patents applied 
by domestic firms within each U.S. state. The difference between their and my 
measure is that they construct a ratio which equals the employees of U.S. affiliates to 
total employment.  
48
 Refer to Chapter 2 for a detailed discussion of the stylized facts of investment-
promotion policies in U.S. states. 
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variable, defined as the share of government CIT revenues over personal income 
(e.g. Woodward 1992; Head et al. 1999). Other studies construct a tax rate variable, 
expressed as state CIT collection as a percent of gross state product (e.g. Coughlin 
and Segev 2000) or utilize the CIT per-capita variable (Fredriksson et al. 2003). 
 As Reed and Rogers (2006) clarify, these measures are problematic in terms 
of measuring CIT policies. They conclude that the typical tax burden measures lead 
to significant measurement error of actual policy changes, in the sense that they 
include changes driven by non-tax factors (Reed and Rogers 2006, pp. 406), such as 
income, gross product and population. They also suggest using “(s)tatutory tax 
parameters”, such as top CIT rates, as valid instruments to address measurement 
errors associated with measuring tax policies (Reed and Rogers 2006, pp. 422). With 
their findings in mind, and following the state-level research of FDI location choices, 
I construct the tax policy variable (            as the top CIT rate for each U.S. 
state. Offering a competitive top CIT rate and reducing the top rate are viewed as 
efforts by a state to promote business development. 
 Governments also offer grants or subsidies out of tax revenues to investors as 
an inducement for attracting investment. Some firm-level empirical studies 
investigate the role played by subsidies or grants in MNEs’ location decision. For 
example, Devereux et al. (2007) take advantage of the British data on grant received 
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by each plant,
49
 while Girma et al. (2007) utilize a dummy variable indicating 
whether or not a firm received a grant.
50
 However, firm-level grant data are 
unavailable in the U.S. Therefore, firm-level research of FDI location choice in the 
U.S. rarely incorporates factor subsidies/grants. Head et al. (1999) were first to 
explicitly include factor subsidies into their investigation of Japanese MNEs’ 
location decisions in the U.S. They construct the subsidy variable in a rate form by 
dividing per-job subsidies by the state’s wage.  
 A core issue associated with using jobs (capital) subsidies/grants is the policy 
endogeneity. The root for endogeneity in this case is that not only are foreign plants 
attracted by subsidies/grants, they could also boost subsidies if they have an 
increased bargaining power due to an agglomeration effect. Accordingly, instruments 
are used by this paper to address this potential source of estimation errors. One 
reasonable candidate is per-capita total expenditure on subsidies by a state 
government (           ). State total expenditure on subsidies contains items that 
are not significantly affected by the stock of foreign investment, such as housing and 
agricultural subsidies. As shown by Figure 3.1, U.S. states vary significantly in terms 
of per-capita government spending on subsidies. From 1999 to 2008, West Virginia 
                                                 
49
 Devereux et al. (2007) focus on MNEs’ location decision in British counties and 
find that, although government grants have little effect in attracting foreign plants, 
they are less effective than the agglomeration effect.   
50
 Girma et al. (2007) report that discretionary grants have a positive impact on births 
of new manufacturing plants in Ireland between the years 1973 and 1998.  
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had the lowest average annual per-capita subsidy expenditure ($63.3), while South 
Dakota had the largest amount of $403.3.
51
 
 Foreign-Trade Zones (FTZs) are special economic regions designed to lower 
tariff costs of imported intermediate goods via three mechanisms: payment delay, re-
export, and reclassification. Although FTZs have been widely distributed among 
U.S. states, few studies have investigated its role in attracting foreign development. 
Head et al. (1999) were the first to take into account the impact of FTZs using a 
dummy variable to indicate the presence of at least one general-purpose zone in each 
state. One critical drawback associated with using general-purpose zones is that the 
count of these zones rarely changes over time for each state. However, differences 
and changes in state subzones are more substantial. Meanwhile, subzones are 
normally specialized to individual manufacturing users. Accordingly, I measure a 
state’s effort at providing FTZs (      ) as the sum of counts of both general-
purpose zones and subzones. 
 A common practice by U.S. states to promote foreign investments is 
establishing investment-promotion offices or employing official trade representatives 
abroad. Given the prominent existence of Japanese-owned firms in the U.S., state-
level efforts to open overseas offices in Japan have been examined by several studies 
(e.g. Woodward 1992; Head et al. 1999). Coughlin and Segev (2000) extend the 
analysis of this policy by investigating ALL international offices abroad for each 
                                                 
51
Data source: State and Local Government Finance, 1999-2008, U.S. Census 
Bureau. 
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state. Following Coughlin and Segev (2000), I utilize the counts of all overseas 
offices for each state (         ) to measure the state’s effort at opening offices 
abroad. In addition, I build off of Coughlin and Segev (2000) by creating separate 
dummy variables for all host countries (refer to Appendix 3.A for the country list and 
detailed information). They are employed to test the differential roles of offices in 
various host countries in promoting U.S. employment. The validity of using 
instruments to identify these dummies in a dynamic system GMM estimation is 
reported by SARGAN test results. 
3.3.4. Agglomeration Explanatory Variables 
 The literature on agglomeration claims that foreign firms in the same industry 
cluster within a region to utilize the convenience from information sharing and labor 
pooling and to strengthen their bargaining power against domestic governments (Du 
et al, 2008; Blonigen et al, 2005; Head et al, 1999; List, 2001; etc). Various measures 
of FDI agglomeration have been employed in the literature. For instance, cumulative 
FDI stock has been widely considered in aggregate-level studies (see for reference, 
Baltagi et al. 2007; Cheng and Kwan 2000; Desai et al. 2004; Ge 2009; Hajazi 2009; 
Kemegue & Mohan 2009; Kolstad & Vilanger 2008; Sun et al. 2002). Most micro-
level papers, on the other hand, utilize the cumulative count of foreign plants (e.g. 
Devereux et al. 2007; Du et al. 2008a,b; Head et al. 1999; Levinson 1996; List and 
Co 2000; Woodward 1992; Lee et al. 2007).
52
 However, the employment measure of 
                                                 
52
 Although they all use the count of foreign firms to measure FDI clustering, they 
construct different variables. For example, both focusing on foreign firms’ location 
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FDI clustering has been used in only a few studies (Blonigen et al. 2005; Barrios et 
al. 2006). To better capture the dynamic feature of employment outcomes, my study 
follows Blonigen et al. (2005) using one-year lagged employment levels to measure 
FDI agglomeration effects. Specifically, I incorporate two different dimensions of 
FDI clustering. 
 Intra-industry (Within-state) Agglomeration. This dimension of FDI 
clustering has been the most intensively examined in the literature of FDI location 
choices (Arauzo-Carod et al. 2010). I use one-year lagged employment level of U.S. 
manufacturing affiliates in state i (MANUFEMPi,t-1) to capture this dimension of 
agglomeration. A similar measure is used by Blonigen et al. (2005). They distinguish 
between the “information” effect (one-year lagged level of employment by foreign 
manufacturing firms) and the “agglomeration” effect (summation of employees by 
foreign manufacturing firms over all previous years). I do not include the cumulative 
employment measure of FDI agglomeration for two reasons. First, Blonigen et al. 
(2005) report that only one-year lagged FDI-related employment plays a significant 
role in attracting Japanese firms. This result suggests that recent FDI activities could 
reflect more updated market situation and thus are more important to foreign 
                                                                                                                                          
decision in U.S. and utilizing a Logit model, Head et al. (1999) use the previous 
year’ count of foreign manufacturing plants in a state to measure within-industry FDI 
clustering, while List (2001) employs the summation of the count of all foreign 
establishments in the period 1974-1982 for each county to measure cross-industry 
FDI agglomeration economies. Du et al. (2008a, b) study the location choices by 
foreign plants in China and measure FDI agglomeration effect in a province by its 
share of the count of foreign manufacturing firms over the national level. 
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investments. Second, in contrast to their conditional Logit specification, my 
dependent variable is the employment by foreign manufacturing plants. If I followed 
Blonigen et al. (2005), then there would be a significant problem of colinearity 
between three employment variables, namely, the current-year employment by 
foreign firms, the previous–year FDI-related employment and the accumulation of 
FDI employment for all previous years. As a result, only last year’s employment by 
U.S. manufacturing affiliates in state i (MANUFEMPi,t-1) is used to capture the intra-
industry (within-state) agglomeration effect. 
 All-industry (Cross-state) Agglomeration. FDI location decisions across 
multiple regions are not independent. They may depend on FDI in proximate locales 
(Head et al. 1995). I include a variable to measure the cross-state FDI agglomeration 
effects (∑               ), which is the sum of employment by foreign plants in all 
industries over all adjacent states. Evidence of FDI spatial correlation between 
countries is rich. For example, micro-level studies, such as Head et al. (1995) and 
Head and Mayer (2004), allow for the potential third-country effect by incorporating 
individual firms’ location decisions among all destination countries into a 
conditional-logit specification. Aggregate-level empirical research on this spatial 
correlation between FDI into adjacent markets, however, is sparse. To my 
knowledge, the study by Blonigen et al. (2007) is the only one that considers the 
spatial interaction of FDI using a cross-country sample. Their results suggest that 
U.S. multinationals tend to locate their affiliates in countries with FDI-rich 
neighbors. 
  
71 
 
 Importantly, the spatial interaction of FDI becomes more significant for 
investigations that rely on smaller territorial units, such as states and counties 
(Arauzo-Carod 2010). Head et al. (1999) calculate for each state a measure of 
adjacent states’ FDI agglomeration in the formula ∑          , where      is the 
count of foreign plants in state j and    is a dummy variable which equals one if state 
j is adjacent to state i. The problem associated with discrete choice models is that it 
assumes strict restrictions on the data, e.g., the assumption of the independence of 
irrelevant alternatives (IIA).  
 My aggregate-level study uses a measure which is similar to the one used by 
Head et al. (1999) except that employment is used instead of the count measure. 
There are two reasons for including this inter-industry dimension of FDI 
agglomeration concerning the spatial interaction between neighboring states. First, 
the agglomeration effect could be spillovers from neighboring states when foreign-
owned firms are located in the bordering areas. Second, adjacent states may compete 
for FDI to stimulate domestic economy by offering aggressive promotion policies. 
When the latter effect is stronger than the former, then FDI located in one state may 
“crowd-out” foreign investment in adjacent states. From the estimated coefficient on 
this interstate agglomeration variable, we can infer whether the crowd-out effect 
(indicated by a negative sign) dominates the agglomeration effect (indicated by a 
positive sign). 
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3.3.5. Market Size Variables 
 This set of explanatory variables describes the market potential for each state. 
Gravity theory is widely used in international trade field to explain both MNE 
activity and trade flows. It predicts that the larger the sum of host and home 
countries’ economic size, the larger the involved trade flows.53 Conventional 
empirical studies of FDI location choice are also based on gravity type models (Ng 
and Tuan 2001, 2003, 2006, 2007; Broaconier et al. 2005; etc). A strict 
implementation of the gravity model requires specific information on distance and 
direction of each trade flow between two trade partners. Notably, the importance of 
distance between host and home regions for foreign investors is not as prominent as 
it is to trade flows (Markusen 1984). Correspondingly, many empirical FDI location 
studies that rely on other empirical approaches have dropped the distance variable 
but kept the market size variable.  
 Two general approaches are employed in the literature to measure market 
potential. One uses a population measure. For example, Gross and Ryan (2008) use 
total population to measure the local market size for each Western Europe country, 
while List (2001) and Woodward (1992) measure market size and accessibility for 
each U.S. county by population density (population/land area). The other approach 
uses an income measure. For instance, in their examination of the difference in 
                                                 
53
 The theoretical model for trade flows between regions i and j takes the form of  
      
    
    
 , where M is the economic size of each region, D is the distance and G 
is a constant. The model was first used by Tinbergen (1962). 
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business location decisions between foreign and domestic firms, List et al. (2004) 
include county per-capita income as a measure for host market potential. The same 
measure is also used by Head et al. (1999) and Woodward (1992) for each U.S. state 
and by Coughlin and Segev (2000) for each U.S. economic area.  
 I follow the second approach and use state-level per-capita personal income 
(         ) to measure host market demand and capacity. The income measure 
outperforms the population measure in the sense that personal income could better 
reflect buying power in a market. The larger the buying power of a domestic market, 
the larger the U.S. FDI inflows with a “market-seeking” purpose. However, a larger 
domestic market size may also reflect a stronger power of domestic firms, which 
could discourage foreign-owned firms. Accordingly, the expected sign associated 
with the variable           may be ambiguous. 
 To control for the potential spatial interaction in market demand between 
states, I construct a variable, the sum of all adjacent states’ per-capita 
income ∑               ). This variable captures the effect of demand in contiguous 
states on foreign firms’ location decisions (Head et al. 1999). This dimension of 
market potential is quite important for MNEs following the model of “horizontal 
FDI”, because those multinationals invest and produce in one region and then sell 
products to surrounding regions of the host market.  
3.3.6. Labor Conditions Variables 
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 The fourth set of independent variables reflects the labor cost and quality for 
each U.S. state.  
 Labor cost. Among all human capital characteristics, wage has been the most 
extensively investigated in FDI literature. I incorporate a variable 
               , which is the average annual compensation per manufacturing 
worker in a state. A similar measure, average annual wage per manufacturing 
worker, has been used by studies such as Broaconier et al. (2005), McConnell and 
Schwab (1990), List et al. (2004) and List (2001). Other studies such as Woodward 
(1992), Fredriksson et al. (2003), and Coughlin and Segev (2000) use the average 
manufacturing hourly wage rate. Compensation paid per manufacturing worker 
includes supplements to wages and salaries. Therefore, it is a more accurate 
measurement for the actual costs associated with hiring one employee. 
 Labor market. The effect of state unemployment variation on a foreign firm’s 
location decision is ambiguous (Coughlin and Segev 2000). For one thing, a high 
jobless rate may indicate the availability of labor. Following this logic, a state with a 
higher unemployment rate may attract more foreign plants due to its larger job 
applicant pool (Head et al. 1999). On the other hand, a high unemployment rate may 
not be attractive for expanding FDI because it could indicate a lower labor turnover 
and a lower availability of efficient workers. This would be true if the unemployment 
was induced by efficiency wages (Shapiro and Stiglitz 1984; Basu and Felkey 2008). 
In that case, foreign investment may be discouraged due to the larger labor cost. 
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Alternatively, a high unemployment rate could boost current workers’ effort by 
warning them of a surplus in the labor market. The higher the unemployment rate, 
the larger the probability of being fired for shirking. For another reason, foreign 
firms may avoid locating their affiliates in high unemployment regions if they treat 
high jobless rates as a warning of “(l)ess-competitive industrial conditions and a 
lower quality of life” (Woodward 1992, pp. 700).  
 Labor quality. In their survey paper, Arauzo-Carod et al. (2010) demonstrate 
a general conclusion that a higher level of educational attainment in the working 
population is conducive to attracting foreign investments. Following Coughlin and 
Segev (2000), I use the share of population over 25 years old with at least a high 
school diploma for each state,       , to measure state labor force quality. 
Woodward (1992) utilizes the median year of school completed for the working 
population in each U.S. county. Some other researchers have used government 
expenditures on education (e.g. McConnell and Schwab 1990; Gabe and Bell 2004). 
However, my measure reflects the actual average performance of working population 
in education attainment. This seems to be what actually matters to foreign investors. 
3.3.7. Transport Infrastructure Variables 
 A better transportation system could facilitate firms in their activities of 
transporting inputs and outputs. In addition, better transport infrastructures could 
reduce workers’ commuting cost. As a result, extensive studies have hypothesized a 
better transport infrastructure as a positive determinant for industrial location 
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decision (Arauzo-Carod et al. 2010). Previous studies differ in the measures of 
transport infrastructure. List et al. (2004) use total highway expenditures to measure 
a local government’s effort to provide a better transportation system for each U.S. 
county. Coughlin and Segev (2000) utilize a dummy variable which equals one for 
counties with at least one interstate highway. Fredriksson et al. (2003) employ state 
total highway mileages without normalizing. I employ state per square mile highway 
mileages (            to measure the accessibility to transport infrastructure for 
U.S. states. My measure of state transport infrastructure reflects the actual existing 
situation of transportation system. Normalizing state total highway mileages by 
square miles controls for the measurement errors associated with state geographical 
area. 
3.3.8. Border Effects Variables 
 When it comes to analyzing location decisions by foreign plants, border 
effects are a concern. Foreign investors may find it convenient to establish a business 
in border areas to serve both the local market and a third-country that share borders 
with the host market (Arauzo-Carod et al. 2010). Regarding FDI location choices in 
Europe, border effects have been examined by Cie ́lik (2005). He focuses on the 
location behavior of world-wide foreign investments in Poland in the 1990s. His 
result suggests significant border effects by showing that Polish regions that share 
borders with EU countries are more attractive to foreign investors than their 
counterparts which share borders with Eastern non-EU countries.  
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 Notably, very little attention has been paid to border effects on FDI location 
decisions in the U.S. The U.S. borders only two countries: four U.S. states 
(California, Arizona, New Mexico and Texas) borders Mexico,
54
 and twelve (Alaska, 
Washington, Idaho, Montana, North Dakota, Minnesota, Michigan, Ohio, New York, 
Vermont, New Hampshire and Maine) share borders with Canada.
55
 Trade statistics 
suggest that there exists potential border effects regarding states adjacent to Mexico 
and Canada when foreign plants make location decisions in the U.S. Canada has 
been the largest trade partner with the U.S. for a long time, and Mexico has been the 
3
rd
 largest. In 2009, the total value of imports and exports between Canada (Mexico) 
and the U.S. was $429.64 billion ($305.53 billion).
56
 To reflect the importance of 
border effects, I construct two dummy variables,              , which are set 
equal to one for states that share borders with Mexico and Canada, respectively. The 
resulting estimate of coefficients on these dummies may indicate whether or not 
border states are more attractive to foreign investors and thus have a higher level of 
FDI-related employment. 
3.4. Econometric Framework 
 Because FDI-related employment in a state is dynamically correlated with  its 
lagged value, I employ the Blundell-Bond (1998) Dynamic System GMM Estimation 
                                                 
54
 Map of Border Governments, U.S. - Mexico Border Field Office of the Pan 
American Health Organization, http://www.fep.paho.org/bcmap.asp. 
55
 The Canada-U.S. Border Map, the Canada - United States Transportation Border 
Working Group, http://www.thetbwg.org/map_e.htm. 
56
 Data source: Top Trading Partners - Surplus, Deficit, Total Trade, Foreign Trade 
Statistics, the U.S. Census Bureau, http://www.census.gov/foreign-
trade/top/index.html#1998. 
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(DSGMM) to control for potential problems associated with the dynamically 
determined system (Barrios et al. 2006; Cheng and Kwan 2000; Ge 2009; Kemegue 
and Mohan 2009; Sun et al. 2002). The discussion below demonstrates how the 
DSGMM approach works in solving some critical econometric issues associated 
with my empirical specification. 
3.4.1. Econometric Issues  
 For the sake of analytic convenience, Equation (1) can be re-written in a 
more general form: 
              
                 
                                                                                                                                              
 Equation (2) is a two-way fixed effects dynamic panel regression with a 
lagged dependent variable on the right-hand side. Assuming that the fixed effect 
components of error terms,            , are independently distributed across   and 
have the standard assumptions that  
          (    )         (      )             
                                                   
  (        )                                                                                    
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  In addition to assumptions on error terms, there is also a standard assumption 
on initial conditions      (Blundell and Bond 1998), 
   (        )                                                                              
 Conditions (2.1) through (2.3) necessitate corresponding specification tests 
described in Section 4.4. 
 Several econometric issues may arise from estimating Equation (2).
57
 First, 
some explanatory variables, such as investment-promotion policies, manufacturing 
compensation and per-capita personal income etc, are assumed to be endogenous. 
However, endogeneity may run in both directions (Cheng and Kwan 2000), causing 
these regressors to be correlated with disturbances. Second, some state-level 
unobserved geographical and demographical characteristics (i.e. fixed effects,   , and 
observation-specific errors,     ) are time-invariant and may be correlated with other 
explanatory variables (Cameron and Trivedi 2005, pp. 764). Third, the presence of 
the lagged dependent variable,       , may result in serial autocorrelation in error 
terms (Cameron and Trivedi 2005, pp.763). Finally, my panel dataset contains a 
short time period (T=10) and a larger state dimension (N=50). In panels with a long 
enough time span, shocks associated with states’ fixed effects will decline with time. 
However, with a panel that has a small-T large-N dimension, it becomes more 
                                                 
57
 For a detailed discussion of why standard panel estimators, such as OLS, 
fixed/random effects and 1
st
-differenced OLS, are inconsistent when the regressors 
include lagged dependent variables, please refer to Cameron and Trivedi (2005), pp. 
764 - pp. 765. 
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important to address this potential bias in a dynamic setting (Blundell and Bond 
1998). 
 The aforementioned econometric issues provide significant implications for 
specifying an appropriate model estimation. To solve these problems, I follow 
Blundell and Bond (1998) and utilize a system Generalized Method of Moments 
(GMM) framework. It starts with the Arellano and Bond (1991) differenced GMM 
estimation. It then augments the first-differenced moment conditions by using the 
level moment conditions. This augmentation process is conducted by incorporating 
the level equation to obtain a system of equations: one in differenced and one in 
levels. 
3.4.2. First-Differenced GMM: Arellano and Bond (1991) 
 Following Arellano and Bond (1991), my GMM approach begins with 
estimating the first-differenced version of Equation (2): 
                
                  
                                                                     
in which, the state-specific effects are removed by the differencing operation. 
Assuming away the serial correlation in level error terms     , two-year or longer 
lagged values of y are qualified as instruments for        in the first-differenced 
system (Cameron and Trivedi 2005, pp. 765).  
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 This implies the following moment conditions: 
 (            )                                                                                                                                                
 The GMM estimator makes use of lagged values of independent variables as 
additional instruments (Cameron and Trivedi 2005, pp. 766). If explanatory variables 
were strictly exogenous, then current, past and future values of    could be valid 
instruments (Cameron and Trivedi 2005, pp. 749): 
 (              )                                                                             
 However, given the potential endogeneity issue due to reverse causality of 
some covariates, current and one-year lagged explanatory variables may be 
correlated with error terms and thus are endogenous: 
 (          )                                                                                                                                                                                                   
 To address this issue, I assume weak exogeneity of independent variables 
(Cameron and Trivedi 2005, pp. 749): 
 (          )                                                                                                                                                                                                  
 Equation (7) implies that only a subset of Equation (5) could be used as 
additional moment conditions (Arellano and Bond 1991): 
 (              )                                                                         
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3.4.3. System GMM:  Blundell and Bond (1998) 
 The first-differenced GMM approach estimates Equation (3) by utilizing 
moment conditions given by Equations (4) and (8). It is worth noting that sometimes 
lagged regressors, particularly the time-invariant explanatory variables, are poor 
instruments for the first-differenced model. This occurs because they are eliminated 
by the first-differencing operation. This induces problems in my study because some 
policy variables of interest are nearly constant for some states over time, such as 
state top CIT rates (TAXRATE), host country dummies in which each equals one if a 
state has office(s) in that country (HOST), the number of overseas offices (OFFICE), 
and border effects dummies for two countries (Canada and Mexico). The first-
differences of these variables are relatively uninformative. 
 The aforementioned problems associated with the first-differenced GMM 
could be addressed by using a Dynamic System GMM estimator provided by 
Blundell and Bond (1998). Their model builds off the first-differenced GMM model 
by utilizing more moment conditions that are based on the level equation. Therefore, 
variables in the level equation are instrumented with their own first differences 
(Cheng and Kwan 2000; Cameron and Trivedi 2005, pp. 766). 
 Following Blundell and Bond (1998), I expand the first-differenced GMM by 
adding the level equation, Equation (2), into the system: 
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 The lagged differences of y,        , could be used as instruments in the level 
Equation (2), which implies the following moment conditions (Arellano and Bover 
1995; Blundell and Bond 1998): 
 (             )                                                                                                     
 The lagged differences of x,        , could also be used as instruments based 
on the assumption of a strict exogeneity for explanatory variables (see Equation(6)). 
However, considering the possibility of endogenous covariates due to the reverse 
causality, I assume that weak exogeneity exists (see Equation (7)). This assumption 
leads to additional moment conditions for estimating the level equation (Cameron 
and Trivedi 2005, pp.749 and pp.766): 
 (             )                                                                                                                                   
 The system GMM estimator could increase efficiency over Arellano and 
Bond (1991) by employing more moment conditions (Cheng and Kwan 2000).
58
 
However, in addition to assumptions used for estimating the 1
st
-differenced equation, 
this efficiency gain comes with the cost of additional assumptions that the first-
                                                 
58
 Built off the Arellano-Bond (1991) estimator, various more efficient estimators are 
obtained by using different additional moment conditions. For example, Ahn and 
Schmidt (1995) use the moment conditions               ; Arellano and Bover 
(1995) add the moment conditions  (             )     etc. For a detailed discussion 
of what additional assumptions are added on Arellano-Bond (1991) estimation to 
increase the efficiency, refer to Cameron and Trivedi (2005), pp.766. 
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differenced instruments for variables in the level equation are not correlated with 
unobserved region effects (Blundell and Bond 1998). To justify these assumptions, I 
conduct some specification tests which are explained in detail in the next section. 
3.4.4. Specification Tests for System GMM: AR(1), AR(2) and SARGAN Tests 
 My study relies on the Blundell-Bond system GMM estimator which 
estimates simultaneously the first-differenced and the level equation. Equations (4)-
(8) and Equations (9)-(10) imply two sets of linear moment conditions for estimating 
the differenced and the level equation, respectively. The consistency of the GMM 
estimator depends on the validity of these moment conditions. To apply these 
moments, two critical assumptions are made: one is that of auto-correlation on level 
residuals; the other is that of the exogeneity of instruments. Therefore, it is important 
to investigate the validity of these assumptions. 
 The results of a Sargan/Hansen’s J test proposed by Sargan (1958) and 
Hansen (1982) indicate the overall validity of selected instruments (Blundel and 
Bond 1998; Cheng and Kwan 2000; Ge 2009). Its null hypothesis is that the 
instruments are exogenous as a group. It compares the value given by the minimized 
GMM criterion function with the critical values from a    distribution whose degree 
of freedom equals the difference between the number of moment conditions and 
number of parameters. If the former is smaller, then the null hypothesis cannot be 
rejected. Accordingly, the larger the p-value of the SARGAN statistic, the stronger 
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the instruments.
59
 The SARGAN test is applied to both the first-differenced equation 
and the level equation. 
 Because a lagged dependent variable is included on the right-hand-side of the 
regression, the consistency of estimates depends critically on the lack of second-
order serial correlation. Accordingly, the AR(1) and AR(2) tests are conducted to test 
the null hypothesis of zero first-order and second-order autocorrelation, respectively, 
between the differenced residuals (Ge 2009; Barrios et al. 2006). Given that the first-
order autocorrelation in differenced residuals is obvious by construction, the AR(1) 
test usually rejects the null hypothesis.
60
 The test for AR(2) in differenced residuals 
is more informative. A high reported p-value in AR(2) test indicates that the moment 
conditions are valid due to the lack of second order serial correlation in level 
residuals.
61
 
3.5. Results 
 Column (1) of Table 3.3 reports the regression results for the basic Blundell-
Bond (1998) Dynamic System GMM (DSGMM) estimation. The sample for the 
basic model includes all 50 states during the period 1999-2008. In the base model, 
two-year lagged values of state domestic independent variables are used as 
                                                 
59
 Readers are referred to Cameron and Trivedi (2005), pp.277, for a detailed 
discussion of the relevant formulae and the statistical distribution of SARGAN test. 
60
 To illustrate,                   and                       both contain       . 
61
 For a detailed introduction of AR(1) and AR(2) processes, readers are referred to 
Hamilton (1994), pp.53 – pp.58. The book also provides a detailed discussion of the 
maximum likelihood estimation for the Gaussian AR(1) and AR(2) processes on 
pp.118 – pp.126. 
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instruments. Specifically,        and         are used as instruments in the first-
differenced equation; while,         and         are instruments for the level 
equation. The reported AR(1) and AR(2) tests indicate that with the lag of two years 
there is no significant autocorrelation in error terms. The reported P-value of 
Sargan/Hansen test supports the validity of selected instruments. 
 The estimated coefficient on corporate income tax (            is found to 
be positive and statistically significant. This result diverges from previous studies 
that find either a negative effect of income tax (Bartik 1985; Head et al. 1999; 
Woodward 1992; Coughlin and Segev 2000) or an insignificant income tax effect 
(Levinson 1996; Blonigen & Davies 2004).
62
 It is worth noting that among these 
studies, Bartik (1985), Levinson (1996), and  Coughlin and Segev (2000) do not 
control for benefits of government spending other than the transport infrastructure; 
while Head et al. (1999), Woodward (1992) and Blonigen and Davies (2004) do not 
include any benefits of public spending. Ignoring the benefits of government 
spending financed by taxes may result in a biased estimation of tax effects on 
business activities (Gabe and Bell 2004). To address this potential measurement 
error, I incorporate the government spending on subsidies/grants to measure the 
benefits associated with tax collections.  
                                                 
62
 Studies that rely on property tax tend to report an insignificant effect of property 
tax on FDI location choices. For example, Bartik (1985), Carlton (1983), Woodward 
(1992) and List (2001) both report an insignificant property tax effect on FDI 
location choices in U.S. counties. However, studies that use the overall tax collection 
to measure the tax burden tend to find a negative effect of total tax collection on 
local attractiveness. For reference of such evidence in U.S. states, see List and Co 
(2001) and Fredriksson et al. (2003). 
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 The estimated coefficient on governmental subsidies/grants for production 
factors (          ) suggests that a 10 percent increase in per-capita total subsidies 
is correlated with 0.5 percent higher employment by foreign manufacturing plants. 
The reported positive relationship is consistent with the study by Head et al. (1999). 
Although this estimated coefficient is statistically insignificant, its economic 
significance is worth noting. Take California as an example. In 2008, per-capita 
government spending on total subsidies/grants in California was $216.19; per-capita 
government spending on job-training (labor) and housing-and-urban-development 
(capital) subsidies was $15.28 and $29.76, respectively. The employment by foreign 
manufacturing plants was 193,300. So, per-capita labor and capital subsidy spending 
accounted for 20.83% of total subsidies per-capita. According to the estimated 
coefficient, a 2 percent increase in per-capita government spending on job and capita 
subsidies (i.e. $45.04 * 0.02 = $0.9 per capita) is associated with an estimated 0.5 
percent more employment by foreign manufacturing plants (i.e. 193,300 * 0.5% = 
966.5 employees).
63
  
 Foreign Trade Zones, both “general-purpose” zones and subzones together, 
have a predicted significant and positive impact on the FDI-related employment 
level. The estimates suggest that a 10 percent increase in the count of FTZs is 
associated with 3.2 percent more employment supported by foreign manufacturing 
firms. The same positive effect of FTZs on FDI location choices is reported by Head 
                                                 
63
 The data for these calculations are from Stimulus Spending by State, the Wall 
Street Journal, August 6, 2009. 
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et al. (1999). Note that, their study examines only one type of FTZs, namely the 
“general-purpose” zones. Because the count of such zones rarely varies over time, 
they employ a dummy variable which equals one for states with at least one 
“general-purpose” zone. This measure, however, cannot be applied to my sample in 
the sense that between 1999 and 2008 all states have such zones.  
      Studies by Head et al. (1999), Woodward (1992) and Coughlin and Segev 
(2000) all report that the opening of investment-promotion offices in Japan could 
attract more Japanese firms. The estimate results for           suggest that the total 
number of state trade offices abroad has a predicted small and insignificant negative 
effect on the employment by foreign firms. Moreover, the selection of host countries 
is quite notable. The estimation results of coefficients on all host country dummy 
variables suggest that having international offices in a combination of countries, 
including Austria, China, Egypt, Ghana, Israel, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Spain, 
Mexico, Singapore and Turkey, is correlated with 4.2 percent more employees in 
foreign manufacturing firms in the U.S. On average, opening one more trade office 
in these countries is correlated with a 0.35 percent increase in U.S. manufacturing 
FDI-related employment.
64
 However, holding overseas offices in some other 
                                                 
64
 Appendix 3.B describes the results of coefficients for all host country dummies. 
The role of international offices in promoting FDI-related employment deserves a 
more in-depth investigation.  Most previous studies of FDI location choices in the 
U.S. have been focusing on such offices in one or a couple of countries, e.g. Japan.  
To my knowledge, no study currently conducts a systematic and comprehensive 
analysis of overseas offices. An investigation by employing country dummy 
variables is rough and tentative. One interesting  extension could be conducting a 
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countries, such as Brazil, Chile, Germany, Russia, South Africa, Taiwan, Vietnam, 
etc, is correlated with less employment by foreign firms in U.S. states. 
 Consistent with the literature on FDI agglomeration, the estimated 
coefficients on both intra-industry-within-state agglomeration 
(                and all-industry-cross-state FDI clustering 
(∑                  are positive and significant at 1% and 10% level, respectively 
(Devereux et al. 2007; Woodward 1992; Coughlin and Segev 2000; List 2001; Head 
et al. 1999).
65
 The former result suggests that foreign manufacturing firms in the U.S. 
tend to cluster within one state. The latter suggests that FDI between contiguous 
states is not crowding out each other. Instead, foreign manufacturing plants are more 
likely to operate businesses in a region where neighbors have more FDI in all 
industries. One explanation for the significant all-industry, cross-state agglomeration 
effect is that FDI in adjacent states could indicate the proximity to nearby specialized 
inputs.  
 The estimated coefficient on the host market size (            , although 
positive, is statistically insignificant. Moreover, adjacent market demand 
(∑                  is estimated to be negatively correlated with FDI activity at 5% 
significance level. Most extant studies report a positive relationship between market 
potential and FDI activities (Gross and Ryan 2008; Head et al. 1999; List et al. 2004; 
                                                                                                                                          
“benefit vs. cost” analysis by incorporating the state governmental spending 
associated with holding international offices  
65
 A few studies report that the agglomeration has negative effect on FDI location 
decisions, for reference, see List et al. (2004) and Sun et al. (2002). 
  
90 
 
Sun et al. 2002; etc). At first glance my result conflicts with the theoretical 
expectation that a larger domestic economy may attract more FDI. The expectation 
above, however, could merely reflect the behavior of “horizontal” FDI with a 
purpose of market-seeking (Markusen 1984). An alternative model of FDI behavior 
is the “vertical” FDI which predicts that foreign investors, especially the European 
and Japanese investors, produce goods in U.S. affiliates and then re-import a large 
portion of the products back to Europe and Japan or export them to other countries 
(Helpman and Krugman 1985). From this perspective, a larger U.S. state market size 
may not result in more FDI. On the contrary, foreign manufacturing firms may like 
to locate in states with a lower per-capita income to utilize lower production costs. 
This interpretation is consistent with the study by Braconier et al. (2005) which 
concludes that MNEs with headquarters in skill-intensive countries (e.g. Europe and 
Japan) tend to invest more in regions where unskilled labor is relatively cheap. This 
negative effect of the host market size is also reported in a study of U.S. inbound 
FDI by Fredriksson et al. (2003). 
 The coefficient on manufacturing annual per-employee compensation 
(                  is estimated to be positive but statistically insignificant. This 
result is weakly consistent with some other empirical studies of U.S. inbound FDI 
which find evidence that foreign plants tend to pay higher wages ( Head et al. 1999; 
Broaconier et al 2005; List et al. 2004). State unemployment rate (              
has an estimated significant and negative impact on the FDI-related employment. 
One explanation is that foreign firms treat a high jobless rate as a signal of economic 
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downturn and a lower quality of life. As a result, they avoid locating affiliates in 
such regions (Woodward 1992; Fredriksson et al. 2003). The estimated coefficient 
on the educational attainment variable (        is negative and statistically 
significant. This is inconsistent with most studies that report a positive effect of 
education attainment on business location choices (Coughlin and Segev 2000; 
Woodward 1992). However, considering that the level of education is a “(p)lausible 
exogenous determinant of wages”, the negative effect of this education variable on 
FDI-related employment may actually come from some unobserved negative effects 
of wages (Bartik 1985, pp.21). 
  Consistent with most studies of FDI location choices (e.g. Bartik 1985; 
Levinson 1996; Coughlin and Segev 2000; List 2001; Fredriksson et al. 2003), the 
coefficient on transportation system variable (              is estimated to be 
positive and statistically significant at one percent level of significance: a 10 percent 
increase in state highway mileages leads to a predicted 2.5 percent growth in 
employment by foreign manufacturing plants. This result, combined with the 
estimated positive tax effect, indicates that foreign manufacturing firms tend to 
operate in regions with better infrastructures, even though these come with a larger 
tax burden.  
 My results also show evidence of a positive and significant Canadian border 
effect: states that neighbor Canada are predicted to have 0.2 percent more 
employment supported by manufacturing MNEs on average. However, the Mexican 
  
92 
 
border effect is estimated to be a small negative amount, and is statistically 
insignificant. Empirical research of FDI location choices that investigates the border 
effects in the U.S. is sparse. Therefore, to my knowledge, there is no exiting result 
with which to compare. A similar finding is reported by Cieslik (2005). He 
concludes that Polish regions along EU countries are more attractive to foreign 
investors than their counterparts sharing borders with Eastern non-EU countries. 
3.6. Robustness Check 
 As the first sensitivity test, I run the same Blundell and Bond (1998) dynamic 
system GMM (DSGMM) estimation with the basic model for all 50 states except for 
using 3-year lagged values as instruments. To be specific,        and         are used 
as instruments in the first-differenced equation; while,         and         are 
instruments for the level equation. Given that the AR(2) test only tests for 
autocorrelation at exactly the second-order lag,  the AR(3) test is employed to 
investigate the potential for third-order autocorrelation. The regression results are 
reported in Column (2) of Table 3.3. The reported P-value of the AR(3) test indicates 
that there is no significant autocorrelation in error terms with 3-year lags. When we 
use the past information implied by deeper lags as instruments, the Sargan/Hansen 
test indicates an increase in the validity of selected instruments (P-value goes up 
from 0.1395 to 0.6612).  
 Compared with the coefficient estimates in the basic model, most coefficients 
are estimated to have same signs and similar magnitudes. One difference is that the 
  
93 
 
coefficient on the cross-state, all-industry agglomeration effect becomes much 
smaller and insignificant. One other important difference appears in the estimated 
coefficient on the tax variable. The estimated tax effect drops by half from 0.802 to 
0.445 and becomes insignificant. Lastly, the estimated coefficients on host country 
dummy variables change. As shown by Column (2) of Appendix 3.B, the coefficients 
for Mexico, Singapore and Turkey are no longer significantly positive and having 
state offices in the EU is no longer correlated with less employment by foreign 
manufacturing plants in the U.S. Having international offices in the suggested 
combination of host countries, as a whole, is predicted to be correlated with 3.0% 
more manufacturing FDI-related employment. 
 This study also investigates the spatial interaction of FDI-related employment 
between adjacent states. In another robustness check, I exclude observations for 
Alaska and Hawaii, which have no neighboring U.S states, and then run the 
DSGMM model using this subsample. Regression results for the subsample with 2-
year and 3-year lagged variables as instruments, are reported in Column (3) and 
Column (4) of Table 3.3, respectively. Compared with the estimation results of the 
basic model, the cross-state, all-industry agglomeration effect is strengthened: not 
only does the coefficient increase from 0.132 to 0.265, the significance level also 
increases to 1 percent. The positive corporate income tax effect is also increased to 1 
percent significance level with a larger magnitude of 1.124. Meanwhile, differences 
are found in the coefficients for host country dummies. State offices in more 
countries are now estimated to be positively associated with FDI-related employment 
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in the U.S. (see Column (3) and (4) of Appendix 3.B for detailed information of all 
coefficients). 
 As Figure 3.2 shows, the manufacturing FDI-related employment is 
distributed unevenly among U.S. states. California has the largest average share 
(8.95%), while Hawaii has the lowest average share (0.06%). I define a state as FDI-
rich if it captures more than 5 percent of the national manufacturing FDI-related 
employment. Accordingly, a total of six states are defined as FDI-rich and treated as 
large outliers: California (8.95%), Texas (6.52%), Ohio (5.99%), Michigan (5.24%), 
Pennsylvania (5.10%) and Indiana (5.09%).
66
 As a whole, they account for 36.89% 
of overall employment by foreign manufacturing firms between 1999 and 2008. To 
exclude one source of unobservable determinants associated with FDI-rich states, I 
remove them from the sample.  
 Column (5) and (6) of Table 3.3 report the DSGMM regression results for 
this subsample with 2-year and 3-year lagged variables as instruments, respectively. 
Compared with regression results for the full sample, some important patterns of FDI 
activities for states in lower tiers (in terms of FDI-related employment) are notable. 
First, states in lower tiers are more sensitive to neighbors. To illustrate, the inter-
state, all-industry agglomeration effect is more significant to FDI in lower-tier states: 
a 10 percent increase in FDI-related employment in neighboring states is associated 
                                                 
66
 Percentage in parentheses is the manufacturing FDI-related employment share for 
each state over the overall U.S foreign manufacturing employment during the period 
1999-2008.    
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with 2.56 percent more employment by in-state foreign manufacturing firms. 
Meanwhile, the negative coefficient on the adjacent-state market size variable 
becomes larger in magnitude and raises its significance level.  
 Second, investment-promotion policies are more important for states in lower 
tiers. Corporate income taxes have a positive effect that is larger in magnitude and 
significant at a higher level of significance: a one percentage point increase in top tax 
rate is correlated with a 1.8 percent increase in FDI-related employment. Finally, the 
estimated coefficients on some host countries, such as Canada, India, Netherlands, 
and Latin American countries, are no longer insignificant in terms of promoting FDI-
related employment for the full sample; instead, they become significantly positive. 
Meanwhile, having overseas offices in some other host countries, such as the United 
Kingdom, Hong Kong and Ukraine, ends up with having a negative association with 
FDI-related employment. Correspondingly, the suggested combination of host 
countries varies (refer to Column (5) and (6) of Appendix 3.B for detailed 
information). 
 To demonstrate the importance of investigating different investment-
promotion policies simultaneously, I re-run DSGMM estimates for the 50 states and 
each time only one policy variable was incorporated. Results are reported by 
Columns (7) through (10) of Table 3.3 and are compared with Column (1). The 
comparison is quite worth noting. When the government spending is not considered, 
the corporate income tax effect becomes very small (although positive) and 
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statistically insignificant. When only the government spending is included, its 
coefficient is estimated to be approaching zero (-0.004) and statistically insignificant. 
More importantly, the estimated coefficient on FTZ changes from being positive and 
significant (0.323) to being negative and significant (-0.024).  
 Under the three aforementioned circumstances, some similar results are also 
observed. First, the coefficient on cross-state, all-industry agglomeration drops 
substantially in magnitude and becomes insignificant. Second, the manufacturing 
compensation effect becomes significant and positive. Third, the coefficient on state 
highway mileage drops by half in magnitude. Lastly, instead of a positive Canadian 
border effect, we now observe a negative Mexican border effect.  
 When only the state policy of overseas office is investigated, as shown by 
Column (10), the coefficient on the sum of state international offices becomes 
statistically significant, although negative. Departing from previous estimation 
results, having offices in the United Kingdom is now estimated be positively 
associated with FDI-related employment while having offices in Netherland becomes 
a negative effect (refer to Column (10) of Appendix 3.B for detailed information of 
coefficients on all host country dummies). The reported P-value of Sargan/Hansen 
test indicates a drop in the validity of instruments. All the aforementioned 
differences in results between Columns (7) through (10) and Column (1) of Table 3.3 
suggest that it is important to have all policy variables under the investigation. 
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 In the last robustness check, I present the estimation results for OLS 
estimates with random-effect and fixed-effect in Column (11) and (12), respectively. 
Compared with the DSGMM estimate, the estimated coefficient on top CIT rate 
becomes negative and insignificant. The coefficient on governmental subsidy 
spending is now positive and significant. The role of FTZ in promoting FDI-related 
employment loses its significance and the host countries suggested by OLS 
estimation (Chile, Germany and Ireland) are all estimated to be negatively associated 
with FDI-related employment using DSGMM estimation (see Columns (1) and (11) 
of Appendix 3.B for the comparison of coefficients on all host country dummy 
variables). Moreover, only two non-policy variables are estimated to have a 
statistically significant coefficient now: a positive coefficient on manufacturing 
compensation variable and a negative Canadian border effect. 
3.7. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
 This study investigates the relationship between state-level attributes and 
employment by foreign manufacturing plants in U.S states. Particular attention is 
given to the role of state-level business incentives in influencing the employment 
decisions of foreign manufacturing firms. Specifically, U.S. inbound manufacturing 
FDI for 50 states during the period 1999 – 2008 is empirically investigated using a 
two-way fixed effects panel data framework. To address the econometric issues 
associated with the dynamic features of employment outcomes, this research 
employs the Blundell and Bond (1998) system GMM approach. My contributions are 
twofold. First, I measure the size of FDI in terms of employment level, rather than 
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the counts of establishments or the stock of foreign assets, to uncover the 
employment contribution of FDI on a local economy. Second, by correcting for the 
measurement errors and addressing policy endogeneity, this research attempts to 
provide valid advice to policy makers on the role of business incentives in promoting 
employment. 
 The top priority is given to the policy implications. The estimated 
coefficients on investment-promotion policies and infrastructure suggest that state 
and local governments could play an important role in FDI-related employment 
outcomes. First, combining the positive coefficient on government subsidy spending 
and the strong positive effect of state highway mileages, my interpretation for the 
aforementioned positive income tax effect coincides with the trade-off story between 
taxes and the provision of public goods suggested by Gabe and Bell (2004): regions 
with high taxes are on average more attractive to investors as long as those regions 
spend more tax revenues on providing public goods and services. Take New York 
State in 2008 for example. Based on my estimation, holding other conditions 
constant, a one percentage point increase in New York’s top corporate income tax 
rate (from 9% to 10%), plus a one percent increase in state highway mileage (i.e. 
114,471 * 1% = 1,144.7 miles), is correlated with 1.05 percent (or 73,500 * 1.05% = 
771.75 jobs) more U.S. employment by foreign manufacturing firms.  
 The provision of FTZs (both general-purpose zones and subzones) has a 
significant and positive effect on employment by foreign firms. Ceteris Paribus, the 
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state of New York is predicted to increase its FDI-related employment in 
manufacturing industry by 3.2 percent (or 73,500 * 3.2% = 2,352 jobs) when it 
provides 10 percent (or 22 * 10% = 2.2) more FTZs for investors.   
 Most previous studies report that having state offices in Japan is helpful to 
attract Japanese firms (Head et al. 1999; Woodward 1992). The present research 
extends the literature by reporting that opening more trade offices abroad does not 
necessarily help to expand a state’s employment by foreign firms; what actually 
matters is a state’s selection of host countries. According to estimated coefficients on 
different host country dummies, some host countries of U.S. state overseas offices, 
such as China, Egypt, Israel, Japan and Turkey, are associated with a higher level of 
employment by foreign firms. While, foreign offices in some host countries, such as 
Brazil, Chile, Germany, South Africa, Switzerland and Taiwan, are estimated to be 
negatively associated with U.S. employment by foreign firms. According to the 
estimation results of the baseline model, the suggested combination of host countries 
contains Austria, China, Egypt, Ghana, Israel, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Spain, 
Mexico, Singapore and Turkey. Having state offices in all these countries is 
correlated with 4.2 percent (or 73,500 * 4.2% = 3,087 jobs) more employees in 
foreign manufacturing firms in New York. 
 Some other important results are summarized as follows. First, both intra-
industry, within-state FDI agglomeration and all-industry, cross-state FDI clustering 
are significant. This result is consistent with the existing literature (e.g. Devereux et 
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al. 2007; Woodward 1992; Coughlin and Segev 2000; List 2001). One possible 
explanation is that foreign manufacturing firms tend to cluster in a state to capture 
the convenience of sharing information, labor pooling and increased bargaining 
power relative to domestic firms. Meanwhile, foreign firms tend to treat FDI in 
adjacent regions as close sources of specialized inputs and may would like to expand 
their business in such an environment (Head et al. 1999).  
 Second, the estimated coefficient on host market size is insignificant and the 
coefficient on adjacent market potential is significant and negative. One possible 
interpretation is that manufacturing FDI in the U.S. is consistent with a “vertical” 
model provided by Helpman and Krugman (1985). To be specific, foreign investors, 
especially European and Japanese investors, produce goods in U.S. states with low 
per-capita income to utilize low production costs, and then re-import a large portion 
of the products back to Europe and Japan or export them to other countries 
(Braconier et al. 2005). 
 Third, foreign manufacturing firms in the U.S. avoid operating in states with 
a high jobless rate. One interpretation is that high unemployment rates may indicate 
less competitive market conditions and lower level of life quality (Woodward 1992). 
The U.S. employment by foreign firms tends to be positively associated with the 
level of manufacturing compensation paid per employee. However, to the extent that 
some unobservable negative effects of compensation may be captured by the 
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educational attainment, no strong conclusion can be drawn from estimates of these 
two variables. 
 Lastly, this study finds a significantly positive Canadian border effect. Given 
other conditions identical, states that are geographically adjacent to Canada have on 
average 0.2 percent more employment by foreign manufacturing firms. For instance, 
if New York was not adjacent to Canada, then it would be predicted to have 147 
(73,500 * 0.2% = 147) fewer jobs supported by foreign manufacturing firms in 2008, 
ceteris paribus. The border effect for Mexico, however, is estimated to be very small 
in magnitude and statistically insignificant. This result suggests that states adjacent 
to Canada are more attractive to foreign manufacturing investors. Combining the 
results for coefficients on market potentials, one possible interpretation for this 
policy implication is consistent with Helpman and Krugman’s (1985) “vertical” 
model of FDI: given that locating in states neighboring Canada could better serve the 
Canadian market, these states are thus more attractive to foreign investors.
67
 
 
 
 
                                                 
67
 To the extent that multiple reasons could explain why border effects exist, such as 
political barriers, cultural proximity, transportation access, etc (Arauzo-Carod et al. 
2010), in this study I only offer one tentative possibility for the Canadian border 
effect because this possibility could be supported by the theory. One of many further 
extensions could be made by checking the shipping access effect associated with the 
St. Lawrence waterway. This channel connects the Great Lakes to the Atlantic Ocean 
and thus facilitates low transportation cost between foreign markets and the U.S. 
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Table 3.1: Description of Variables 
Variables Description Expected 
Sign 
Data Source 
            
Dependent:  employment by U.S. 
affiliates of foreign 
manufacturing firms 
in state i and year t 
 Employment and Manufacturing 
Employment of  All  Nonbank U.S. 
Affiliates, by State, 1999-2008, BEA. 
Independent:    
              Intra-Industry 
Agglomeration, state 
employment by U.S. 
affiliates of foreign 
manufacturing firms 
in the previous year 
+ Ibid. 
 
∑            
   
 
FDI spatial interaction, 
employment by U.S. 
affiliates of ALL 
foreign firms in all 
neighboring states of 
state i in year t 
? Ibid. 
          Local market demand 
and capacity, per-
capita personal income 
in state i and year t 
+ Personal current taxes, Regional 
Economic Information System, BEA.  
 
∑           
   
 
Spatial effect on the 
demand side, sum of 
all adjacent states’ per-
capita personal income 
+ Ibid. 
                Labor cost, annual 
manufacturing 
compensation divided 
by manufacturing 
employees by state 
_ Compensation of employees by 
NAICS industry, Regional Economic 
Information System, BEA 
            Labor condition, state 
i’s unemployment rate 
in year t. High 
unemployment could 
reflect low labor cost 
due to low demand or 
excess supply  
? Local Area Unemployment Statistics, 
BLS 
 
       Education attainment, 
share of population 
over 25 years old with 
at least a high school 
diploma for each state 
+ Educational Attainment by State: 
1990 to 2009, FactFinder, U.S. 
Census Bureau. 
50 State Comparison - Fiscal, 
Economics, and Population Table, 
Postsecondary Education 
Commission of California. 
           Tax policy, state top 
corporate income tax 
rate 
- State Corporate Income Tax Rates, 
various years, Tax Foundation 
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Table 3.1: Continued 
Variables Description Expected 
Sign 
Data Source 
            Non-tax direct 
financial support, state 
total subsidy spending 
divided by population 
+ Gross Domestic Product by State, 
Regional Economic Information 
System, BEA (1999-2008) 
       Foreign Trade Zones, 
sum of counts of both 
“general-purpose” and 
subzones 
+ Annual Report of the FTZ Board to 
the Congress of the United States , 
various years, U.S. Department of 
Commerce 
          State effort to attract 
foreign investments by 
opening overseas 
office, sum of all 
overseas offices 
+ Directory of Incentives for Business 
Investment and Development in the 
United States: A State-by-State Guide, 
1991, National Association of State 
Development Agencies (NASDA). 
State Official’s Guide to International 
Affairs, by Chris Whatley, the 
Council of State Governments. 
        Host countries, a set of 
dummy variables and 
each equals one if a 
state has office(s) in 
that country (see 
Appendix 3.A for the 
country list ) 
+ Ibid. 
            Transports 
infrastructure, high 
way mileages per 
square mile in each 
state 
+ Highway Statistics, various years, 
U.S. Federal Highway 
Administration. 
U.S. States Area and Ranking, 
EnchantedLearning.com.  
              Border effects, each 
dummy equals one for 
states that share 
borders with Mexico 
and Canada, 
respectively 
+ Map of Border Governments, U.S. - 
Mexico Border Field Office of the 
Pan American Health Organization. 
The Canada-U.S. Border Map, the 
Canada-United States Transportation 
Border Working Group. 
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Table 3.2: Summary Statistics (1999 - 2008, by State) 
Variable Observation Mean (S.D.) Min Max 
FDI Employment: 
Manufacturing (1000s) 450 37.84 (39.45) 0.5 208.2 
FDI Employment: All Industries 
(1000s) 450 112.42 (129.22) 5.6 749.4 
Per-capita Personal Income 
(Current U.S. Dollars) 500 33,009.66 (6,205.71) 20,555 56,245 
Per-employee Annual 
Compensation: Manufacturing 
(Current U.S. Dollars) 499 57,022.19 (11,376.38) 33,528.03 92,279.29 
Unemployment Rate 
(Percentage) 500 5.07 (1.65) 2.3 13.6 
Population over 25 years old 
with at least a high school 
diploma (Percentage) 500 85.18 (4.07) 72.9 92.8 
State Top Corporate Income Rate 
(Percentage) 500 6.73 (2.77) 0 12 
Per-capita State Total Subsidies 
(Current U.S. Dollars) 500 150.15 (79.66) 22.84 624.32 
Count of FTZs: General-purpose 
Zones and Subzones 500 14.05 (16) 1 104 
Count of Overseas Offices 500 4.32 (4.21) 0 23 
Host-country dummies of state 
overseas offices 
2378 foreign 
offices between 
43 countries 
55.3 offices per Host-
country 0 1 
Highway Mileages (Miles): Total 500 79,590.27 (52,361.5) 4,251.08 306,404 
Highway Mileages (Miles): Per 
Square Mile 500 1.65 (0.97) 0.02 4.50 
Geographical Area (Square 
Miles) 500 75,736.32 (95,354) 1,545 656,425 
Border Effect: Dummies for 
Mexico and Canada 500 
4 states share borders 
with Mexico; 12 with 
Canada 0 1 
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Data source: Gross Domestic Product by State, 1999-2008, Regional Economic 
Information System, BEA http://www.bea.gov/regional/gsp/. 
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Data Source: Employment and Manufacturing Employment of Nonbank U.S. 
Affiliates, by State, various years, BEA. 
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Base Model
1 2 3 4 5 6 10 11
AG -0.009 0.011 -0.092 -0.029 0.095 0.185
[.075] [.088] [.075] [.082] [.087] [.339]
AT 0.053 0.037 0.144 0.101 -0.078 -0.043 0.05 -0.565
[.044] [.041] [.054]*** [.053]** [.037]** [.033] [.038] [.483]
AR 0.515 0.418 0.723 0.569 0.376 0.345
[.175]*** [.157]*** [.218]*** [.186]*** [.123]*** [.132]***
BZ -0.164 -0.097 -0.281 -0.152 -0.267 -0.187 0.013 -0.548
[.070]** [.067] [.084]*** [.087]* [.091]*** [.098]** [.027] [.813]
CA -0.003 0.001 -0.03 -0.017 0.155 0.119 -0.023 0.319
[.029] [.029] .034] [.034] [.045]*** [.035]*** [.033] [.417]
CH -0.303 -0.217 -0.521 -0.359 -0.479 -0.383 -0.139 1.334
[.106]*** [.091]** [.153]*** [.136]*** [.124]*** [.121]*** [.076]* [.727]*
CN 0.064 0.067 0.002 0.027 0.07 0.069 0.057 0.534
[.022]*** [.021]*** [.024] [0.028] [.023]*** [.023]*** [.022]*** [.413]
CZ 1.451 1.163
[.406]*** [.406]***
DB 0.103 0.019 0.326 0.157 0.662
[.107] [.121] [.140]** [.147] [.246]***
EG 0.456 0.275 0.658 0.471 0.01
[.160]*** [.134]** [.219]*** [.226]** [.074]
EU -0.051 -0.026 -0.062 -0.028 0.03 0.026 0.009 -0.288
[.030]* [.030] [.028]** [.028] [.029] [.036] [.017] [.580]
FR 0.036 0.017 0.061 0.021 -0.065 -0.061 0.026 -0.233
[.038] [.033] [.032]** [.033] [.035]* [.046] [.038] [.484]
GM -0.184 -0.108 -0.36 -0.202 -0.236 -0.156 -0.026 0.437
[.074]*** [.062]* [.113]*** [.106]** [.075]*** [.084]* [.051] [.238]*
GN 0.809 0.587 1.212 0.817 1.252 0.962 0.318
[.246]*** [.199]*** [.327]*** [.282]*** [.299]*** [.280]*** [.138]**
GR 0.759 0.444
[.206]*** [.197]**
HK -0.065 -0.042 -0.065 -0.048 -0.377 -0.301 0.005 0.198
[.049] [.051] [.042] [.054] [.099]*** [.092]*** [.047] [.520]
IL -0.009 0.039 -0.218 -0.076 -0.015 0.041 0.065 1.909
[.050] [.053] [.090]** [.094] [.050] [.063] [.051] [.965]**
IN -0.122 -0.097 -0.31 -0.233 0.595 0.444 -0.138
[.125] [.136] [.131]** [.137]*** [.175]*** [.200]** [.119]
IR 0.239 0.206 0.403 0.322 0.248 0.215 0.154 0.066
[.086]*** [.082]*** [.119]*** [.106]*** [.078]*** [.100]** [.072]** [.441]
IT -0.055 -0.051 -0.037 -0.041 0.149 0.113 -0.05 0.355
[.057] [.065] [.046] [.064] [.075]** [.096] [.071] [1.359]
JP 0.154 0.124 0.216 0.176 0.242 0.208 0.101 0.135
[.035]*** [.028]*** [.052]*** [.042]*** [.046]*** [.043]*** [.025]*** [.357]
KO 0.218 0.151 0.364 0.241 0.364 0.277 0.027 0.097
[.070]*** [.054]*** [.098]*** [.085]*** [.091]*** [.078]*** [.023] [.212]
KZ -1.177 -0.772
[.417]*** [.314]**
Continued
Appendix 3.B: Estimation Results of Coefficients on Host Country Dummy Variables
Host 
Country 
Dummies Robustness Check
  
117 
 
 
Appendix 3.B: Continued
Base Model
1 2 3 4 5 6
LA -1.021 -0.892 0.259 0.175
[.295]*** [.342]*** [.071]*** [.069]***
ML 0.239 0.2 0.359 0.269 0.253 0.195 0.152
[.092]*** [.085]** [.113]*** [.098]*** [.089]*** [.085]** [.095]
MT
MX 0.057 0.041 0.063 0.051 0.109 0.084 0.005
[.035]* [.033] [.028]** [.034] [.042]*** [.045]** [.032]
NL 0.067 -0.001 0.259 0.149 0.187 0.119 -0.101
[.086] [.061] [.131]** [.107] [.086]** [.073]* [.062]*
PL
QT -0.716
[.250]***
RS -0.377 -0.275 -0.569 -0.474 -0.146
[.132]*** [.104]*** [.130]*** [.128]*** [.074]**
SA -0.209 -0.183 -0.318 -0.261 -0.26 -0.218 -0.127
[.081]*** [.084]** [.098]*** [.094]*** [.128]** [.159] [.057]**
SB
SD 0.212
[.118]*
SG 0.137 0.051 0.361 0.171 0.328 0.217 -0.035
[.078]* [.087] [.116]*** [.135] [.135]** [.154] [.058]
SL -0.309 -0.206 -0.591 -0.375 -0.239 -0.167 -0.081
[.121]*** [.096]** [.189]*** [.160]** [.078]*** [.074]** [.078]
SP 1.095 0.968 0.025
[.363]*** [.377]*** [.089]
TK 0.191 0.092 0.446 0.225 0.252 0.151 -0.121
[.101]** [.085] [.155]*** [.137]* [.093]*** [.096] [.108]
TW -0.498 -0.363 -0.805 -0.551 -0.728 -0.56 -0.216
[.156]*** [.127]*** [.222]*** [.190]*** [.179]*** [.163]*** [.108]**
UK -0.015 0.008 -0.071 -0.019 -0.23 -0.162 0.073
[.048] [.053] [.049] [.060] [.086]*** [.091]* [.045]*
UR -2.108 -1.307 -1.532 -1.123 -0.103
[.619]*** [.532]** [.418]*** [.379]*** [.205]
VN -0.552 -0.394 -0.909 -0.599 -0.729 -0.553 -0.202
[.189]*** [.154]*** [.261]*** [.230]*** [.195]*** [.191]*** [.108]*
VZ -0.928 -0.858
[.320]*** [.359]**
CN DB 
GN IR JP 
SD UK
∑coefficients 4.174 2.996 7.147 4.058 5.497 3.683 1.577
Average 0.347 0.332 0.476 0.451 0.343 0.283 0.225
[0.057, 
0.662]
[0.437,1.90
9]
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate significances at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
The empty entries indicate no estimated coefficients for variables that are dropped because of collinearity .
Suggested Combination
[0.057,1.095][0.067, 0.968][0.061, 1.451][0.101, 1.163][0.07, 1.252][0.069, 0.962]
AR CN EG 
GN IR JP 
KO ML 
MX  SG 
SP TK
AR CN EG 
GN IR JP 
KO ML SP 
AT AR CZ 
DB FR GR  
 GN IR JP 
KO ML 
MX  SG  
TK
AT AR CZ  
 GR  GN 
IR JP KO 
ML  TK
AR CA 
CN EG 
GN IN IR 
IT JP KO 
LA ML 
MX NL 
SG TK
AR CA 
CN EG 
GN IN IR 
JP KO LA 
ML MX 
NL
CH GM IL
[.480]
0.311
[.411]
-0.509
[.501]
0.609
[.845]
[.426]
-5.305
10 11
0.276
[.643]
1.226
Range
3.68
[1.075]
0.669
[.623]
-0.375
0.431
[.162]
[3.425]
-0.226
0.306
[.395]
0.127
Host Country Dummies 
Robustness Check
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Chapter 4: 
Employment by Foreign Firms: Heterogeneous Response 
to Investment-Promotion Policies across US States 
 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 State and local governments are increasingly engaged in providing 
Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) with substantial tax, fiscal, administrative and 
financial incentives aimed at attracting foreign investment (Head 1998; Girma et al. 
2001; Girma and Görg 2005; Rogers and Wu 2012). Meanwhile, employment by 
foreign-owned plants operating in the US is an increasingly important aspect of 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) activities.  In 2009, about 5.97 million US workers 
were employed by foreign-owned plants in the US (BEA 2010).  Between 2003 and 
2009, foreign owned companies created about 632,500 new jobs in over 4,500 new 
projects (ITA 2010). However, the role of investment-promotion policies in this 
employment growth and other local outcomes associated with the US inward FDI 
has been elusive. Rogers and Wu (2012) address this gap by utilizing a two-way 
fixed effects Dynamic System Generalized Method of Moments (DSGMM) 
approach to investigate how state business incentives affect employment in the US 
by foreign-owned firms (FDI-related employment, hereafter). In the present paper, 
particular attention is given to exploring the potential heterogeneous response to 
business incentives based on different state-level employment characteristics of 
foreign firms. 
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 My contribution to the literature is twofold. First, although the firm-level 
research examining the heterogeneous response across the distribution of 
employment outcomes is extensive (Görg et al. 2000; Görg and Strobl 2002; Falzoni 
and Grasseni 2005; Nataraj 2008; Girma and Gong 2008; Görg et al. 2000; Mata and 
Machado 1996; Coad and Rao 2007), few studies examine the uneven response of 
employment by foreign firms alone (Bellak and Pfaffermayr 2002; Bellak 2004). 
Significant variations in responses across the distribution are also reported for many 
aggregate-level outcomes (Dufrenot et al. 2010; Fayissa and Nsiah 2010; Gomanee 
et al. 2005; Sula 2008; Okada and Samreth 2011; Goel and Ram 2004). Such 
unequal effects on the aggregate-level employment, however, are not well 
established. Therefore I extend the literature by investigating the potential 
heterogeneous effects of business incentives on the FDI-related employment 
aggregated to the state level.    
 Second, my empirical approach extends Rogers and Wu (2012), and 
addresses the potential bias associated with the violation of a normal distribution 
assumption. I employ panel data on manufacturing FDI-related employment for the 
50 US states between 1997 and 2008. Notably, FDI-related employment does not 
follow a normal distribution when aggregated to the state level. This may render the 
conditional mean effects generated by standard least squares estimates unreliable. 
Accordingly, I estimate a log-linear panel data model (Gross and Ryan 2008) using a 
Simultaneous Quantile Regression (SQR) approach to reveal the relative importance 
of each policy at various locations of the employment distribution. 
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 My results refine the findings of Rogers and Wu (2012) that state investment-
promotion policies such as providing more foreign-trade zones (FTZs), the provision 
of better public services even with higher corporate income tax (CIT) rates, and 
holding overseas offices in particular countries, have statistically significant effects 
on FDI-related employment in the US. Furthermore, the SQR estimation adds to the 
previous research by revealing that the estimated effects of a better transport 
infrastructure and FTZs vary significantly across the FDI-related employment 
distribution. Therefore, unequal employment benefits of attracting FDI could be 
expected between states, as well as more interest for FDI for some but not all states. 
The implications are of interest to researchers and policy makers regarding the 
strategic use of business incentives to attract inbound foreign investment and to 
promote US employment. 
4.2. Variable Selection 
My empirical specification developed in the next section employs six 
categories of state attributes. These are selected based on previous research. For a 
detailed discussion of how these selected variables fit into the literature and how they 
outperform their alternatives, please refer to Rogers and Wu (2012).  
My dependent variable (MFGEMPi,t) is the total employment by foreign-
owned manufacturing firms in each US state. In so doing, people’s attention is 
brought into the employment outcomes of inbound FDI activities, and assessment 
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could be made on state FDI-attracting policies with an eye toward expanding and 
retaining local employment.  
I analyze four major investment-promotion policies. First, tax policy is 
captured by the top CIT rate for each US state (TAXRATEi,t). The use of statutory 
top tax rates is following the suggestion by Reed and Rogers (2006) and others to 
avoid the measurement error due to changes driven by non-tax factors, such as 
income, gross product and population. Competitive and low CIT rates are a tool to 
encourage investments. Second, per-capita total expenditure on subsidies by a state 
government (SUBSIDYi,t) is used to instrument for jobs (capital) subsidy because the 
latter may be endogenous. As shown by Figure 4.1, per-capita total subsidy spending 
varied across US states during the sample period. The top 5 states (Rhode Island, 
California, Arizona, Oregon and Connecticut) on average spent $183.3 per-capita 
and the average for the bottom 5 (Idaho, Oklahoma, Utah, North Dakota and West 
Virginia) was $108.9. Third, I build off Head et al. (1999) by employing the sum of 
number of both general-purpose zones and subzones (FTZi,t) to capture state effort at 
providing FTZs. Fourth, I build on Coughlin and Segev (2000) in utilizing the counts 
of all overseas offices for each state (OFFICEi,t) to measure state effort at opening 
offices abroad. I further extend their work by creating separate dummy variables 
(HOSTi,t) for all office-host countries to explore their differential impacts on US 
FDI-related employment (refer to Table 4.4 for the list of country and related 
abbreviations).  
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Figure 4.2 demonstrates the considerable dynamics of US foreign offices 
from both the spatial and the time perspectives by displaying the distribution of 
overseas offices across states for three years of the data. In 1991, only 76 foreign 
offices were held by 22 states, among which 46 were held by 13 eastern and southern 
coastal states and none was in the west. In 2002, the total count of foreign offices 
increased sharply to 236 in 42 states. Although most offices were established by 
states in the Atlantic coast and Great Lakes area, 23 were held by 3 Pacific coast 
states. In 2009, 3 states (California, Maine and Utah) closed their foreign offices and 
6 (Delaware, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire and Vermont) opened 
foreign offices. As a consequence, there were a total of 240 offices belonging to all 
but 5 states (Maine, Rhode Island, Utah, Wyoming and California). Figure 3 
illustrates the top 10 office-host countries that are the most popular among US states. 
Between 1991 and 2009, the Far East (Japan, China, Korea and Taiwan) has been the 
most attractive region for US overseas offices. Europe was the second most popular 
region in 1991, but it was overtaken by North America after 2002. This is primarily 
due to the rising popularity of Mexico which attracted 27 and 25 state offices in 2002 
and 2009, respectively. Other developing countries such as Brazil also became 
increasingly popular, and China even outperformed Japan and became the most 
office-attractive country by 2009.  
Foreign firms cluster within a region to take advantage of information sharing 
and labor pooling and to strengthen their bargaining power (Du et al. 2008; Blonigen 
et al. 2005; Head et al. 1999; List, 2001; etc). I follow Blonigen et al. (2005) and use 
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the one-year lagged employment by US manufacturing affiliates in a state 
(MFGEMPi,t-1) to capture the intra-industry-within-state dimension of agglomeration. 
On the other hand, FDI location decisions across multiple regions are not 
independent (Head et al. 1995; Blonigen et al. 2007; Arauzo-Carod 2012). To 
account for the spatial interaction of FDI between proximate locales, the sum of 
employment by foreign-owned plants in all industries in all adjacent states 
(∑               ) is used as the measure of all-industry-cross-state dimension of FDI 
agglomeration. The estimated coefficient on this variable would indicate whether the 
crowd-out effect (consistent with a negative correlation) dominates the 
agglomeration effect (indicated by a positive coefficient) in terms of the FDI-related 
employment outcomes across contiguous states.  
 In a similar manner two dimensions of market size are considered. First, I use 
state per-capita personal income (         ) to measure the host market demand 
and capacity (List et al. 2004; Head et al. 1999; Woodward 1992; Coughlin and 
Segev 2000). For one thing, a domestic market with a large buying power tends to 
attract more FDI inflows with a “market-seeking” purpose. For another, if 
transportation costs are not important, then foreign investment seeking low 
production costs may locate in a state with low income. Second, I employ the sum of 
per-capita personal income in all adjacent states  ∑                 to capture the 
model of horizontal FDI that multinationals to whom transportation costs are 
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important would invest and produce in one region and then sell products to regions 
surrounding the host market (Head et al. 1999). 
 Labor conditions for each US state are characterized by three variables. First, 
the annual compensation paid to per manufacturing worker (COMPENSATIONi,t) is 
used to measure the actual total costs for hiring an employee (Broaconier et al. 2005; 
McConnell and Schwab 1990; List et al. 2004 and List 2001). Second, labor market 
conditions are captured by state unemployment rates (UNEMPi,t). A high 
unemployment rate may indicate labor surplus and low wages which would 
encourage foreign investment (Head et al. 1999). High jobless rates may 
alternatively indicate an inactive business environment and deter investments 
(Woodward 1992). Finally, the share of a state’s working-age population with at 
least a high school diploma (HS      ) is employed to represent the state labor 
quality (Coughlin and Segev 2000). 
 State per square mile highway mileages (           ) is employed to 
measure accessibility to transport infrastructure which would reduce the 
transportation costs of inputs and outputs and would lower employees’ commuting 
costs ( Fredriksson et al. 2003). Borders may be important for FDI location decisions 
due to the convenience of serving both the host market and a third-country sharing 
borders (Arauzo-Carod et al. 2010). The border effects on US inward foreign 
investment, however, has been largely ignored (Rogers and Wu 2012). To explore 
whether the borders are more attractive to foreign investors in terms of their business 
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operations and employment outcomes, I construct two dummy variables for the two 
neighbors of the US and states are assigned a value of one if border Mexico and 
Canada (MEXi and CANi), respectively. 
4.3. Empirical Specification  
My basic empirical specification builds off Rogers and Wu (2012). It is a log-
linear panel data model for the 50 US states between 1997 and 2008.  Specifically, 
                                                  
                                                                                              (1) 
All variables are described in Table 4.1 and their summary statistics are summarized 
in Table 4.2. 
 In a panel data estimation procedure, excluding state-specific unobservable 
factors and time-specific macroeconomic shocks from the specification is debatable 
in the sense that the estimated coefficients may be biased due to omitted variables 
(Co 2001; Fredriksson et al. 2003). Ideally, I would like to include the state dummy 
variables in Equation (1). However, both the implementation and the interpretation 
of quantile regression (QR) estimator for a panel structure have not been well 
established (Sula 2008; Gomanee et al. 2005).
68
 Meanwhile, concern about the 
potential bias given by the exclusion of time-specific factors could be mitigated to 
                                                 
68
 Although advances are being made on this topic very recently, the implication of 
quantile regression for a panel structure is still not straightforward. For references of 
several recently-developed approaches on this issue, see Koenker (2004), Lamarche 
(2010) and Galvao (2009). 
  
126 
 
some degree by utilizing the QR approach (Dufrenot et al. 2010). This approach 
accounts for unobserved heterogeneity and heterogeneous effects, and accordingly, 
the unobserved macroeconomic shocks could be captured by the individual specific 
errors (Sula 2008; Goel and Ram 2004; Fayissa and Nsiah 2010). 
 Within a cross-sectional framework, the interpretation of time effects 
indicated in Equation (1) is particularly worth noting. First, the estimation of 
Equation (1) could reasonably yield long-run parameters by utilizing state-level 
cross-sectional data (Goel and Ram 2004). Accordingly, the estimation results here 
also refer to the long-run effects on state-level FDI-related employment. Second, the 
inclusion of lagged FDI-related employment as an explanatory variable in a cross-
sectional analysis is no longer an indirect procedure for obtaining the long-run 
effects. Instead, the lagged employment variable is just a measure of intra-industry-
within-state FDI agglomeration effect (Blonigen et al. 2005; Barrios et al. 2006). 
More importantly, a QR with bootstrapped standard errors would treat Equation (1) 
as an error-correction model (Rogers 1992). Therefore, even without the inclusion of 
time dummies, the cyclical shock could be captured by the short-run dynamic 
components, i.e. the lagged FDI-related employment variable (Dufrenot et al. 2010). 
4.3.1. Econometric Issues 
 A further investigation of my dataset reveals that state-level manufacturing 
FDI-related employment in the US does not have a normal distribution, even though 
the performance variable is measured in logarithm (          . The upper panel 
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of Figure 4.4 shows that both the real density and the Kernel density estimates of 
       depart from the corresponding density if the data were normally 
distributed. This is also confirmed by the 1
st
 column of Table 4.3, which describes 
the summary statistics for the dependent variable: the reported P-values from both 
Shapiro and Francia (1972) test for normality and D' Agostino et al. (1990) skewness 
and kurtosis test for normality are statistically significant at 1 percent level, rejecting 
the null hypothesis that         is normally distributed.  
 The lower panel of Figure 4.4 compares the real density and the Kernel 
density estimates of           with its normality appearance. Although the 
departure from normality is not very clearly observed from the figure, the results 
from two normality tests strongly reject the null hypothesis of a normal distribution 
(Column 2 of Table 4.3).   
 Standard least squares estimation techniques focus on the conditional mean 
function of the dependent variable. However, if the distribution of the dependent 
variable is skewed and violates the assumption of a normal distribution, or there are 
significant outliers, then the estimated “average” effect becomes less informative. As 
a result, least squares regression techniques end up being inadequate (Girma and 
Görg 2005; Gomanee et al. 2005; Okada and Samreth 2011).  
 The QR estimate proposed by Koenker and Bassett (1978), however, turns 
out to be an appropriate solution. By centering regressors around different quantiles, 
this technique estimates the effect of independent variables on the outcome not only 
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in the center but also in the lower and upper tails of the conditional distribution of 
the response variable. Moreover, its optimization scheme is to minimize an objective 
function which equals a weighted sum of absolute deviations (Gomanee et al. 2005). 
Accordingly, the QR approach is “more robust to outliers than least-squares 
regression … [and] can be consistent under weaker stochastic assumptions than 
possible with least-squares estimation” (Cameron and Trivedi 2005, pp. 85; Okada 
and Samreth 2011).  
 In addition, in the presence of persistent heterogeneity in terms of 
employment outcomes across firms (see for reference, Görg et al. 2000; Mata and 
Machado 1996; Görg and Strobl 2002; Falzoni and Grasseni 2005), researchers are 
specifically interested in investigating if FDI-related employment outcomes respond 
heterogeneously to state attributes. To this empirical end, neither conventional OLS 
nor MLE approach is adequate. The QR approach, however, generates estimates of 
various slope coefficients at multiple quantiles of the conditional distribution of FDI-
related employment outcome. As a consequence, a more precise picture showing the 
dynamics of the response across the entire distribution are obtained which enables 
investigation of impacts at specific parts of the FDI-related employment distribution 
(Koenker 2005; Okada and Samreth 2011).  
4.3.2. Quantile Regression: Koenker and Bassett (1978) 
 For the sake of analytic convenience, Equation (1) can be re-written in a 
more general form: 
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where   {        } is a random sample of a random variable   with a 
distribution function Ғ. Let         for         denote the     quantile of the 
distribution of  , given a vector   of independent variables. Considering the 
conditional distribution function,       , we can model the conditional quantile by: 
            {            }   
                                                                 
where      is a vector of QR coefficients. 
 Koenker and Bassett (1978) proposed to estimate coefficients      by solving 
a simple optimization problem: 
        {∑        
            
      ∑            
            
     }                                            
This method estimates quantiles by assigning asymmetric weights to positive and 
negative residuals. When       (the median), the procedure described above 
minimizes the sum of absolute value of residuals,
69
 also known as the median 
regression or the least absolute deviations estimator (Cameron and Trivedi 2005, 
pp.87). The same procedure could be applied to other quantiles by changing  . To 
illustrate, in order to obtain the 30
th
 quantile estimator, set      . According to the 
optimizing scheme in Equation (4), the negative residuals given by    that lies on the 
                                                 
69
 This is analogous to the standard least square estimator: ̂        ∑         
  
    , which estimates the linear conditional mean function           . 
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lower percentile of the distribution are given a larger weight than the positive ones. 
The minimum of the procedure (4) is achieved until 70 percent of the residuals are 
negative. Therefore, as one increases   continuously from 0 to 1, one can trace the 
entire distribution of the dependent variable  , conditional on explanatory 
variables   (Fayissa and Nsiah 2010; Gomanee et al. 2005). 
 Several points are worth noting when applying a QR approach. First, the QR 
method allows the response coefficients to vary by quantiles of the dependent 
variable conditional on both observed covariates and unobservable factors. The 
procedure is analogous to segmenting the entire distribution of the outcome variable 
into some subsets conditional on covariates. Therefore, it is not comparable to the 
procedure which segments the unconditional distribution of the dependent variable 
and then runs a least-square estimation. The latter, according to Koenker and Hallock 
(2001), involves errors from sample selection problems. 
Second, the QR approach applied in this paper estimates a random effects 
model with a cross-sectional dataset. As mentioned above, in spite of the very recent 
advances of applying a quantile regression for panel data (for reference, see Koenker  
2004, Lamarche 2010 and Galvao 2009, etc.), the application of this approach in 
estimating a fixed effects model is not straightforward. Differencing (or time-
demeaning) the data, which is a typical way to estimate a fixed-effect model, 
becomes inappropriate for QR: the sum of quantiles conditional on X is not equal to 
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the quantiles of the sum of Y (Arias et al. 2001).
70
 In addition, an alternative method 
that includes a set of individual state- and/or time-specific dummy variables is also 
inappropriate. The inclusion of too many individual fixed effects may inflate the 
variation of estimating other explanatory variables and as a result, even “to estimate 
an individual specific location-shift effect … may strain credulity” (Koenker 2004). 
Lastly, the concern of potential bias due to unobserved state- and/or time-
specific effects could be mitigated somewhat by applying QR. This econometric 
approach controls for unobserved heterogeneous effects by allowing the  th quantile 
of state FDI-related employment to be conditional on (1) the explanatory variables  , 
and (2) the quantile of the state conditional on  . Accordingly, the response 
coefficients could be obtained at multiple quantiles of both observed and unobserved 
factors (Sula 2008). This advantage of QR makes the inclusion of individual fixed 
effects less beneficial. Moreover, an examination of my dataset reveals that the FDI-
related employment in a certain state falls within a certain range of quantiles. If 
different intercept terms were assigned to different states, then I may end up with 
failing to capture the heterogeneous sizes of FDI-related employment among states. 
4.4. Results 
 Table 4.4.a presents the results from a SQR estimate where the basic model is 
estimated as simultaneous equations across quantiles of state manufacturing FDI-
related employment. To allow for the presence of heteroschedasticity, standard errors 
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 ∑                   ∑               . 
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are bootstrapped following the procedure introduced by Gould (1997). I report 
estimated coefficients for 10 percentiles of state employment by foreign 
manufacturing firms. To compare effects at various quantiles with the conditional 
mean effect, Table 4.4.a also presents results from the OLS regression estimate with 
random effects and results from the DSGMM estimator. To illustrate how 
heterogeneously the FDI-related employment responds to each independent variable 
across its distribution, the estimated coefficients are plotted for quantiles in Figures 
4.5.a – 4.5.n. I further test whether these coefficients are statistically different across 
quantiles using the F-tests of equality (Dufrenot et al. 2010; Goel and Ram 2004; 
Falzoni and Grasseni 2005; Gomanee et al. 2005). The corresponding results are 
reported in Table 4.4.b. The discussion focuses primarily on coefficients on 
investment-promotion policy variables. Among the non-policy variables, only those 
whose estimated coefficients are statistically significant and/or statistically different 
across the distribution will be discussed. By comparing the SQR estimate results 
with that of OLS and DSGMM approach, cautions are drawn on the scenarios in 
which conditional mean effects may not be reliable. 
4.4.1 State Business Incentives  
 The estimated coefficient of state top CIT rates (            is found to be 
positive but statistically insignificant for percentiles from the 20
th
 up to the 80
th
 and 
to follow an inverted U-shape pattern (Figure 4.5.a). The reported F-tests of equality 
in Table 4.5, however, indicate a failure to reject the null hypothesis of equality for 
           across quantiles. Therefore, the magnitude of the positive coefficients 
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on            is about the same between quantiles. This result suggests an absence 
of a significant negative CIT effect and thus confirms in part that of Rogers and Wu 
(2012). Compared with the SQR estimate results, the conditional mean effects fail to 
reveal the negative CIT effect at the two tails of the FDI-related employment 
distribution (Figure 4.5.a).  
 The coefficient on government total subsidies/grants (          ) is 
estimated to be negative and statistically significant for most quantiles. The reported 
P-values of the F-tests suggest a failure to reject the null hypothesis of equality for 
coefficients on            between quantiles. Accordingly, the average of 
coefficients at all quantiles seems to be consistent with the mean effect generated by 
the OLS estimate (Figure 4.5.b). The reported negative relationship diverges from 
Head et al. (1999). Head et al. utilize directly the subsidies on jobs creation and 
capital usage which may be endogeneous. I employ the government total spending 
on subsidies to address the potential policy endogeneity. The latter, however, may be 
a weak instrument for the former because the government subsidy/grant on factor 
usage may be a quite small portion of the total governmental subsidies/grants. Take 
California as an example. In 2008, per-capita governmental subsidies/grants in 
California was $216.19; per-capita government spending on job training (labor) and 
on housing and urban development (capital) subsidies was $15.28 and $29.76, 
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respectively. So, per-capita labor and capital subsidy spending accounted for merely 
20.83% of total subsidies per-capita.
71
 
The provision of both general-purpose zones and subzones is estimated to 
have positive and statistically significant effects throughout the distribution of state 
manufacturing FDI-related employment. The magnitudes of these positive 
coefficients, however, vary significantly between quantiles: a 10 percent increase in 
the count of FTZs is predicted to correlate with various rates of employment growth 
ranging from 1.08 percent at the 50
th
 up to 3.31 percent at the 90
th
. The reported F-
tests of equality indicate rejecting the null hypothesis of equality for coefficients 
between the lower and the median, and between the median and the higher quantiles. 
Plotting the estimated coefficients on        for different quantiles, Figure 4.5.c 
reveals a U-shape pattern: the positive impact of FTZs on state FDI-related jobs first 
decreases with quantiles and then increases after reaching the minimum at the 
median. Therefore, it would be inappropriate to rely on the conditional mean effect 
of FTZs in interpreting its policy implication. 
 The SQR estimated coefficients on           suggest that the total count of 
state trade offices abroad has a predicted small and negative effect on the FDI-related 
employment for all quantiles but the 80
th
, and that the negative relationship is 
statistically significant at the lower and median quantiles. Furthermore, the reported 
F-tests of equality suggest that the null hypothesis of equal coefficients could be 
                                                 
71
 The data for these calculations are from Stimulus Spending by State, the Wall 
Street Journal, August 6, 2009. 
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rejected only between the 80
th
 and other quantiles. This result adds to the DSGMM 
estimate by Rogers and Wu (2012) which predicts a negative and statistically 
insignificant effect of having more overseas offices. My general finding also adds to 
Head et al. (1999), Woodward (1992) and Coughlin and Segev (2000), which report 
that holding investment-promotion offices in Japan is predicted to attract more 
Japanese firms. 
The SQR estimate results reinforce the finding of Rogers and Wu (2012) that 
the role of the selection of office-host countries is notable in affecting the US FDI-
related employment. To be specific, holding foreign offices in East Asia (e.g. Korea, 
Japan, China, Malaysia, India) is predicted to have a significant and positive effect 
throughout the employment distribution; while, having overseas offices in South 
America (e.g. Brazil, Argentina) and the Europe Union is estimated to have a 
negative effect. In addition, the SQR estimate adds to the conditional mean effects by 
revealing the heterogeneous effects of office-host countries across the employment 
distribution. For example, state overseas offices in China, Korea, Japan and Mexico 
all have estimated positive and significant effects according to the OLS and GMM 
estimates. However, offices in China are not predicted to promote the US FDI-
related employment at its lower tail; offices in Korea and Japan are predicted to fail 
at the upper tail and offices in Mexico may fail at quantiles around the median. The 
reported F-tests of equality further confirm that office-host countries rarely have 
constant effects between different quantiles. Notably, the conditional mean effects 
would miss some office-host countries, such as Dubai (positive) and Argentina 
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(negative), which may have a significant relationship with the employment by US 
affiliates at some but not other quantiles. 
4.4.2. Other Explanatory Variables 
Some non-policy variables have estimated coefficients that follow an inverted 
U-shape pattern when plotted for quantiles. First, the estimated coefficients on the 
intra-industry-within-state dimension of agglomeration (              are positive 
and significant at 1% level throughout the employment distribution (Devereux et al. 
2007; Woodward 1992; Coughlin and Segev 2000; List 2001; Head et al. 1999; 
Rogers and Wu 2012).
72
 This result suggests that US affiliates of foreign 
manufacturing firms tend to cluster within one state. Furthermore, plotting these 
coefficients for quantiles, Figure 4.5.e reveals an inverted U-shape pattern: the 
positive intra-industry-within-state agglomeration effect first increases and peaks at 
the median (0.889). After that, its magnitude decreases with quantiles and drops by 
half at the 90
th
 quantile. The reported F-tests of equality further confirm this pattern 
and suggest the null hypothesis of equal coefficients is rejected between the lower 
and the higher, as well as between the median and the higher quantiles. 
  The estimated all-industry-cross-state FDI agglomeration effect 
(∑                 also has an inverted U-shape pattern. It is negative throughout 
the employment distribution but statistically significant only at the upper tail (-
0.258). The null hypothesis of equal coefficients could be rejected between the 90
th
 
                                                 
72
 A few studies report that the agglomeration has negative effect on FDI location 
decisions, for reference, see List et al. (2004) and Sun et al. (2002). 
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and all other quantiles. A similar “crowding out” effect has been reported by List et 
al. (2004) and Sun et al. (2002). Nevertheless, the SQR estimate adds to this 
literature by revealing that the “crowding out” effect associated with the competition 
of FDI in neighboring states is not equal across the employment distribution and it is 
the top percentiles that suffer significantly the most (Figure 4.5.f). 
 Some variables have estimated coefficients that follow a U-shape pattern 
when plotted for quantiles. The market demand in adjacent states is estimated to 
have a positive and statistically significant effect (0.317) only at the top percentiles 
(Figure 4.5.h). The reported F-test of equality confirms that the FDI-related 
employment at the top quantiles does respond to ∑                in a significantly 
different way than at other quantiles. Meanwhile, the SQR estimate reports a positive 
but insignificant coefficient throughout the distribution for the host market size 
variable INCOMEi,t. My finding of the insignificant market potential effect at all 
quantiles except the upper tail of the distribution contributes to the literature by 
revealing a transition from the models of “vertical” FDI to that of “horizontal” FDI 
as the size of FDI activities expands.
73
  
The estimated positive coefficients on state transportation system variable 
(             also follow a U-shape pattern and the two tails of the FDI-related 
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 The “vertical” models predict that US affiliates of foreign firms produce in the US 
and then re-import the products back to the home country or export them to other 
countries (Helpman and Krugman 1985). The “horizontal” models conclude that 
foreign investment would locate in economies with great market potential with a 
market-seeking purpose (Markusen 1984). 
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employment distribution are impacted more than the median area (Figure 4.5.l). At 
the median, a 10 percent increase in             is expected to result in a 0.6 
percent increase in the FDI-related manufacturing jobs; this effect is doubled at the 
30
th
 quantile and quadrupled at the 90
th
. The reported F-tests of equality indicate the 
null hypothesis is rejected between the median and the higher quantiles. This result, 
combined with the estimated positive tax effect, adds to Rogers and Wu (2012) in 
suggesting that different packages of public service and corporate income tax should 
be considered by states according to their locations of the employment distribution. 
The estimated coefficients on state educational attainment variable 
(          follow a down-ward sloping curve pattern when plotted for quantiles 
(Figure 4.5.k). They are negative, increasing in magnitude with quantiles, and 
statistically significant for quantiles higher than the median. The reported F-tests 
suggest rejecting the null hypothesis of equal coefficients between the higher and 
other quantiles. This finding confirms and extends that of Rogers and Wu (2012) 
which report a negative and statistically significant mean effect of education 
attainment. This contrasts studies that report a positive effect of educational 
attainment on business location choices (Coughlin and Segev 2000; Woodward 
1992). The negative effect may actually be attributed to the unobserved wage effects 
(Bartik 1985, pp.21).  
The estimated effect of state unemployment rate is moving up and down 
around an average when plotted for quantiles (Figure 4.5.j). The estimated negative 
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coefficients on          are statistically significant at all quantiles but the 90
th
. The 
reported F-test of equality suggests a failure to reject the null hypothesis of equal 
coefficients. This reinforces the finding of Rogers and Wu (2012) that a high jobless 
rate may deter foreign investments because it may indicate weak economy or low 
quality of life (Woodward 1992; Fredriksson et al. 2003).  
4.5. Robustness Check 
 I explore the implications of examining investment-promotion policies in 
isolation. Specifically, I estimate the basic SQR procedure for all 50 states using four 
alternative specifications where only a single policy variable is included in each 
specification. The SQR estimate results are presented in Tables 4.5.a – 4.8.a and the 
corresponding results of the F-tests for equality are reported in Tables 4.5.b – 4.8.b, 
respectively. A comparison between the SQR result and its OLS counterpart in each 
case is shown graphically in Figures 4.6 – 4.9.  
 When only CIT is included, its estimated effect becomes negative at the 
median and the upper quantiles (Table 4.5.a). Furthermore, the null hypothesis of 
equal coefficients is rejected between the 20
th
 and the median percentile of the 
employment distribution (Table 4.5.b). When only the state government spending 
variable is included, its estimated impact remains negative and equal in magnitude 
throughout the employment distribution. However, it loses statistical significance for 
the higher quantiles. Meanwhile, the estimated effect of the market proximity in 
adjacent states becomes negative at the lower tail (Table 4.6.a) and the reported F-
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test of equality suggests rejecting the null hypothesis between the lower tail and all 
other quantiles (Table 4.6.b). When only FTZs are included, the estimated positive 
impact of FTZs drops dramatically in magnitude throughout the distribution and it 
becomes significant only for quantiles higher than the median. Meanwhile, the 
estimated negative Canadian border effect becomes statistically significant for the 
lower and the median quantiles of the FDI-related employment distribution (Table 
4.7.a). 
 There are common trends associated with these three specifications. First, the 
estimated positive and significant effect of               and the negative effect 
of ∑                now both decrease with quantile. This indicates that as the 
manufacturing FDI-related employment expands in scale, the positive intra-industry-
within-state FDI agglomeration effect is declining and meanwhile the crowding-out 
effect due to the competition with FDI from all industries in contiguous states would 
intensify. Second, the estimated manufacturing compensation effect now becomes 
positive and statistically significant for most quantiles and I fail to reject the null 
hypothesis of equal coefficients between any two different quantiles. Consequently, 
a significant and positive compensation effect throughout the employment 
distribution is revealed in these specifications. Third, the estimated effect of state 
transport infrastructure becomes negative for most of quantiles and it is significant 
for percentiles lower than the median. Not only is this result counterintuitive, it is 
also controversial and inconsistent with the existing studies. Lastly, instead of a 
positive Mexican border effect throughout the employment distribution, I now 
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observe a negative Mexican border effect for most of the quantiles and the statistical 
significance is confirmed for percentiles lower than median.  
 When only the state policy of overseas offices is examined, the number of 
offices has an estimated negative effect and this effect remains significant for the 
lower and the median percentiles (Table 4.4.a and Table 4.8.a). There are, however, 
notable departures from the baseline estimate results. First, few office-host country 
dummies have significant coefficients across the employment distribution, and, 
controversially, having offices in Korea is now expected to be negative for the higher 
quantiles at the 0.05 significance level. Second, the estimated manufacturing 
compensation effect is now negative only at the higher quantiles and it is 
significantly different in magnitude between the lower and the higher quantiles, 
indicating responses in opposite directions between the two tails of the employment 
distribution. Third, the estimated effect of education attainment loses significance for 
percentiles above the median. Fourth, not only does the estimated transport 
infrastructure effect now become insignificant throughout the employment 
distribution, it also varies little in magnitude. Finally, instead of being positive and 
insignificant, the estimated Mexican border effect becomes negative and 
insignificant throughout the employment distribution.  
Taken together, the differences in results between the basic model (Table 
4.4.a) and specifications investigating policy variables separately (Table 4.5.a - 
4.8.a) highlight the importance of considering investment-promotion policies in 
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combination rather than in isolation. As a consequence, conclusions stemming from 
studies that examine related policies in isolation warrant further scrutiny. 
4.6. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
 This study explores the potential heterogeneous effects of state business 
incentives on the employment by foreign-owned firms in the US throughout the 
employment distribution. Specifically, I empirically investigate the US inbound 
manufacturing FDI for 50 states during the period 1997 – 2008 using a random 
effects panel data framework. My contributions are twofold. My paper contributes to 
the literature of uneven effects on the employment outcomes by focusing on the FDI-
related employment aggregated to the state level. In addition, econometric issues 
associated with the violation of the normal distribution assumption are addressed 
using the simultaneous quantlile regression approach. The SQR estimate reveals the 
relative importance rather than a single central tendency of each policy at various 
points of the employment distribution.  
My estimates provide evidence of heterogeneous response to investment-
promotion policies based on different state-level employment characteristics of 
foreign-owned firms. Foreign investments tend to create and/or retain jobs in regions 
with high corporate taxes as long as these regions provide more public goods and 
services (Gabe and Bell 2004). Notably, the estimated positive transport 
infrastructure effect differs significantly between the median and the upper tail of the 
employment distribution.  
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 Take Washington in 2005 and Texas in 2006 for example. The former has 
21,700 employees (at the median of the distribution) and the latter has 97,700 
employees (at the 90
th
 percentile) in foreign manufacturing firms. Holding other 
conditions constant, a one percentage increase in Washington’s top CIT rate from 
9% to 10% (or from 0% to 1% in Texas) coupled with a one percent increase in 
Washington’s highway mileage of 0.026 mile per-mile2 (or 0.02 mile per-mile2 in 
Texas) is predicted to create 77 more jobs by foreign manufacturing firms in 
Washington (or 528 more such employees in Texas).
74
 
 The estimated positive effect of the provision of FTZs (both general-purpose 
zones and subzones) on state employment by foreign firms varies significantly along 
the distribution with a U-shape pattern. The policy implication associated with this 
result is worth noting. For instance, if the count of FTZs in Washington increased by 
10 percent (or 15 * 10% = 1.5 more FTZs) in 2005 (which is located at the median of 
the distribution), ceteris paribus, then it is expected that there would have been 
approximate 1.08 percent (or 21,700 * 1.08% = 234.36 jobs) more employment by 
foreign manufacturing firms. A 10 percent growth of FTZs in North Dakota 2000 
(the 10
th
 percentile) and Texas 2006 (the 90
th
 percentile), ceteris paribus, is predicted 
to increase the FDI-related employment by 2.44 percent (or 2,800 * 2.44% = 68.32 
                                                 
74
                         and                          . I use 
the conditional mean CIT effect (0.294, c.f. Table 4.a) obtained from the OLS 
estimate because the reported F-tests of equality suggest that coefficients 
on            are equal in magnitude (Table 4.b). 
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employees) and 3.31 percent (or 97,700 * 3.31% = 3233.87 employees), 
respectively.  
 Having more trade offices abroad is predicted to decrease state FDI-related 
employment throughout the employment distribution and this negative relationship is 
statistically significant for the lower and the median percentiles. Ceteris Paribus, a 
100 percent (or 3 * 100% = 3 offices) increase in the count of overseas offices by 
Washington State in 2005 (at the median of the employment distribution) is expected 
to be associated with an approximate 2.6 percent drop (or 21,700 * 2.6% = 564.2 
employees) in Washington’s manufacturing FDI-related jobs. 
 Finally, the predicted employment enhancing office-host countries include 
Japan, Korea, China, Malaysia, India, Mexico, Dubai, etc. In contrast, some office-
host countries such as Brazil, Argentina, Taiwan, Canada and the Europe Union are 
negatively associated with the FDI-related manufacturing employment in the US. 
Furthermore, the SQR estimate reveals heterogeneity in the effects of office-host 
countries at different points of the employment distribution. For example, offices in 
Korea and Japan have an estimated positive effect for the lower and the median 
quantiles where a negative effect is expected for the EU. China and Mexico, 
however, are predicted to promote the FDI-related employment at the two tails of the 
distribution. 
My exploration of the heterogeneous effects of state investment-promotion 
policies on the FDI-related employment is innovative and provides a basis for future 
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investigation regarding the effects of inward FDI on local economies. My results, 
however, should be interpreted with caution. The source-country specific 
information in the state-level employment data is available for only seven countries, 
namely Canada, France, Germany, Netherlands, Switzerland, United Kingdom and 
Japan. The lack of detailed source-country specific information has been found in 
some of other subnational-level studies such as Coughlin and Segev (2000), 
Kozlowski, Solocha and Dixon (1994), etc. In spite of this data limitation, it has been 
widely recognized that foreign offices serve as an important component of state’s 
marketing efforts to promote business (and thus employment) within a global 
context. Correspondingly, the link between state overseas offices and inward foreign 
investment (and thus US employment) is warranted. An investigation of the bilateral 
relationship between state business incentives and the employment by inbound FDI 
from a source-country (or source-region) would be an interesting extension. 
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Table 4.2: Summary Statistics (1997 - 2008, by State)
a
 
Variable Observation Mean (S.D.) Min Max 
MFGEMPi,t 550 38.78 (40.52) 0.5 208.2 
 ∑ALLEMPi,,j,t 550 111.56 (126.87) 3.7 749.4 
  INCOMEi,t 600 31,246.86 (6,255.13) 18,880 56,245 
COMPENSATIONi,t 600 53,844.67 (11,508.01) 30,635.35 92,279.29 
 UNEMPi,t 600 4.68 (1.14) 2.3 8.3 
 HSEDUi,t 600 84.77(4.15) 72.9 92.8 
 TAXRATEi,t 600 6.76 (2.79) 0 12 
 SUBSIDYi,t 600 142.24 (77.78) 22.84 624.32 
 FTZi,t 600 13.37 (15) 0 104 
 OFFICEi,t 600 3.75 (4.04) 0 23 
 HOSTi,t 
2250 
foreign 
offices 
between 43 
countries 
52.3 offices per Host-
country 0 1 
Total Highway 
Mileage 600 79,405.30 (52,158.27) 4165 306,404 
HIGHWAYi,t 600 1.64 (0.96) 0.02 4.50 
Geographical Area  
(Square Miles) 600 75,736.32 (95,354) 1,545 656,425 
Border Dummies: 
MEXi,t, CANi,t 600 
4 states border 
Mexico; 12  
border Canada 0 1 
a
 Due to the fact that since 2008 state-level data on US affiliates employment 
published by BEA include both bank and nonbank affiliates, such data are thus 
inconsistent with the one before 2008. As a result, state FDI-related employment 
data are for the years 1997-2007. 
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Table 4.3: Summary Statistics for State-Level Manufacturing FDI-Related 
Employment in US (      ) and Log      , 1997-2008 
Statistics Variable 
 
       (1000s)           
Mean 38.78 4.298 
Standard Deviation 40.516 0.578 
Skewness 1.449 -0.496 
Kurtosis 4.842 2.455 
5th quantile 1.6 3.23 
10th quantile 2.75 3.447 
25th quantile 8.7 3.942 
Median 21.5 4.336 
75th quantile 57.2 4.765 
90th quantile 97.3 4.985 
95th quantile 120.3 5.08 
Num. of Obs. 600 600 
Test 1 (P-value) 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Test 2 (P-value) 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Notes:  
  Test 1: Shapiro and Francia (1972) test for normality 
Test 2: D'Agostino et al.(1990) Skewness and Kurtosis  test for normality                                
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Figure 4.1: Annual Per-Capita Spending on Subsidies by State and Local 
Governments in US, Average over 1997-2008, By State (Top 5, Middle 5 and 
Bottom 5) 
 
Data source: State and Local Government Finances by Level of Government and by 
State: 1997-2008, State and Local Government Finance, U.S. Census Bureau.  
http://www.census.gov/govs/www/financegen.html/ 
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Figure 4.2: Distribution of Overseas Offices by US States in 1991, 2002 and 2009 
(from top to bottom)
75
 
 
 
 
                                                 
75
 Based on the data collected and compiled by the author, Figure 4.2 is made 
originally using Microsoft
®
 MapPoint 2011and all rights are thus reserved. 
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Figure 4.3: Top 10 Popular Office-host Countries by US states in 1991, 2002 and 
2009 (from top to bottom, with the counts of overseas offices included) 
 
 
 
Data Sources for Figure 4.2 and 4.3: Author’s compilation from the following: 
Directory of Incentives of Business Investment and Development in the United 
States: A State-by-State Guide, 1991, National Association of State Development 
Agencies (NASA); Appendix A, State Official’s Guide to International Affairs, by 
Chirs Whatley, Council of State Governments, 2003, pp. 49-51; and state Websites 
related to economic development authorities for all states. 
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Figure 4.4: Density Estimates of State-Level FDI-Related Manufacturing 
Employment in US (      ) and Log      , 1997-2008 
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Figure 4.5: Empirical Results _ SQR Estimate Results when All State Business 
Incentives Are Incorporated 
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Figure 4.6: Robustness Check _ SQR Estimate Results when Only State Top 
CIT Rates Are Incorporated 
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Figure 4.7:  Robustness Check _ SQR Estimate Results when Only State 
Government Spending on Subsidy/Grant Is Incorporated 
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Figure 4.8: Robustness Check _ SQR Estimate Results when Only State FTZs 
Are Incorporated into the Examination 
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Figure 4.9: Robustness Check _ SQR Estimate Results When Only State 
International Offices Are Incorporated 
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Chapter 5: 
Entry/Exit Behavior and Employment by Foreign Firms in the US: 
Sunk Costs, Agglomeration and Investment-Promotion Policies 
 
5.1. Introduction 
 The expansion of worldwide FDI is remarkable. In the latter half of the 
1990s, FDI flows increased annually by around 32%. During the same period, 
exports increased annually only by 1.5% and the annual growth in world GDP was 
only 0.6% (Blonigen et al. 2007). The conventional empirical studies on the 
determinants of FDI entry and exit behavior have relied on either a gravity-type 
framework or a logit location choice model utilizing firm-level data. More recently, 
the direction of FDI entry/exit studies has moved from cross-country level towards 
state/province or even county level. One important reason is that the huge 
heterogeneity across countries may lead to significant unobservable issues thus 
biasing the empirical estimation. Meanwhile, some unconventional factors, e.g. FDI 
agglomeration and spatial interaction across neighboring regions, have been 
proposed as important determinants of FDI location choice. 
 Producers’ discrete decisions of entry and exit determine the market 
structure. In the field of Industrial Organization, studies commonly use a two-stage 
model of entry and competition initiated by Bresnahan and Reiss (1987). Recently, 
Pakes, Ostrovsky and Berry (2007) developed a dynamic model of entry and exit 
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within the context of imperfect competition to describe the evolution of market 
structure (Dunne et al. 2009). In their model, the number of firms is determined by 
firms’ entry and exit decisions and is thus endogenous. Firms’ choices of entry/exit 
depend upon their continuation value and entry value. An incumbent will exit the 
market if expected future profits cannot cover fixed cost. A potential entrant will 
enter the market if the discounted entry value exceeds its private entry cost. The key 
step here is to estimate the incumbent’s (potential entrant’s) perceived transition 
probabilities across states of the market. 
 Pakes, Ostrovsky and Berry (2007), by showing how to measure the 
continuation and entry values from market level data on profits, exit rates and 
transition rates for market states (Dunne et al. 2009),  motivates my investigation of 
the FDI entry/exit behavior without firm-level data. The implication of local 
government promotion policy on FDI behavior could also be investigated. Believing 
that FDI could stimulate local economic growth by increasing employment, 
transferring new technology and management know-how, many local governments 
in the U.S. compete aggressively for new FDI by offering various promotion policies 
to foreign investors (Head et al. 1999). The empirical research is ambiguous 
regarding the effectiveness of FDI promotion policies. However, the promotional 
activities by local governments will affect foreign firms’ entry costs and fixed costs. 
As a result, foreign firms may make an entry/exit decision in a different way than 
domestic firms. 
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 To sum up, this empirical study attempts to test the entry/exit model offered 
by Pakes, Ostrovsky and Berry (2007) within the context of US county-level FDI in 
retail industry. To my knowledge, few studies of FDI entry/exit have employed this 
model and utilized the market-level data. 
5.2. Previous Literature on FDIs’ Location Choices 
5.2.1. Theoretical Literature 
 The theoretical analysis of Multinational enterprises (MNEs) begins from two 
important studies. Markusen (1984) provides the first theorem of “horizontal” FDI, 
which means MNEs arise due to a market-access motive to substitute for export 
flows. Based on this model, FDI flows into the host region in order to avoid trade 
frictions. Finally, they sell products to host market. In contrast, Helpman (1984) 
develops a general-equilibrium model in which MNEs locate firms in the host 
country not for market access, but for a better resource of production input. Based on 
this “vertical” FDI model, MNEs investigate potential destination countries 
searching for the lowest-cost input provider. 
 Recently developed theoretical models of FDI relax the two-country 
assumption to allow for more realistic spatial interactions in MNEs location choice 
motives. Bergstrand and Egger (2004) develop a model of “export-platform” FDI, in 
which a destination market is selected by MNEs to produce and serve a “third” 
market as a platform through exporting the final goods from the host market to the 
“third” market. This type of FDI is a plausible outcome when the trade protection 
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between the host and the “third” markets is relatively lower than trade frictions 
between the parent and the “third” countries. A more complicated variation of 
Helpman’s “vertical” FDI model, the “complex-vertical” FDI, was offered by 
Baltagi et al. (2007) . Based on this model, an MNE will separate out different 
activities along its vertical production chain across regions to exploit the comparative 
advantages of each location. The incentive for MNEs to follow this type of FDI may 
be the agglomeration economies due to the supplier networks, or just the immobile 
resources. 
5.2.2. Empirical Literature 
 The question that what determines the FDI location decision continues to 
intrigue academics and policy-makers. Conventional empirical studies on the 
determinants of FDI have relied on a gravity-type framework and used data on 
bilateral country-level FDI activity. The widely suggested determinants include 
production costs, infrastructure, institutions, market size and geographical distance, 
etc. For example, Fredriksson et al. (2003) focus on testing the “pollution haven” 
hypothesis and the relationship between corruption and FDI by investigating the 
effect of endogenous US state environmental regulations on FDI inflows controlling 
for state government corruption. They regress a continuous measure of inbound FDI 
in a state on environmental regulation, supply of public goods, control variables 
(including tax effort, unemployment and unionization, market proximity, population, 
wage rate, land value, etc), and state/time dummies, using both OLS-FE and IV-FE 
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estimators. Their empirical results confirm the expected role played by 
aforementioned determinants (see also Levinson 1996, List and Co 2000). 
 More recently, the direction of FDI location choice studies has moved from 
cross-country level towards state/province or even county level. This reflects a 
concern that the huge heterogeneity across countries may lead to significant 
unobservable issues thus biasing the empirical estimation. During the same period, 
some unconventional factors have been proposed as important determinants for FDI 
location choice. First, agglomeration among FDI could impact MNEs entry decision. 
This sort of FDI concentration within one region could result in huge economies of 
scale, as well as the convenience of sharing information and labor pooling (Krugman 
1991). For instance, Du et al. (2008) investigate the importance of agglomeration 
economies and institutional quality in addition to the conventional factors like 
production costs and infrastructure as determinants of FDI location choices. To 
account for the issue of endogeneity, they utilize a discrete choice model with firm-
level data on manufacturing firms from U.S., EU, Japan and Korea over the period 
1993–2001 in China. As a result, they mainly focus on how regional institutions and 
industry agglomeration affect individual foreign firms’ location choice without 
worrying about codetermination. The empirical results from a conditional logit 
model confirm that higher horizontal and vertical agglomerations and stronger 
regional institutions promote inward FDI. Foreign horizontal agglomeration may 
help overcome the regional weak institutions and thus it plays a more pronounced 
role in regions with weaker institutional strength. 
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 Blonigen et al. (2005) examine the potential effect of networking connections 
through horizontal keiretsu (a type of within-industry clustering) on Japanese 
manufacturing MNEs’ location choices by employing a conditional logit model. To 
distinguish between agglomeration effects and networking/information effects, they 
consider both stock measures (agglomeration) and one-year flow measures 
(information) for 4 types of clustering within a region. In contrast to previous studies 
that examined only whether membership in a horizontal keiretsu affects investment 
decisions, they investigate the effect of recent investment activity by horizontal 
keiretsu members across regions to identify the networking effect (cf.  Kolstad and 
Villanger 2008; Barrios et al. 2006; List 2001; Ge 2009). 
 Second, the spatial agglomeration spillover effect between bordering regions 
has been highlighted but not sufficiently investigated. The spatial effects vary with 
patterns of FDI. The “horizontal FDI”, which is motivated by market access and 
minimizing transportation costs and import protection in host countries, incurs no 
spatial relationship with FDI in neighboring markets. The “export-platform FDI”, 
which assumes MNEs choose one region to produce and serve other markets via 
exports, may imply both a negative spatial lag and a positive surrounding-market 
potential effect. In the model of “vertical FDI”, MNEs will select the host country 
which is the lowest-cost provider to produce and resend the goods to their parent 
markets. So, we could predict a negative spatial lag coefficient and an insignificant 
surrounding-market potential effect.  
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 The first study concerning the spatial interaction of FDI agglomeration is 
Coughlin and Segev (2000b). By looking at US FDI across Chinese provinces, this 
paper finds that the FDI flows into one province is positively correlated with FDI 
flows into neighboring provinces due to the spatial spillover of agglomeration 
economies. Blonigen et al. (2007) investigate two questions that are not addressed by 
the previous literature by utilizing a panel of annual data on US outbound FDI into 
35 host countries for the period 1983 to 1998. The first question is whether the 
omission of spatial interactions biases coefficients on conventional regressors and 
the other question is how robust the estimated spatial relations in FDI patterns across 
samples are.  
 Third, believing that FDI could stimulate local economic growth by 
increasing employment, transferring new technology and management know-how, 
many local governments in U.S compete aggressively for new FDI by offering 
various promotion policies to foreign investors (Head et al. 1999). Whether those 
FDI promotion policies work or not has not been concluded in the empirical work. 
 Girma et al. (2007) focus on investigating whether the grant provision system 
in the Irish manufacturing sector has contributed to enhancing plant survival 
probabilities. Their empirical results indicate that the grant payments have 
differential impacts on the performance between domestic firms and foreign 
multinationals. The grant provision can effectively enhance domestic-owned plant 
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survival probabilities; however, the evidence on foreign-owned firms is much more 
tentative. 
 Governmental subsidies are offered to regions with low economic growth 
performance for the purpose of attracting investments from multinationals. Devereux 
et al. (2007) investigate the question that whether the potential benefits from 
agglomeration affects the effectiveness of fiscal instruments like government 
discretionary grants to investors. Their study further disentangles the effects of 
agglomeration externalities into two parts, namely, the effects of localization within 
industry (horizontal agglomeration), and the diversification across industries (vertical 
agglomeration). To fulfill these objectives, they first use data on matched grant-
offered-plants which actually have grants to estimate coefficients for expected grants 
equation. Then, they use the estimated parameters to obtain an expected grant for 
each entrant in each location. When investigating the impacts of grants and 
agglomeration on firm locational choice, they use a fixed effect conditional logit 
model. 
5.3. Previous Literature on Market Structure in Empirical IO 
5.3.1. Static Equilibrium Models 
 When investigating the dynamics of market structure adjustments to policy 
changes, the key determinants include sunk entry costs and scrap value (sell-off 
value) if firms exit the market. However, the lack of "sunk costs" data has been 
existing for a long time. The first difficulty is that they are proprietary and are thus 
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very hard to access. The second problem is that they are difficult to measure. As a 
result, the early stream of entry/exit studies has to rely on two-period static models 
which only make sense when the sunk costs are assumed away. The static nature of 
this type of model precludes accounting for the impacts of environmental dynamics 
on market structure over time; see Bresnahan and Reiss (1990,1991), Berry (1992), 
Mazzeo (2002), Seim(2002), and Cilberto and Tamer (2007). 
 The early studies with static equilibrium models of the market structure 
focused on the optimal number of active firms across markets. For example, 
Bresnahan and Reiss (1990) assume that variable profits in a market depend on the 
market structure and exogenous variables representing the effects from demand and 
cost variables. Market structure is assumed to linearly depend on market population, 
contiguous market population and population growth. Based on this set-up, we could 
expect that the coefficients on the number of firms are negative and decreasing in 
magnitudes with the number of active firms in the market. One important issue 
associated with static two-step models is that they may result in multiple equlibria 
which makes it impossible to determine the probability of an outcome conditional on 
observables and estimated parameters (Pakes, Ostrovsky and Berry 2007). Almost all 
papers in the early entry/exit literature tried to deal with this critical issue using 
different methods. 
 Berry (1992) considered the effect of nonunique equilibriums in a sequential-
move entry model and allowing for fixed costs to vary among firms. He modeled 
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airlines’ decisions to serve airline routes as a result of a comparison between variable 
profits and fixed costs. The homogeneous-product variable profit for a firm in a 
certain market depends on mileage between endpoint cities, population, number of 
operating firms and unobserved profit shocks. The heterogeneity is modeled in fixed 
costs which contain a set of dummies, like whether a firm serves both endpoint 
cities. To guarantee the uniqueness of equilibrium, he made a key assumption that 
airlines are post-entry symmetric such that the only thing that affects profits is the 
total number of operating firms. A market structure of N
*
 firms is the unique 
equilibrium when it satisfies the condition that N
*
 results in nonnegative net gains 
while (N
*
+1) will lead to non-positive net gains. 
 Mazzeo (2002) obtained data on motels with different qualities at 
geographically distinct highway exits. His discrete choice game is one where 
potential entrants decide about both the quality and the entry. To address the non-
uniqueness issue of equilibrium, he made two assumptions. The first follows Berry 
(1992) and assumes a sequential-move game. This assumption guarantees a unique 
prediction for the game. Different from Berry (1992), he assumed that motels are ex 
ante symmetric and then select qualities after entry. This makes it possible to 
estimate profit functions without knowing the order of entry. Assuming that the entry 
of a motel with the same quality lowers profits more than a different-quality 
monopolist, we could infer that the 2nd-mover will always choose the other quality 
than the 1st-mover no matter what type the 1st-mover selected. 
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 Ciliberto and Tamer (2009) utilize a “bounds” approach which properly fit 
the situation in which the econometric model cannot make complete predictions 
about observed outcomes. The general idea is that, if a firm enters, then its expected 
average profit plus the unexpected profit shock should be nonnegative. However, in 
the existence of multiple equilibria, the aforementioned conditions are necessary but 
not sufficient, because the observed and unobserved profit shifters may result in 
different entry decisions. As a result, they calculate the joint probabilities across 
firms in a market that satisfy the aforementioned two conditions using the 
distribution of unobserved profit shocks. Note that, these probabilities are upper 
bounds, in the sense that necessary conditions are weaker than necessary and 
sufficient conditions. The problem of the “bounds” approach is that the “identified 
set” of parameters which satisfies the necessary-but-not-sufficient conditions may 
not be informative enough. 
 5.3.2. Dynamic Games 
 The aforementioned two-step static equilibrium analysis assumes away “sunk 
costs” and thus avoids computational complexity. Although useful in organizing 
empirical facts, it is unable to analyze the effects of dynamics in policies or in 
environment over time. In a lot of cases, these dynamics may greatly change the 
desirability of certain policies. As a result, the analysis based on dynamic 
oligopolistic competition becomes more informative. The examples of dynamic 
situation include entry/exit decisions, dynamic pricing and auction games, collusion 
study and investment decisions. 
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5.3.2.1. Framework 
 The critical feature of dynamic games is that the future state will be affected 
by current actions of firm. Through this channel, firms’ future values and strategic 
interactions are impacted correspondingly. Assuming that all firms move 
simultaneously with symmetric information, we immediately obtain a set of 
objective functions, in which each firm maximizes its expected discounted sum of 
profits conditional on its current state and firm-specific profit shocks: 
      ∑  
  
                                                                                   (1) 
The actions represented by ait may be decisions on entry/exit, investment, prices and 
quantities. Relevant state variables sit include firms’ production capacities, product 
qualities, market share, technical progress, or the set of incumbent firms, etc.  
 For dynamic games with infinite time horizon, it is important to specify the 
transitions between states. In situations where current decisions have lasting effects 
on future states, for example, entry/exit decision and long-term investment, the 
current decisions could further impact future payoffs by affecting future states. So, 
it’s reasonable to assume that states are distributed based on the probability function 
P(st+1|st,at). Focusing on Markov perfect equilibria (MPE), in which a Markov 
strategy is defined as the action taken by a firm based on the current state and 
information, we could define a Markov strategy profile  i as a MPE if for firm i,  i 
is always preferable to  i
’
 given that opponents choose  -i. That is: 
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                                                                   (2) 
 In a recursive form of MPE, firm present discounted profits can be written as 
the Bellman equation (BLP 2007): 
            
                        ∫    
    
 | )dG(  
                         (3) 
5.3.2.2. The Nested Fixed Point Approach 
 In order to estimate the dynamic games model, one needs to calculate the 
continuation values. As the initial wave towards solving continuation values, Rust 
(1987) offered a direct method of obtaining continuation values by solving for a 
fixed point of a function. The methodology suggested by Rust (1987) could be 
simplified as a 3-step searching and matching procedure as follows: 
1. Obtain an equilibrium firm value given a set of states and parameters  , with 
the help of computers; 
2. Plug the equilibrium firm value into an objective function which is then 
estimated using data; 
3. Iterate step 1 and step 2 in a searching process for the value of parameters 
until the objective functions are maximized. 
 Pakes and McGuire (1994) propose an algorithm for computing continuation 
  
182 
 
values based on Rust’s idea.76 The advantage associated with the “nested fixed 
points” approach is that the 1st step contains no sampling error. However, one 
disadvantage of this method is the heavy computation burden in empirical models 
with hundreds of fixed points to calculate. Moreover, dynamic oligopoly models also 
suffer the problem of multiple equilibia, but using the “nested fixed points” approach 
to select the correct equilibrium is almost impossible. 
5.3.2.3. Two-Step Approaches 
 To address the obstacle of computation complexity associated with “nested 
fixed points” approaches, the recent literature on dynamic games derived a set of 
nonparametric estimates of  the continuation values, which effectively avoids the 
heavy computation of all equalibia. This set of methodology is grouped as “two-step 
approaches”. 
5.3.2.3.1 A Single Agent Dynamics Game 
 As the first attempt of using nonparametrics to release the complexity of 
computing continuation values in dynamic games, Hotz and Miller (1993) compared 
a single-agent dynamic discrete-choice problem with a static discrete-choice 
problem. They showed that, by replacing the mean utilities in a static game with the 
                                                 
76
 They suggest to begin with an initial guess of the value function, V0(s; Θ), and 
substitute it into the right hand side of the Bellman Equation (Eq.(3)). Then, solve 
the maximization equation on the right hand side of Eq. (3) for each state and every 
firm. This step will yield a new estimate of the value function V1(s; Θ), which is 
plugged back in to the Bellman Equation to compute for another new estimate of the 
value function. The iteration will last until we find the fixed point, i.e. the new and 
old value functions converge. 
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value functions in a dynamic one, we could obtain the continuation values 
nonparametrically follwing a similar "invertion" method used in static game 
literature to estimate mean utilities. Generally speaking, in the first step, we estimate 
the firm's choice probabilies for all states using a discrete choice model and then 
invert them to recover the corresponding continuation values. In the second stage, 
parameters of profit functions could be estimated using results from the first stage. 
 Hotz and Miller （1993）made an important simplifying assumption: firms' 
current payoffs only depend on the states of their own and that of rivals. If firms' 
payoffs also depend on the rivals' actions, which rely on their own shocks, then we 
need to integrate over all rivals current actions for maximizing each firm's profits. 
This would immediately complicate the compution. (As a comparison, one could 
refer to Aguirregabiria and Mira (2007), in which the firms' profits are modeled to 
depend on rivals' actions.) Based on Hotz and Miller’s simplifying assumption, 
profits function is given by, 
               ̃                                                                              (4) 
where          is firm i’s private profit shock associated with the action      
 Further, we could obtain the Bellman equation for this problem, 
            { ̃             ∫   
                        }.  (5) 
 Now we can infer that in this discrete-choice problem, the mean profit works 
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like the mean utility in a static game, 
        ̃        ∫   
                        .                              (6) 
 The probability an agent selects an action can be expressed as in a static 
discrete-choice problem if firm-specific shocks are independent across time and 
agents, 
                                  
      .                                 (7) 
 The left hand side of Eq.(7) can be obtained from data. The next step is to 
invert value functions from observed choice probabilities using the relationship  
                .                                                                                    (8) 
 Note that this transformation can only identify the normalized or differences 
in value functions at each state given the estimated choice probabilities. This is due 
to the nature of the discrete-choice model. Instead, the continuation values are 
obtained using a maximization routine, 
           {           }                                                                      (9)                   
 To estimate profit function parameters, in the second step we plug our 
estimated continuation values into the right hand side of Bellman equation to update, 
 ̂      
 ∫    { ̃               ∫  ̂  
                        }             (10) 
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 Based on the new continuation values estimates from Eq.(10), we compute 
new predicted choice probabilities. We then use these choice probabilities to 
construct objective functions (e.g. pseudo-likelihood, or GMM) that match the 
model's predictions to the observed choices. One problem with this method, 
however, is that the firm values and transition rate are estimated nonparametrically. 
So, there may exist estimation error in the second stage objective function 
estimation. 
5.3.2.3.2. An Investment Dynamics Game with Entry/Exit 
 Bajari, Benkard and Levin (2007) construct an investment game with entry 
and exit, in which each firm selects its investment level to improve its own state in 
the next period without investment spillovers. The appropriate examples that they 
considered include: (1) the investment improves product quality; (2) advertising 
investment increases consumers' awareness and (3) investment in capital stock. As a 
result, an incumbent firm's current profit from running business is equal to 
             (                  )                                              (11) 
Considering entry and exit behavior, the firms' current payoffs will depend on their 
actions (e.g. prices, investment, entry/exit) and their private shocks (e.g. individual 
entry cost). In a more specific way, at each period, the incumbent firms could choose 
either staying, or leaving and receiving a scrap value whose distribution is commonly 
known. The potential entrants could choose to enter the market if their expected 
discounted value of entering exceeds their entry costs. Both sell-off value and entry 
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costs are assumed to be private information, while their distributions are commonly 
observed. Based on the aforementioned general framework, firms' current payoffs  
are given by 
              {     }[             (                  )  
             ]              
               
    .                            (12)                                      
 Bajari, Benkard and Levin (2007) follow a two-step approach to estimate the 
discounted values of future returns. They first nonparametrically estimate policy 
functions by regressing the observed actions on firms' state variables. Then, they use 
the estimated policies to obtain the discounted value of future returns by a Monte 
Carlo method.  
5.3.2.3.3. Dynamic Discrete Games: Entry and Exit 
 Pakes, Ostrovsky and Berry (POB, 2007) developed a dynamic model of 
entry and exit which I briefly outlined in this sector. Assuming that the state 
variables, s = (nt,zt), and the counts of entrants and exits, (et, xt ) are observed, with nt 
representing the number of incumbent firms and zt referring to exogenous profit 
shifters; but, the sunk entry and exit costs are to be estimated. Correspondingly, the 
number of active firms n will be endogenously given by individual firms’ entry and 
exit decisions and evolves as n’ = n + e – x. They are mainly interested in estimating 
the fixed costs and entry costs by first estimating the continuation/ entry values. 
 Let’s start with the behavior of incumbent firms to exit or to remain in the 
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market. Assume that all incumbent firms have the same average profit          At 
the end of each period, they draw a fixed cost    with an independent and identically 
distributed (i.i.d.) cumulative distribution function   . If an incumbent firm remains 
in operation, then this fixed cost will be paid in next period. The firm will exit if its 
fixed cost exceeds the expected continuation values. So, an incumbent firm’s 
probability of exit is: 
          (          )     
 (       )                                (13) 
The firm’s payoff comes from its production profits as well as the discrete 
continue/exit decision: 
                     {              }.                                   (14) 
 Given the continuing incumbent’s belief of the future state s’,    
  , it will earn 
the average profit       with the a production probability, (        )  When it 
actually produces in the future state s’, it will earn the discounted expected future 
value net of the fixed cost. Thus, an incumbent’s continuation value could be 
represented as: 
         
 [             {     
        } ] 
    
 [       (        )                       ]                  (15) 
The last expectation term is conditional on that the incumbent decide to produce in 
future as the expected continuation value outweighs the fixed cost. We may think 
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about this expectation of fixed costs as the mean over    that are less than VC(s’). 
 To simplify our estimation, we could assume that the fixed costs   follows an 
exponential random distribution,         
 
 
  
 with parameter 𝜎. So, the mean 
fixed cost below the value of VC(s’) could be written as: 
 (  |         )  𝜎               /                                          (16) 
Substituting Eq.(16) in to Ea.(15), the continuation value is simplified as: 
         
  [               𝜎(        )]                                   (17)       
 Using aggregate data on average profit and market turnover rate, POB (2007) 
suggest using nonparametric estimates of both the incumbents’ perceived transition 
rates,  ̂  
 , and exit probability,  ̂     , to construct VC by substituting them into 
Eq.(17). In this way, we don’t have to solve the continuation values at each 
parameter vector. 
 Next, let’s look at the decision procedure of potential entrants. Assuming that 
each potential entrant faces a private entry cost    with a common distribution  
 . A 
potential entrant will enter the market if its private entry cost is less than the 
discounted expected entering value:             As a result, the entry rate is: 
        (         )   
         .                                                (18) 
Once a potential entrant enters the market, its expected future payoffs will be the 
same as that of incumbents, however, all are conditional on a potential entrant’s 
  
189 
 
belief about the state transition rate,    
 . The expected future payoff for a firm that 
enters the market is: 
         
  [               𝜎(        )].                                  (19) 
Given   ̂,  ̂ from estimation of Eq.(17) and nonparametric estimates of    
   ̂  
 , we 
can construct   ̂. Then, we could substitute   ̂ into Eq.(18) to estimate the entry 
cost cumulative distribution function    using the entry flow data. 
 As an empirical application of POB (2007), Dunne et al. (2009) utilize the 
market level U.S. data on entry/exit flow for dentist and chiropractor industries in 
small towns to estimate a dynamic entry game. They first project the average profit 
function on the market structure and a set of exogenous variables (e.g. population, 
per capita income, etc) using revenue and cost data. And then, they estimate the 
entry/continuing values as well as the sunk costs by employing POB (2007) method. 
The main differences between the two studies appear in both the model setup and the 
method used to estimate continuation values. POB (2007) assumed that an 
incumbent will obtain a scrap value (sell-off value) if it exits the market, but Dunne 
et al. (2009) assumed a fixed cost for remaining incumbent in the next period. 
Moreover, POB (2007) suggested using nonparametric estimates of both  ̂  
 , and exit 
probability,  ̂     , to construct VC. This method may relief the computation 
complexity, since we don’t need to calculate the continuation values for each 
parameter vector. Dunne et al. (2009), however, used a fixed-point approach to 
calculate VC. Given nonparametric estimate of  ̂  
  which is obtained from observed 
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data on the state transitions, they estimate VC as a fixed point to Eq.(17) with 
               . Though computationally complicated, this method may 
result in an exit rate that is consistent with other parameters.
77
 
5.4. Empirical Model 
 Following Dunne et al. (2009), my methodology could be identified as a 
3SLS-matching estimation. To be specific: 
5.4.1. Profit Function 
 As the first step, we need to run the average profit for all foreign firms in a 
market (say a county) on variables such as FDI agglomeration structure (how many 
foreign firms are in the county in the last year), variables measuring the competition 
effect from domestic firms, a set of exogenous variables (population, personal 
income, average wage), FDI promotion policy variable showing how many Free 
Trade Zones are in the county, and market fixed effect: 
    =                          
                  
  
               
               
  
       +        
 +              )+               )+          
   ) +                                                   (20) 
 Although foreign firms and domestic firms may have different entry costs 
and fixed costs due to the promotion policies (e.g. government grant, tax credit and 
                                                 
77
 Dunne et al. (2009) argue that their fixed point approach to Eq.(17) is not a source 
of computation burden and their estimated VC are stable.  
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subsidy paid to FDI), there should not be significant difference in terms of profit 
ability between foreign firms and domestic firms which have same technological 
productivity level. Later on, we will use  ̂    the estimate of equation (20) as the 
average profit condition for all firms in the market. 
5.4.2. State Transitions, the Value of Entry and Continuation  
 In this stage, we need first to estimate two transition matrices Mc and Me. To 
fulfill this purpose, we construct an exogenous aggregated market state variable 
vector z, which reflects income, population, wages and unobserved market-specific 
effects on profits based on the 1st-stage estimates: 
 ̂   
 ̂         ̂      
   ̂       ̂    
  
 ̂      + ̂       
 + ̂              )+ ̂              )+ ̂         
   )   ̂   ̂       .                                                                              (21) 
 Then, following Dunne et al. (2009) we discretize the market state variables 
for all counties into a small number of categories (e.g low-z, median-z and high-z) 
and use the mean of each category zd as the discrete set of points for evaluation. To 
highlight the impact of promotion policy on FDI entry/exit behavior, we separate all 
markets into policy groups based on their promotion strength which is measured by 
 ̂     ̂          We denote the means of each policy group as Fd and use it for 
evaluation. 
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 Based on how many discrete groups we have in FDI, DOM, zd and Fd, the 
size of transition matrices could be determined. In total, there are 
FDImax*DOMmax*zd*Fd discrete states. For the computation convenience, we use 5 
groups for zd (large-, upper-middle-, middle-, lower-middle- and small-market) and 3 
groups for Fd (high-, middle- and low-promotion policy). Even though, the size of 
estimated transition matrices could also be quite large, depending on FDImax and 
DOMmax in the selected industry. 
The transition probability for a continuing foreign firm is: 
  
                  ) =  
       
                            
                                     (22) 
where 
 ̂      
                      
                           
∑ (       
 )              
            
                   
∑ (       
 )                 
   (23) 
Here, I is a dummy variable which is equal to one if in the period t+1 the state is 
FDI’ and DOM’. 
The transition probability for a continuing domestic firm is: 
  
                  ) =  
       
                            
                                     (24) 
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 ̂      
                      
  
∑ (       
 )              
            
                   
∑ (       
 )                 
.                      (25) 
The transition probability perceived by a potential foreign entrant is: 
  
                  ) =  
       
                            
                                     (26) 
where 
 ̂      
                      
  
∑ (   
 )  [           
            
 ]    (           )
∑ (   
 )    (           )
.                               (27) 
The transition probability perceived by a potential domestic entrant is: 
  
                  ) =  
       
                            
                                     (28) 
where 
 ̂      
                      
 
∑ (   
 )  [           
            
 ]    (           )
∑ (   
 )    (           )
.                                (29) 
For all of the aforementioned transition probabilities, the transition probability for 
the exogenous state variable z is:  
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 ̂    
      
∑ (   
 )  [        
 ]    (           )
∑              (           )
.                                        (30) 
The estimators in equations for ̂   (i=F or D; j=e or x) allow to get estimates of  
 . 
5.4.3. Fixed Costs and Entry Costs 
 Assumptions about the distributions of fixed costs λ and entry costs κ are 
required for estimating these costs. Due to the local promotion policies, both costs 
could differ for foreign firms and domestic firms. For the sake of convenience, we 
assume that these costs are distributed as exponential random variables (Dunne et al. 
2009). Accordingly, their cdf’s are: 
    𝜎      
     ⁄                                                                                  (31) 
           
     ⁄    .                                                                             (32) 
The subscription i is F or D, for foreign firms or domestic firms, respectively. 𝜎i is 
the mean fixed cost and ∂i is the mean entry cost.  
 Before we estimate 𝜎i and ∂i using Maximize Likelihood Estimator (MLE), 
we need the estimates of VCs and VEs. VCs are constructed as a function of the 
mean fixed cost 𝜎: 
  ̂  
  𝜎    [    ̂ 
 ]
  
 ̂ 
   ̂   𝜎      
   .                                        (33) 
VEs are also constructed as a function of the mean fixed cost 𝜎: 
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  ̂  
  𝜎    [    ̂ 
 ]
  
 ̂ 
   ̂   𝜎      
                                            (34) 
 ̂ is estimated in the first stage and  ̂ 
  and  ̂ 
  are from the second stage estimates. 
 Following Dunne et al. (2009), we estimate VC as a fixed point because 
    
     (  ̂  
 )   Given the estimators of continuation values and entry values, 
combining the exponential distribution assumption for costs, the log of the 
probability to observe a market with    
  (the number of exits by foreign firms),    
  
(the number of exits by domestic firms),    
  (the number of entrants by foreign 
firms) and    
  (the number of entrants by domestic firms) is: 
     
 ,    
  𝜎      ∑ {(   
     
 )       (  ̂  
  𝜎    𝜎 )      
(   
 )         (  ̂  
  𝜎    𝜎 )   (   
 )       (  ̂  
  𝜎      )  
(   
        
 )         (  ̂  
  𝜎      )}.                                               (35) 
 Finally, given the observations on entry and exit flows, (   
 ,    
  ), we could 
estimate the mean fixed costs and entry costs by MLE, that is: 
            𝜎      ∑ ∑      
     
  𝜎                                                  (36) 
A firm may quit the market if its future continuation value is less than the fixed cost, 
implying that the probability of exit for a firm with type i (i=F or D)  is: 
 ̂ 
             𝜎 )) 
     =      (  ̂  
  𝜎    𝜎 )                                                                        (37) 
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A potential entrant may enter the market if the entry cost is lower than its expected 
value of entry. So, the probability of entry for firms with type i is: 
 ̂ 
             𝜎 )) 
                 =    (  ̂  
  𝜎      ).                                                                              (38) 
5.5. Data Description 
 Table 5.1 shows the descriptive statistics for U.S. inbound foreign-owned 
establishments in all industries in the year of 2002. California had the largest number 
of foreign-owned establishments (13969), and South Dakota had the least (152). On 
average, each state had 2325 foreign-owned establishments in 2002. The foreign-
owned firms in California hired the largest amount of employments (673738), while 
Montana’s FDIs had the least employments (4723). The average employment level 
for each state was 115601. California also had the largest amount of payrolls (34933 
million dollars) and sales (317446 million dollars) from foreign-owned firms in all 
states. South Dakota and Montana has the least amount of payrolls and sales, 
respectively. The reported standard deviations indicate states vary significantly in 
terms of the absolute values. In contrast, the shares of foreign-owned establishments 
over all US establishments vary less drastically among states. Delaware (South 
Carolina) led all other states with 3.7 percent (9 percent) of total establishments 
(total employment) by foreign-owned firms. At the lower end, Montana had the 
lowest FDI shares in both total establishments (0.7 percent) and total employment 
(1.6 percent). Table 5.2 reports the descriptive statistics for U.S. inbound Foreign-
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Owned Establishments in Retail Trade Industry only. The data reveals variations in 
both magnitudes and shares of retail FDI among states in 2002.  
5.6. Ongoing Research  
 I prefer county-(or metropolitan-) level panel data on both foreign-owned 
firms and domestic firms for a specific industry (e.g. manufacturing or retail 
industry). The data on market level demand and cost variables, i.e. population, per-
capita income and average wage paid to industry employees are available from 
annual County and City Data Book, various years. However, data on FDI that I’ve 
obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis are selected data of Majority-
Owned U.S. Affiliates by Industry of Affiliate and selected data of U.S. inward FDI 
by states. The data include information about FDI employment, sales, net income, 
PPE, etc. either by industry or by state. Although I have not obtained the county-
level data so far, I will keep searching. The empirical investigation will be conducted 
upon obtaining the data, and the resulting policy implications will be discussed as 
well. The primary contribution of this analysis is to examine how investment-
promotion policies affect foreign firms’ entry/exit behavior in the US within a 
dynamic market structure as proposed by POB (2007). 
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Num. of 
FTZ
States
Foreign-
Owned
As % of 
all US 
Est.
Foreign-
Owned
As % of 
all US 
Est.
Foreign-
Owned
As % of 
all US 
Est.
Foreign-
Owned
As % of 
all US 
Est.
Total 118588 1.7 5895669 5.4 273947 7.4 2335700 13.5 249
Alabama 1539 1.6 83708 5.5 2932 6.7 24034 11 5
Alaska 292 1.6 14668 6.8 740 9.4 8770 22.1 5
Arizona 2002 1.7 64819 3.8 2306 4.5 16340 6.4 6
Akansas 537 0.9 33283 3.6 1083 4.4 14188 10.1 2
California 13969 1.8 673738 5.3 34933 7.3 317446 15 17
Colorado 2259 1.6 84461 4.3 3554 5.3 39815 13.4 2
Connecticut 2095 2.4 125260 8.3 6667 10.5 78374 31.2 4
Dalaware 867 3.7 32062 8.7 1858 13 22757 28.3 1
Dist. of Columbia 499 2.6 13619 3.9 712 4.2 3751 7.7
Florida 7015 1.6 315390 5.1 10828 5.9 77162 9.3 20
Georgia 4313 2.2 198904 6.2 8582 8.1 90915 15.8 3
Hawaii 990 3.3 35110 8.4 1017 8.3 5699 10.9 1
Idaho 419 1.1 12284 2.8 399 3.4 2959 5 1
Illinois 5602 1.9 286205 5.7 14481 7.8 144122 16.1 8
Indiana 2012 1.4 153390 6.3 6521 8.5 54889 13.4 6
Iowa 826 1.1 41514 3.5 1466 4.3 15193 8.7 3
Kansas 829 1.2 37118 3.5 1408 4.4 13498 8 2
Kentucky 1497 1.7 95901 6.8 4145 10.1 40551 16.6 2
Louisiana 1274 1.3 52983 3.5 2242 5.2 39608 14.1 5
Maine 572 1.5 29966 6.3 973 7.2 8167 13.6 4
Maryland 2644 2.1 110548 5.5 4129 5.9 35235 12.5 4
Massachusetts 3824 2.3 201121 7 9360 8 64634 14.8 3
Michigan 3343 1.5 224455 6 11577 8.7 100197 15.3 7
Minnesota 1792 1.3 93147 4.1 4466 5.6 26050 7.3 2
Missisippi 604 1.1 25186 2.9 714 3.2 5905 5 3
Missouri 1909 1.4 96703 4.3 4025 5.6 42666 11.9 3
Montana 228 0.7 4723 1.6 131 1.8 1528 4.2 3
Nebraska 466 1 19408 2.7 628 3 4712 4.4 2
Nevada 808 1.6 35655 3.8 1652 5.7 7271 6.1 2
New Hampshire 808 2.2 41109 7.8 1743 10 9402 13 1
New Jersey 4216 1.8 255839 7.3 13992 10 130833 20.1 5
New Mexico 494 1.2 12805 2.3 441 3 2689 3.7 2
New york 8332 1.7 462951 6.4 34155 10.7 226859 20.8 13
N. Carolina 4098 2.1 218887 7 8283 8.6 66484 13.8 6
N Dakota 182 0.9 7426 3 259 4.1 2644 7.6 2
Ohio 4663 1.8 239390 5.2 9829 6.6 90035 12.5 10
Oklahoma 774 0.9 37845 3.3 1390 4.4 10307 6.5 4
Oregon 1399 1.4 52048 4.1 2052 5 23510 11.9 4
Pennsylvania 5094 1.8 271858 5.7 12214 7.7 73823 10.2 7
Rhode Isand 520 1.9 24699 6.2 776 6.2 5538 11.5 1
S. Carolina 1950 2.1 134110 9 4918 11.6 38506 17.8 3
S. Dakota 152 0.7 4940 1.7 156 2.1 1015 2.6 1
Tennessee 2611 2.1 136827 6.2 4973 7.3 45876 12.6 6
Texas 8319 1.8 370172 4.8 18042 7 177732 12.8 31
Utah 971 1.7 35196 4.1 1355 5.5 9776 8.6 1
Vermont 310 1.5 13483 5.5 412 5.8 3247 10.2 2
Virginia 3711 2.2 150768 5.3 5775 6 36490 9.3 5
Washington 2562 1.6 90674 4.3 3959 4.9 33718 9.8 13
W. Virginia 427 1.1 24233 4.5 944 6.6 8335 11.4 2
Wisconsin 1735 1.3 106419 4.6 4276 5.9 28609 8.3 3
Wyoming 234 1.3 8661 4.8 472 9.7 3837 13.4 1
Maximum 13969 3.7 673738 9 34933 13 317446 31.2 31
Minimum 152 0.7 4723 1.6 131 1.8 1015 2.6 1
Average 2325.255 1.652941 115601.4 5.084314 5371.471 6.562745 45798.06 11.89412 4.98
Standard Deviation 2636.017 0.584244 132504.5 1.790907 7358.326 2.517933 61481.1 5.702435 5.501354
Data source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Census Bureau, FTZ Board at U.S. 
Department of Commerce
Table 5.1:  U.S. Inbounds Foreign-Owned Establishments in ALL Industries 
Discriptive Statistics, by state, 2002
Number of 
Establishments  Employment Payroll (million$) Sales (million$)
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Payroll 
(million$)
Sales 
(million$)
Num. of 
FTZ
States
Foreign-
Owned
As % of 
all US 
Est.
Foreign-
Owned
As % of 
all US 
Est.
Foreign-
Owned
Foreign-
Owned
Total 30540 2.7 655359 4.5 13173 128684 249
Alabama 433 2.2 14004 6.3 278 2901 5
Alaska 55 2.1 969 2.9 20 171 5
Arizona 528 3.1 6283 2.3 130 1235 6
Arkansas 111 0.9 968 0.7 17 170 2
California 3337 3.1 50027 3.3 1251 12110 17
Colorado 778 4.1 9172 3.7 162 1651 2
Connecticut 447 3.2 22852 11.9 479 4476 4
Delaware 111 3 2754 5.3 56 545 1
District of Columbia 44 2.3 748 4 20 147
Florida 2386 3.4 38146 4.2 715 6808 20
Georgia 990 2.9 16178 3.6 306 2941 3
Hawaii 302 6.1 5357 8.4 104 1265 1
Idaho 138 2.3 1535 2.2 29 315 1
Illinois 1097 2.5 18000 3 391 4053 8
Indiana 539 2.2 8808 2.6 193 2662 6
Iowa 246 1.8 3362 1.9 65 611 3
Kansas 194 1.6 1790 1.2 36 400 2
Kentucky 305 1.8 3446 1.6 59 664 2
Louisiana 261 1.5 5702 2.5 88 818 5
Maine 233 3.3 11624 14.5 197 2157 4
Maryland 814 4.2 29370 10.3 688 5923 4
Massachusetts 948 3.7 44860 12.5 906 8402 3
Michigan 708 1.8 16611 3.2 363 2972 7
Minnesota 434 2.1 5894 1.9 117 895 2
Missisippi 148 1.2 3499 2.6 62 571 3
Missouri 447 1.9 4029 1.3 87 841 3
Montana 44 0.9 564 1.1 10 80 3
Nebraska 115 1.4 1704 1.6 35 277 2
Nevada 248 3.4 3072 2.7 77 670 2
New Hampshire 276 4.1 11040 11.8 205 2195 1
New Jersey 827 2.4 27746 6.4 666 6287 5
New Mexico 122 1.7 1041 1.2 20 158 2
New York 1759 2.3 61574 7.3 1340 12121 13
N. Carolina 1099 3.1 35900 8.2 601 6582 6
N Dakota 56 1.6 618 1.5 11 83 2
Ohio 1565 3.7 21845 3.6 384 4508 10
Oklahoma 163 1.2 1978 1.2 40 352 4
Oregon 315 2.2 3158 1.7 70 1053 4
Pennsylvania 1100 2.3 29788 4.5 513 4709 7
Rhode Island 140 3.4 6979 13.8 141 1373 1
S. Carolina 600 3.3 17958 8.4 293 3038 3
S. Dakota 42 1 579 1.2 10 88 1
Tennessee 908 3.8 14906 4.9 250 2592 6
Texas 1714 2.3 20320 2 419 3837 31
Utah 356 4.4 4087 3.4 58 632 1
Vermont 125 3.2 3834 9.6 71 733 2
Virginia 1632 5.6 40533 10.1 743 7743 5
Washington 673 3 8682 2.9 176 1803 13
W. Virginia 122 1.6 2223 2.5 35 378 2
Wisconsin 447 2.1 8742 2.8 180 1593 3
Wyoming 58 2 500 1.7 8 98 1
Maximum 3337 6.1 61574 14.5 1340 12121 31
Minimum 42 0.9 500 0.7 8 80 1
Average 598.8235 2.633333 12850.18 4.588235 258.3333 2523.275 4.98
Standard Deviation 659.9098 1.125641 14624.08 3.729914 311.9327 2953.443 5.50135419
Data source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Census Bureau, 
FTZ Board at U.S. Department of Commerce
Table 5.2: U.S. Inbound Foreign-Owned Establishments in Retail Trade Industry 
Descriptive Statistics, by state, 2002
Number of 
Establishments  Employment 
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